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SURVEY
Deference Defiantly Denied: The Fourth Circuit Rejects
NLRB Position on § 8(f) Pre-hire Agreements in Industrial
TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB
In the celebrated opinion of Marbury v. Madison,1 the United
States Supreme Court announced that "[i]t is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department, to say what the law is."'
It has been suggested, however, that this statement is only accurate if
qualified as follows: "until and unless the agency charged with
administering the law changes its mind."3 This added proviso has not
yet attained a revered status similar to the Court's pronouncement in
Marbury.4 Nonetheless, it has been fourteen years since the Supreme
Court held in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. ("Chevron")5 that reasonable interpretations of
ambiguous statutes by an agency charged with administering that
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
2. Id. at 177.
3. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1146 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (claiming that the majority's
opinion had effectively added the second phrase as a codicil to the famous quote from
Marbury).
4. Compare Steven Breker-Cooper, The Appointments Clause and the Removal
Power: Theory and Seance, 60 TENN. L. REv. 841, 843 (1993) (calling Marbury the
"seminal case in American constitutional law, which is most often cited for its famed
epigram"), and Sanford N. Claust-Ellenbogen, Blank Checks: Restoring the Balance of
Power in the Post-Chevron Era, 32 B.C. L. REV. 757, 787 (1991) (stating that there is
"nothing more fundamental to our understanding of the Constitution"), and Maxwell
Steams, Mistretta Versus Marbury: The Foundations of Judicial Review, 74 TEx. L. REV.
1281, 1281 (1996) (noting that "nearly every casebook on [constitutional law] begins with
Marbury v. Madison"), with Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1149 (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(observing that he "can only hope that the Court will have occasion for sober reflection
on the wisdom of the approach taken by our court today," where the Ninth Circuit
deferred to an agency interpretation), and 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J.
PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3.3, at 112 (3d ed. 1994) (noting that
understanding the doctrine of deference to agencies "requires acceptance of a reality
courts have often denied"), and Rebecca Hanner White, Time for a New Approach: Why
the Judiciary Should Disregard the "Law of the Circuit" When Confronting
Nonacquiescence by the National Labor Relations Board, 69 N.C. L. REV. 639, 650 (1991)
(noting that courts are reluctant to recognize the Supreme Court's command that
agencies "have a duty and the authority to say what the law is").
5. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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statute are entitled to deference by the courts.6 While Chevron has
worked effectively to eliminate inconsistent interpretations of
statutes between different courts 7 application of Chevron can be
problematic when the policy of deference to agency interpretations
conflicts with the principles of stare decisis.8 In such a situation, a
court is faced with choosing between judicial precedent that
interprets a statute in one way and a different agency interpretation
of that same statute.9
A panel of the Fourth Circuit recently encountered such a
conflict. In Industrial TurnAround Corp. v. NLRB, 0 the panel
reviewed an order of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"
or "Board") premised in part on the NLRB's interpretation of § 8(f)
of the National Labor Relations Act (the "Act")." The NLRB's
interpretation stated that collective bargaining agreements entered
into under § 8(f) could not be unilaterally revoked by either party.
1 2
Although a majority of the circuit courts of appeal had accepted this
interpretation,' 3 the Fourth Circuit rejected it, concluding that it was
bound by prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit precedent." The
court in Industrial TurnAround determined that § 8(f) agreements
are voidable at will in the Fourth Circuit and remanded the case to
the NLRB to revise its order accordingly."
This Note first examines the history of Industrial TurnAround in
6. See id. at 842-43.
7. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 3.4, at 117-18. During the five years
following Chevron, the number of petitions for writs of certiorari filed by the Solicitor
General declined from sixty to thirty. See 1 id. § 3.4, at 118. Richard Stewart, while
serving as Assistant Attorney General for Public Lands and Natural Resources, attributes
this decline "primarily to the reduction in serious intercircuit conflicts that Chevron has
yielded." I id.
8. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J.
2225,2232-33 (1997); Ursula M. McDonnell, Comment, Deference to NLRB Adjudicatory
Decision Making: Has Judicial Review Become Meaningless?, 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 653, 653
(1989).
9. See Pierce, supra note 8, at 2234-35.
10. 115 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1997).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988). Section 8(f) permits collective bargaining agreements
in the construction industry. See id.; infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text (describing
the provisions of § 8(f)).
12. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 253.
13. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
14. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254-55 (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd,
461 U.S. 260 (1983); Clark v. Ryan, 818 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1987)).
15. See id. at 255-56. Remand was necessary so that the NLRB could revise the
remedy it had proposed for violations of the Act based on the incorrect interpretation of
§ 8(f). See id. at 255.
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the NLRB and the Fourth Circuit. 6 After exploring the dictates of
Chevron, which requires deference to administrative agency
decisions,'17 the Note examines the history of § 8(f) and the NLRB's
interpretation of that section. 8  It then reviews the different
approaches that the circuit courts of appeal have used to evaluate the
NLRB's interpretations of § 8(f).1 9 The Note thereafter discusses the
significance of Industrial TurnAround in light of this history.20 The
Note suggests that the Fourth Circuit's rejection of the NLRB's
position is questionable and that the difficulties of its application may
make the issue ripe for future review by the Supreme Court.2'
Finally, from a broader perspective, the Note concludes that the
outcome of Industrial TurnAround may be fueled by unrest among
the courts over their role in the administrative state.22
Industrial TurnAround Corporation ("ITAC") is an electrical
construction firm in Virginia. As a unionized employer, ITAC gave
the National Electrical Contractors Association ("NECA") the
power to negotiate collective bargaining agreements on its behalf.24
When ITAC gave this authorization to NECA in 1990, NECA
already had an agreement with the International Brotherhood of
Electrical Workers, Local 666, AFL-CIO ("the Union"), pursuant to
§ 8(f) of the Act which allows such collective bargaining agreements
in the construction industry.' By its terms, this agreement with the
Union expired on August 31, 1992.26 In November 1992, after the
agreement had expired, the President of ITAC incorporated
Electrical/Mechanical Services, Inc. ("EMSI") as a nonunion
company to perform electrical construction work 7 Thereafter,
ITAC stopped bidding for new jobs and gradually transferred all of
its construction work to EMSI. ITAC eventually laid off its last
16. See infra notes 23-64 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 74-122 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 123-78 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 179-224 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 179-217 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 218-24 and accompanying text.
23. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 250. ITAC was incorporated in 1988 as a
"design engineering and project management company," but it began to do electrical
construction work in 1990. Industrial TurnAround Corp., 321 N.L.R.B. 181, 184 (1996),
enforcement denied, 115 F.3d 248 (4th Cir. 1997).
24. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 250.
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988).
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union employees, who were then offered nonunion jobs by EMSI
which they declined.29 EMSI also informed other union workers that
it was not currently hiring.0
In January 1993, NECA signed a new collective bargaining
agreement (the "1992-94 agreement") with the Union that was
retroactive to the date of expiration of the prior agreement and was
to last through August 31, 1994.31 On May 6, 1993, however, ITAC
told both NECA and the Union via letter that it was revoking its
agreements with them.' As a result of these foregoing events, the
Union filed charges with the NLRB on March 19 and September 20,
1993, against ITAC, "alleging that ITAC and EMSI were alter egos
and that the companies had violated § 8(a)(1), (a)(3) and (a)(5) of
the Act. '33 The Administrative Law Judge ("AU") held that there
were multiple violations of the Act, including a violation of § 8(a)(5),
because: (1) ITAC had created EMSI as an alter ego of ITAC; and
(2) ITAC had wrongly repudiated the 1992-94 agreement. 4
29. See id.
30. See id. at 250-51.
31. See id. at 251.
32. See idL
33. Id. The cited sections describe "unfair labor practices" of employers. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 158(a)(1), (a)(3), & (a)(5) (1988). Section 8(a)(1) of the Act covers interference,
restraint, or coercion of the exercise of guaranteed rights of employees. See id.
§ 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice to discriminate "in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term of condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization." Id. § 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(5)
includes the refusal "to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees."
Id. § 158(a)(5). Violations of these sections are subject to action by the NLRB and an
NLRB order can be enforced by petition of the NLRB to a court of appeals. See id.
§ 160(a), (e).
Some observers might believe Industrial TurnAround provides an example of
questionable employer tactics for dealing with unions. Cf. C.E.K. Indus. Mechanical
Contractors v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350,353-55 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding the NLRB's finding
of alter-ego status between two employers); Z-BRO, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 87, 89-90 (1990)
(finding that three companies were actually one entity where they all had "virtually the
same name," the names were used interchangeably, and employers claimed that one of
the three companies had ceased to exist). It should be pointed out, however, that ITAC
and EMSI started these actions after the original NECA agreement expired in August
1992. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 250. Apparently, once the 1992-94
agreement went into effect retroactively, those actions became retroactively illegal. See
id. at 252-53. If ITAC could have foreseen this possibility, perhaps they would have made
clear to both NECA and the union, prior to the signing of the 1992-94 agreement, that
they were withdrawing from any obligations they might have had.
34. See Industrial TurnAround Corp., 321 N.L.R.B. 181, 188 (1996). ITAC's
President, Sidney Harrison, was apparently told by his construction manager that he could
start a nonunion company to save labor costs but that he could not own it. See id. at 184.
Glenn Harrison, Sidney's wife, was installed as the sole shareholder and director of EMSI
although she had no role in its management. See id. at 185. Furthermore, all the funds for
2334 [Vol. 76
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Thereafter, the NLRB issued an order adopting both the ALJ's
findings of fact and recommended remedy.35 Among other actions,
the remedy required ITAC to pay lost wages and benefits to
discharged union employees, to offer jobs to union employees who
were denied employment, and to comply with the terms of the 1992-
94 agreement. 6
After the NLRB issued its decision, ITAC appealed to the
Fourth Circuity.3  The NLRB in turn cross-petitioned for enforcement
of its order. 8 Judge Williams wrote the opinion for the panel, which
included Judge Luttig and Senior Judge Clarke. The court began its
analysis by presenting the proper standards of review.4" First, the
court noted that findings of fact are " 'conclusive' if supported by
'substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole.' "41
Second, the court observed that although questions of law are
normally reviewed de novo, the "NLRB's interpretation of the Act is
entitled to deference if it is reasonably defensible.
42
The court accepted the NLRB's finding that EMSI and ITAC
were alter egos and were bound by the terms of the 1992-94
agreement.43 The court, however, disposed of ITAC's claim that if it
this investment were provided by a payment from ITAC to Sidney. See id. After
examining all the facts, the AU found that ITAC and EMSI had" 'substantially identical'
business purpose, operations, equipment, customers, management, supervision, and
ownership," therefore meeting the test for a finding of alter egos. Id. at 187 (quoting
Crawford Door Sales Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 1144,1144 (1976)).
As to the repudiation of the 1992-94 agreement, the ALJ found that ITAC's letter of
May 6, 1993, was the first notice that ITAC was withdrawing from NECA's 1992-94
agreement. See id. at 184. The ALJ also noted that because the agreement was effective
by its terms through August 31, 1994, ITAC's obligations did not cease until that date.
See id.
35. See id. at 181.
36. See id. at 182.
37. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 249. To be precise, both ITAC and EMSI
filed an appeal of the NLRB's decision, but they were represented by the same counsel.
See Opening Brief for Petitioners at 21, Industrial TurnAround (Nos. 96-1783 & 96-1926).
38. See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 1, Industrial TurnAround
(Nos. 96-1783 & 96-1926). The NLRB has no individual power to enforce its decisions
and must obtain a judicial decision if a party subject to an order refuses to comply. See 29
U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1988); White, supra note 4, at 642.
39. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 249-50. Judge Clark, a district judge for
the Eastern District of Virginia, sat by designation. See id. at 249.
40. See id. at 251.
41. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 160(e) (West 1973)). This standard is the usual
standard of review for factual findings of agency decisions as set forth in Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474,493 (1951).
42. Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 251 (citing Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 116
S. Ct. 1396,1406 (1996)).
43. See id. at 252-53.
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was bound by the agreement, the agreement was unenforceable
under the Act because the bargaining unit improperly included
supervisors.' The court noted that because ITAC's bargaining agent,
NECA, had agreed to the inclusion of supervisors in the bargaining
unit, ITAC could be bound by that voluntary agreement.45 Based on
these findings, the court agreed with the NLRB that ITAC's
incorporation of EMSI followed by its refusal to employ union
workers violated § 8(a)(1), (a)(3), and (a)(5) of the Act. 6
The Fourth Circuit also agreed with the NLRB's finding that
ITAC had repudiated the letter of assent with NECA and the 1992-
94 agreement with the Union on May 6, 1993. 4 The court noted that
this repudiation served as a basis for the AD's conclusion that
§ 8(a)(5) had been violated and, therefore, was a factor in fashioning
the proposed remedy.48 The court next addressed the effect of the
repudiation on the violations under § 8(a)(5) of the Act.49 The court
observed that the AUJ's conclusion was premised on the NLRB's
decision in John Deklewa & Sons, Inc. ("Deklewa"),5° which held that
§ 8(f) bargaining agreements could not be unilaterally revoked.51
However, Judge Williams pointed out that under the NLRB's
interpretation of § 8(f) before Deklewa, such agreements could be
terminated by either party at any time if the Union did not yet have
44. See id. at 253; Opening Brief for Petitioners at 8, Industrial TurnAround (Nos. 96-
1783 & 96-1926). The Act provides that "no employer ... shall be compelled to deem
individuals defined herein as supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law ...
relating to collective bargaining." 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (1993). This decision to exclude
supervisors from bargaining units allows employees to organize without interference with
their overseers, whose interests may be more aligned with those of employers. See E.I.
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 395, 397 (1974). An employer's designation of
employees as supervisors is not binding on a court. See Richard A. Kaminsky, Overview
of the Law, and the Basic Manufacturing Unit, in APPROPRIATE UNITS FOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 1, 14-15 (Peter G. Nash & George P. Blake eds., 1979).
45. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 253. The court noted that the NLRB's
position-that a voluntary agreement to include supervisors is enforceable-is a
reasonably defensible interpretation of the Act. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. It seems strange that May 6 was found to be the date of repudiation,
because the union filed its first charges on March 19, 1993, which suggests that ITAC had
already breached any agreement at that point. See id. at 251. Nevertheless, the
notification in writing on May 6 was clear evidence of repudiation in the record for the
court to use as a fixed date.
48. See id. at 253.
49. See id.
50. 282 N.L.R.B. 1375 (1987), enforced sub nom. International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770 (3d Cir. 1988).
51. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 253; Deklewa, 843 F.2d at 779-80.
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majority status within the bargaining unit. 2 She observed that this
prior interpretation had been accepted first by the Supreme Court
5 3
and then later adopted by the Fourth Circuit 4 Despite the court's
recognition that several circuits have chosen to follow Deklewa,55 the
court held that Deklewa was not controlling in the Fourth Circuit and
consequently, the AJ had applied the wrong standard 6.5  The court
"emphasize[d] ... that federal agencies, including the NLRB, are
'required to abide by the law of this Circuit ... until and unless it is
changed by this court or reversed by the Supreme Court of the
United States.' 57
The court then stated that because one panel of the circuit
cannot overrule a prior panel decision, it could not apply Deklewa
because Deklewa was in conflict with Clark. Judge Williams
observed that Clark "unequivocally held" that § 8(f) agreements
could be revoked at any time, and that Clark was based on the
Supreme Court's holding in Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd ("McNeff')
59
that such agreements are revocable before a union reaches majority
52. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 253-54 (citing R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 695 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom. Local No. 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). Majority status means that a
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit have, at some point, voted to recognize a
union. See 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1994).
53. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254 (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461
U.S. 250,269-70 (1983)).
54. See id. (citing Clark v. Ryan, 818 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1987)).
55. See id. The court did not discuss the reasoning of the decisions in other circuits
and relegated the citations of them to a footnote. See id. at 254 n.2.
56. See id. at 254. Judge Williams noted that "the AI (and the NLRB) apparently
assumed that Deklewa was the controlling law of this Circuit." Id. The brief for the
NLRB relied on Deklewa and also cited the decisions of other circuits that were in accord
with its decision, but did not address or intimate in any way that Deklewa might not apply.
See Brief for the National Labor Relations Board at 16-17, Industrial TurnAround (Nos.
96-1783 & 96-1926). Though not mentioned by the court, even ITAC did not challenge
the rule of Deklewa. ITAC's brief cites Deklewa in support of some of its arguments. See
Opening Brief for Petitioners at 12, 13-14, Industrial TurnAround (Nos. 96-1783 & 96-
1926). Judge Williams, however, was probably aware of the lurking Deklewa issue.
Three months before the Industrial TurnAround decision was issued, the Fourth Circuit
handed down an unreported per curiam decision in NLRB v. Baker, Nos. 96-1377 & 96-
1548, 1997 WL 5771 (4th Cir. Jan. 8, 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 688 (1998). Judge
Williams sat on that panel, which observed in a footnote that although it did not change
the result of the case, Clark (and not Deklewa) was controlling. See 1997 WL 5771, at *9
n.3. Perhaps the NLRB's failure to note the possible conflict raised by Clark in turn
raised the ire of the court.
57. Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254 (quoting United States Dep't of Energy v.
FLRA, 106 F.3d 1158, 1165 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring)).
58. See id.
59. 461 U.S. 260, 269-70 (1983).
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status." Furthermore, she observed that neither Clark nor McNeff
mentioned deference to NLRB interpretations of the Act or the
concept that the NLRB's Deklewa position was a defensible
construction of the Act that could be changed.61 In support of this
conclusion, the court noted that two prior panels in different circuits
had refused to apply Deklewa because of conflicting circuit
precedent.6' Proceeding to apply the pre-Deklewa interpretation of
§ 8(f) as approved in Clark v. Ryan, the court held that ITAC had
properly repudiated the § 8(f) agreement on May 6, 1993.63 Because
the ALJ's remedy was based on a finding that this repudiation was
improper, the court remanded the case so that the remedy could be
revised to address only those violations that occurred before
repudiation.64
To analyze Industrial TurnAround properly, an understanding of
the general role of courts regarding interpretations of agency-
administered statutes is essential. The Supreme Court's 1984
decision in Chevron affirmed and explained the practice of
deferential judicial review of such statutes.65 Chevron set forth a two-
step approach for judicial review of agency actions. First, a court
must determine if Congress "has directly spoken to the precise
question at issue."66 If so, the inquiry ends, and the court and the
agency involved must effectuate Congress's clear intent.67 If the
applicable statute does not speak to the precise issue, however, then
the court must determine whether the agency's construction of the
statute is permissible.
Chevron was based on the understanding that Congress cannot
60. Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 254-55 (citing Local Union 48 Sheet Metal Workers v. S.L. Pappas &
Co., 106 F.3d 970, 975 (11th Cir. 1997); Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist.
Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 832 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir.
1987), reheard en banc, 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988)).
63. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 255.
64. See id.
65. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984); see also 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 3.2, at 109-10 ("Chevron is one of
the most important decisions in the history of administrative law."). Prior to Chevron,
courts were unsure of the applicable standard of review. See 1 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra
note 4, § 3.1, at 107-09.
66. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
67. See id. at 842-43.
68. See id. at 843. This means that a court should "not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative
interpretation." Id.
2338 [Vol. 76
1998] JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCIES 2339
anticipate and provide for all issues that may arise under a statute.69
The two-step test of Chevron allows Congress to delegate resolution
of all disputes that may arise under a statute to an agency.70 Courts
have interpreted agency-administered statutes more consistently
nationwide as a result of Chevron.71 In the area of labor relations,
Chevron reaffirms the Court's prior command in NLRB v. Hearst
Publications7 that lower courts should pay heed to the NLRB's
policy choices.73 In light of this review of Chevron, an examination of
the long history of § 8(f)-the section of the Act at issue in Industrial
TurnAround74 -is appropriate.
Section 8(f), enacted as part of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959,75.authorizes pre-hire collective
bargaining agreements in the construction industry.76 In 1935,
69. See I DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 3.3, at 112 (noting a number of reasons-
"inadequate expertise, inadequate time, inadequate foresight, or problems inherent in
collective decisionmaking"-that cause Congress to leave some questions unanswered).
70. See 1 id. The Chevron Court thought it appropriate that the executive branch
agencies make these policy decisions because they are more directly accountable to the
people than are judges. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
71. See 1 DAvIS & PIERCE, supra note 4, § 3.4, at 117. This consistency is important
because the only method of resolving conflicting circuit court decisions is through the
Supreme Court, which has limited capacity to tackle such a task. See 1 id.; see also Peter
L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's
Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1105
(1987) (noting that "the infrequency of Supreme Court review combines with the formal
independence of each circuit's law from that of the other circuits to permit a gradual
balkanization of federal law").
72. 322 U.S. 111 (1944).
73. See id. at 131 (noting that "where the question is one of specific application of a
broad statutory term in a proceeding in which the agency administering the statute must
determine it initially, the reviewing court's function is limited"). The Hearst Court
further stated that "the Board's determination.., under this Act is to be accepted if it has
'warrant in the record' and a reasonable basis in law." Id. Commentators have suggested
that Chevron is an adoption of the model set forth in Hearst. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr.,
Chevron and Its Aftermath: Judicial Review of Agency Interpretations of Statutory
Provisions, 41 VAND. L. REV. 301, 311 (1988); Strauss, supra note 71, at 1120; White,
supra note 4, at 655. In fact, there is some evidence that the Court did not think its
Chevron holding was groundbreaking at all. See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law
in the Supreme Court: Highlights from the Marshall Papers, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,606, 10,613 (1993) (noting that the papers of Justice Thurgood Marshall
"indicate that the decision was reached without any significant debate"). Nonetheless,
Chevron is now the most cited decision in administrative law. Search of WESTLAW
(Feb. 10, 1997) (yielding 7207 citations to Chevron in a Shepard's search); see also PETER
L. STRAUSS ET AL., GELLHORN AND BYSE'S ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 620-21 (9th ed. 1995) (collecting "[s]oundbites" on the importance of
Chevron).
74. See Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 252-55.
75. Pub. L. No. 86-257,73 Stat. 519 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1988)).
76. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988).
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Congress passed the Wagner Act,77 under which the NLRB did not
assert jurisdiction over the construction industry because of the
occasional nature of its employment relationships and because the
industry was already substantially unionized and therefore did not
need protection.78 The NLRB eventually began to assert power over
the construction industry,79  which created problems because
construction employers would customarily enter into bargaining
agreements for future periods of one to three years and would apply
these agreements to jobs not yet created." This practice of entering
into collective bargaining agreements regarding future employment
did not mesh with the interpretation of the Wagner Act that a union
can only make valid bargaining contracts once "a representative
number of employees have been hired."'" Consequently, a series of
NLRB decisions held that these pre-hire construction agreements
were illegal and unenforceable.'
In order to legitimate these pre-hire agreements, Congress
enacted § 8(f). 83 Section 8(f) states in relevant part that it is not an
77. Wagner Act of 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1988)). Enacted in response to a negative view of unions by the
judiciary, the Wagner Act also served as protection for the right to organize. See Lee
Modjeska, The NLRB Litigational Processes: A Response to Chairman Dotson, 23 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 399, 401 (1988).
78. See SENATE COMM. ON LABOR & PUB. WELFARE, LABOR-MANAGEMENT
REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, S. REP. No. 86-187, at 10 (1959), reprinted
in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2318, 2344, and in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT OF 1959, at 397 (1959); see
also Johns-Manville Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 1, 2 (1945) (declining to exert jurisdiction over a
construction company because "the policies of the Act will not be effectuated by the
assumption of jurisdiction in this case"). In fact, the election procedures of the Act were
designed with a stable work force in mind, unlike the situation of the construction
industry. See Vincent J. Apruzzese, The Construction Industry, in APPROPRIATE UNITS
FOR COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, supra note 44, at 105-06.
79. See, e.g., Local 74, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, 80 N.L.R.B. 533, 534
(1948) (exercising jurisdiction); Ozark Dam Constructors, 77 N.L.R.B. 1136, 1138 (1948)
(stating that the NLRB's "abstention from exercising [its] jurisdiction in construction
cases was a matter of administrative choice").
80. See S. REP. No. 86-187, at 12, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344.
81. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344. According to the Senate
Report, these practices were followed so that an employer could determine its labor costs
prior to estimating bids for contracts and also so that a ready supply of skilled labor would
be available. See id. at 9-11, reprinted in 1959 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2344-45.
82. See, e.g., Chicago Freight Car & Parts Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1163, 1165 (1949) (holding
that the agreement was invalid because it was entered into before an appropriate
bargaining unit had been created); Daniel Hamm Drayage Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 458, 460
(1949) (refusing to allow pre-hire agreements as an exception for "general custom and
practice in the construction industry").
83. See Labor-Management Report and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257,
§ 705, 73 Stat. 519 (currently National Labor Relations Act § 8(f) and codified at 29
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unfair labor practice for an employer in the construction industry to
enter into bargaining agreements "covering employees engaged (or
who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the building and
construction industry with a labor organization ... because (1) the
majority status of such labor organization has not been established."
' 4
However, Congress did include a limit to the power of such
agreements. The statute provides that "any agreement which would
be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a
petition filed pursuant to section 9(c) or 9(e)." 5 Subsections 9(c) and
9(e) allow an employer to file a petition challenging the majority
status of a union and allow an election to be conducted to determine
majority status.86  Absent this proviso, an employer in the
construction industry could not challenge the majority status of a
union without first waiting twelve months after a valid election. 8 On
its face, the statute does not address whether pre-hire agreements are
U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988)). Although § 8(f) was not adopted until 1959, members of
Congress had attempted to address the problems that § 8(f) addressed soon after they
arose. During the debate of § 8(f), then-Senator John F. Kennedy noted that the section
was substantially similar to a bill first introduced in 1951 and a later bill adopted by the
Senate in 1954. See 1 NLRB, supra note 78, at 1070.
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1988). The full text of the statute is as follows:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this
section for an employer engaged primarily in the building and construction
industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a
labor organization of which building and construction employees are members
(not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in section 8(a) of
this Act [subsec. (a) of this section] as an unfair labor practice) because (1) the
majority status of such labor organization has not been established under the
provisions of section 9 of this Act [29 U.S.C. § 159] prior to the making of such
agreement, or (2) such agreement requires as a condition of employment,
membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the
beginning of such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever
is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer to notify such labor
organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives such
labor organization an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such
employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or experience
qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for
employment based upon length of service with such employer, in the industry or
in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this subsection
shall set aside the final proviso to section 8(a)(3) of this Act [subsec. (a)(3) of
this section]: Provided further, That any agreement which would be invalid, but
for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to
section 9(c) or 9(e) [codifed at 29 U.S.C.S. § 159(c) or (e)].
Id. (alteration in original).
85. Id.
86. See id. § 159(c), (e).
87. See id. § 159(c)(3).
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enforceable.'
Under its first interpretation of § 8(f), the NLRB did not allow
employers to challenge the majority status of a union covered by a
pre-hire agreement, thereby prohibiting an employer from freely
repudiating a pre-hire agreement. 9 In 1971, however, the NLRB
held that such agreements were subject to unilateral repudiation in
R.J. Smith Construction Co.90 In this case, the NLRB noted that the
proviso of § 8(f) explicitly allows the majority status of a union to be
tested at any point after employees have been hired.91 The NLRB
reasoned that because such a test could occur at any time, "it would
be anomalous, indeed, to hold that Section 8(f) prohibits examination
of those questions in the litigation of refusal-to-bargain charges."
9
This decision allowed an employer to challenge majority status of a
union in order to rebut charges of unfair labor practices from
violation of a § 8(f) agreement.93
This voidable-at-will interpretation of § 8(f) did not meet with
immediate success in the courts. In fact, the D.C. Circuit denied
enforcement of R.J. Smith because it believed that Congress's
88. See id. § 158(f).
89. See Bricklayers Local No. 3, 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 477-79 (1966), enforced, 405 F.2d
469 (9th Cir. 1968); Oilfield Maintenance Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1384, 1387 & n.10 (1963).
90. 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of
Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In R.J. Smith, for the first
seven months after a § 8(f) agreement was signed, the employer failed to pay the wage
levels specified in the contract or contribute to employee welfare funds. See id. at 693.
The employer then raised wages, but still not up to the contract rate. See id. The
employer also fired the two existing union members and then later rehired them at the
contract wages while withholding those contract wages from all nonunion employees. See
id. The union complained that the refusal to bargain and the various wage changes
without notice were unfair labor practices under the Act. See id. The trial examiner
rejected these claims primarily because she found that the union had never achieved
majority representation of the company's employees during the time that the bargaining
agreement had been in effect. See id.
91. See id. at 694.
92 Id. Also, in Ruttman Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971), a companion
case to R.J. Smith, the NLRB stated that a § 8(f) agreement is a "preliminary step that
contemplates further action for the development of a full bargaining relationship." Id. at
702.
93. Board Members Fanning and Brown dissented from the decision. See R.J. Smith,
191 N.L.R.B. at 695 (Fanning, M. & Brown, M., dissenting). They noted that by
"declining to find that a rejection of such agreement is a refusal to bargain, our colleagues
are saying that Congress permitted such pre-hire contracts without intending them to
have any effect." Id. (Fanning, M. & Brown, M., dissenting). The dissenters also
questioned how the interpretation would advance the Act's goal of promoting industrial
peace and stability, and they could discern no congressional intent to modify the
requirements of good-faith bargaining by adoption of § 8(f). See id. at 696 (Fanning, M.
& Brown M., dissenting).
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purpose could not be to legitimate pre-hire agreements and also
make them voidable-at-will.94 The D.C. Circuit reasoned that
Congress would not pass a statute allowing minority pre-hire
agreements while allowing them to be unenforceable. 9 Yet despite
such arguments, the NLRB maintained its stance in its 1975 decision
in Iron Workers Local 103 ("Higdon"),96 which was again rejected by
the D.C. Circuit.97 This time, however, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari 9 and upheld the NLRB interpretation.99
In Higdon, the Supreme Court noted that the NLRB's
determination of the various claims represented a "defensible
construction of the statute and [was] entitled to considerable
deference."'' 0 The Court also recognized that while lower courts
"may prefer a different application of the relevant sections[,] ...
'[t]he function of striking that balance to effectuate national labor
policy is often a difficult and delicate responsibility, which the
Congress committed primarily to the National Labor Relations
Board, subject to limited judicial review.' "101 In response to the
claim that the NLRB's decisions in Higdon and R.J. Smith
represented a break from the NLRB's earlier interpretation of § 8(f),
the Court noted that an agency "is not disqualified from changing its
mind," and that when an agency changes its position, a court cannot
94. See Local No. 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186, 1190-
91 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
95. See id. at 1190. Judge Winter, who wrote the panel opinion, stated that "we
cannot conceive of such an exercise in futility on the part of Congress as to validate a
contract with a union having minority status, but to permit its abrogation because of the
union's minority status." Id.
96. Iron Workers Local 103 (Higdon Contracting Co.), 216 N.L.R.B. 45, 46 (1975),
enforcement denied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub nom. NLRB v.
Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434
U.S. 335 (1978).
97. See Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers v. NLRB, 535 F.2d 87, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub nom., 434
U.S. 335 (1978). Disposing of the case, the D.C. Circuit noted that "[i]t is clear enough
that the Board was-and is-unhappy with this court's opinion in [R.J. Smith]." Id. at 88.
However, the court noted that although the NLRB had not appealed or sought en bane
review of that decision, it was requesting its overruling in the instant case. See id.
98. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977).
99. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335,341 (1978). Justice White authored the majority
opinion, see id. at 336, while Justice Stewart wrote a dissent in which Justices Blackmun
and Stevens joined. See id. at 352 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 350.
101. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 353 U.S. 87, 96 (1957)).
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review statutory constructions de novo.'02 Finally, with regard to the
Court's view on administrative deference, the Court "concluded that
the Board's construction of the Act, although perhaps not the only
tenable one, is an acceptable reading of the statutory language and a
reasonable implementation of the purposes of the relevant statutory
sections."'103
The Supreme Court commented on the interpretation of § 8(f)
again in Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd ("McNeff ').t11 The issue before
the Court in McNeff was whether monetary obligations owed under a
§ 8(f) agreement before it was revoked could be enforced under the
Labor-Management Relations Act.10 5 The Court first reaffirmed its
holding in Higdon, noting that Higdon approved the NLRB's
determination that pre-hire agreements are voidable until a union
obtains majority support.106 Thereafter, the tone of the opinion
became more authoritative on the interpretation of § 8(f). The Court
referred to its "fidelity to Congress'[s] intent that pre-hire
agreements be voluntary-and voidable,"1°7 and the "undoubted right
to repudiate a pre-hire agreement before the union attains majority
support."'' ° Later in the opinion, the Court noted that, until the
union establishes majority status, § 8(f) pre-hire agreements remain
subject to repudiation. 0 9 Despite the limited, but binding effect of
pre-hire agreements, the Court noted that it was illogical to claim
that a party to such agreements can obtain the benefits of them and
then refuse to pay for them.110
Following the Supreme Court decisions in Higdon and McNeff,
the Fourth Circuit addressed the voidable interpretation of § 8(f) in
Clark v. Ryan."' The case arose in an attempt by a union to recover
102. Id. at 351.
103. Id. at 341. While the majority's opinion seemed to give considerable deference to
the NLRB's view, the dissent was not inclined to do the same. See id. at 353 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stewart suggested that "[w]hen an employer in the construction
industry does choose to enter a § 8(f) pre-hire agreement, there is nothing in the
provisions or policies of national labor law that allows the employer, or the Board, to
dismiss the agreement as a nullity." Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
104. 461 U.S. 260 (1983).
105. See id. at 262. The provision at issue was § 301 of the Labor-Management
Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1993).
106. See McNeff, 461 U.S. at 269 (referring to and quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 270.
109. See id. at 271.
110. See id. Chief Justice Burger observed that "[h]aving had the music, [the
employer] must pay the piper." Id.
111. 818 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1987). Judge Wilkinson wrote the majority opinion, which
Judge Ervin joined. See id. at 1103. Judge Wilkins wrote an opinion concurring in part
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unpaid trust fund contributions that the employer was to make for
nonunion employees." 2 The court referenced both Higdon and
McNeff but cited only McNeff for the proposition that pre-hire
agreements could be ended at any time so long as the union has not
attained majority representation status." 3  The court, however,
observed that it could not tell from the record (1) if the employer was
in the construction industry and subject to § 8(f); or (2) when
repudiation of such an agreement would have occurred."' Therefore,
it remanded the case for further findings."'
While the NLRB interpretation of § 8(f) was consistent for
sixteen years after the 1971 decision in R.J. Smith, the NLRB's 1987
decision in Deklewa marked an about-face. In Deklewa, the NLRB
expressly overruled R.J. Smith and held that § 8(f) agreements are
enforceable." 6 The NLRB found three flaws with the interpretation
of § 8(f) under R.J. Smith: (1) that it "does not fully square with
either 8(f)'s legislative history or that section's actual wording";1 7 (2)
and dissenting in part. See id. at 1107 (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
112. See id. at 1104.
113. See id. at 1107 (citing McNeff, 461 U.S. at 271).
114. See id.
115. See id. Judge Wilkins concurred in the decision to remand to determine whether
the agreement in issue was a § 8(f) agreement and when repudiation in fact occurred. See
id. (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissenting part of his
opinion only addressed whether the agreement clearly required the employer to make
trust fund payments for both union and nonunion employees. See id. at 1107-08 (Wilkins,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). For a discussion of the result of Clark on
remand, see infra notes 191-96 and accompanying text.
116. See John Deklewa & Sons, Inc., 282 N.L.R.B. 1375, 1377, enforced sub nom.,
International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d
770 (3d Cir. 1988). The complete reversal of the NLRB's position is evidenced by its
statement that "[w]e now find ourselves in fundamental agreement with the common-
sensical pre-Higdon view expressed by the District of Columbia Circuit, in denying
enforcement to R.J. Smith ... , that Congress intended to permit 8(f) bargaining
representatives to enforce their contracts." Id. at 1387-88.
Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit's endorsement of the voidable-at-will interpretation
of § 8(f) in Clark was actually handed down almost three months after the NLRB decided
Deklewa. Compare Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1375 (decided Feb. 20, 1987), with Clark,
818 F.2d at 1102 (decided May 15, 1987). Apparently, the Union in Clark could not raise
Deklewa, as oral argument occurred in Clark in December 1986. See Clark, 818 F.2d at
1102.
117. Deklewa, 232 N.L.R.B. at 1380. The NLRB noted that § 8(f) "specifically
sanctioned the established industry practices that the NLRB had previously found
unlawful." Id. (referring to the fact that § 8(f) allows pre-hire agreements and also
approves other bargaining customs of the construction industry). However, the NLRB
noted that the proviso to § 8(f) allowing tests of majority status was meant to protect the
free choice of workers. See id. at 1380-81. Looking at the analysis of R.J. Smith, the
NLRB commented that the "lynchpin" of the brief reasoning in that case was that the
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that it "inadequately serves the fundamental statutory objectives of
employee free choice and labor relations stability";"" and (3) that
"frustration of statutory policies is increased because of ...
administrative and litigational difficulties.' 1 9 The NLRB did not see
its new interpretation as inconsistent with the Supreme Court
decisions in Higdon or McNeffY It quoted the Court's language in
Higdon that "the previous interpretation was 'acceptable' yet
'perhaps not the only tenable one.' "12 The NLRB also noted that
the new interpretation would more successfully accomplish
Congress's intent to stabilize the construction industry and protect
employee choice."
The Third Circuit heard the appeal of Deklewa and upheld the
new interpretation of § 8(f).afl The court's analysis began with the
proviso of § 8(f) meant that litigation of refusal to bargain charges was another allowable
method of testing majority status. See id. at 1381 (citing R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191
N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971)). But the NLRB saw two crucial problems with the current
interpretation of § 8(f) as determined in R.J. Smith: (1) nowhere in the legislative history
or the Act itself are § 8(f) agreements suggested to be unenforceable or voidable, and (2)
Congress's desire to allow voluntary pre-hire agreements did not mean that "either party
to the agreement is unfettered in its right 'voluntarily' to repudiate the agreement." Id. at
1381.
Member Stephens concurred in the judgment of the majority in Deklewa, but did not
agree with the tenor of the NLRB's view of the legislative history. See id. at 1391
(Stephens, M., concurring). After reviewing the congressional deliberations, he argued
that "there is no evidence that Congress ever directly confronted and consciously
resolved" the issue of whether a failure to follow a pre-hire agreement could be
enforceable under the Act as an unfair labor practice. Id. at 1392 (Stephens, M.,
concurring).
118. Id. at 1380. As to free choice, the NLRB commented that "[a] rule granting
unilateral repudiation rights to an employer who voluntarily enters into a collective
bargaining agreement is not a necessary predicate for advancement of the employee free
choice principles embodied in the... proviso." Id. at 1382.
119. Id. at 1380. For example, the NLRB cited the administrative difficulty of trying
to determine whether a union had achieved majority status at some point in the past. See
id. at 1383. The progeny of R.J. Smith Construction Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701 (1971),
developed the doctrine of conversion. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1378. If a union was
able to show that, at some point, it had gained majority support in a unit, a § 8(f)
agreement would convert into a § 9(a) agreement-meaning that it had become non-
voidable like any other collective bargaining agreement outside the construction industry.
See id. at 1378-79. According to the NLRB, attempts to make such a determination were
made difficult by "serious practical problems with the reliability and relevance of
evidence purporting to establish majority status and with the protraction of litigation."
Id. at 1383.
120. See Deklewa, 282 N.L.R.B. at 1388.
121. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335,341 (1978)).
122. See id.
123. See International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v.
NLRB ("Deklewa"), 843 F.2d 770, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1988). The Supreme Court later
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premise that its job was to decide if the NLRB's interpretation was
reasonable. 4 First, the court rejected the employer's argument that
Higdon and McNeff represented d definitive interpretation of
§ 8(f). 12 The court quoted the deferential sections of Higdon,126 and
although it noted that McNeff did not make its deference so clear, the
court reasoned that the case was simply relying on Higdon and
factually dealt only with obligations of a § 8(f) agreement before
repudiation.127  Second, the court concluded that the new
interpretation of § 8(f) was reasonable after a review of the
legislative history and text of the Act.128
Under the reasoning of the Third Circuit, it would seem likely
that other circuits also would adopt Deklewa. However, before the
Third Circuit decision was handed down, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
rejected this new interpretation of § 8(f) in Mesa Verde Construction
Co. v. Northern California District Council.129 The panel stated that if
the Ninth Circuit had not yet addressed the proper interpretation of
§ 8(f), it would adopt the NLRB's interpretation if reasonable. 10
However, it noted that Deklewa conflicted with prior Ninth Circuit
decisions allowing an employer to repudiate § 8(f) agreements before
a union attains majority support. 13  The court stated that under the
Ninth Circuit decision in Royal Development Co. v. NLRB, 32 "we are
not permitted to overrule prior panels' interpretations of the Act,
even with intervening NLRB case law," and observed that an en banc
decision would be necessary to adopt Deklewa.3'
denied a petition of certiorari. See International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 488 U.S. 889 (1988). The Third Circuit opinion also
decided that Deklewa could be applied retroactively. See Deklewa, 843 F.2d at 780'-81.
124. See Deklewa, 843 F.2d at 775.
125. See id. at 776.
126. See id. (quoting Higdon, 434 U.S. at 341,350).
127. See id.
128. See id. at 779.
129. 820 F.2d 1006 (9th Cir.), withdrawn, 832 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1987), reheard en
banc, 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988). The unions brought Deklewa to the attention of the
court after oral arguments and argued that the employer in that case would still be bound
to its pre-hire agreement. See id. at 1012.
For treatments of Mesa Verde, see Martha Allard, Note, Constitutional Law-A
Struggle Between the Presumption of Correctness Afforded Statutory Precedents and
Deference to Federal Agencies, 13 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 189, 202-23 (1991); James M.
Wilton, Note, Changed Interpretation of Section 8() of the National Labor Relations Act:
Mesa Verde Construction Co. v. Northern California District Council of Laborers, 31
B.C. L. REV. 114, 114-28 (1989).
130. See Mesa Verde, 820 F.2d at 1013.
131. See id.
132. 703 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983).
133. Mesa Verde, 820 F.2d at 1013 (citing Royal Dev. Co., 703 F.2d at 369). Judge
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Accepting the panel's invitation for en banc review, the Ninth
Circuit proceeded to adopt Deklewa.13 The court determined that
the prior Supreme Court cases had only accepted the NLRB's prior
interpretation of § 8(f) as reasonable and proceeded to determine if
the new interpretation was also reasonable.1 35 In similar fashion to
the Third Circuit's approach in Deklewa, the court recounted the
legislative history of § 8(f) and the purposes of the Act to find the
new interpretation reasonable. 36
The en banc court also had to address the panel's view that it
could not adopt Deklewa because it conflicted with other circuit
precedents to which panels must adhere under Royal Development.
1 37
If Higdon and McNeff could be explained as only exhibiting
deference to the NLRB's view, the court reasoned that it would be
"anomalous" to give other circuit court decisions greater deference
than that accorded to Supreme Court decisions.1 38 Therefore, the en
banc court held that if prior precedent represents "deferential review
of NLRB interpretations of labor law, and do not decide that a
particular interpretation of statute is the only reasonable
interpretation... [,] subsequent panels of this court are free to adopt
new and reasonable NLRB decisions without the requirement of en
banc review." '139
In support of its decision, the en banc court noted that strict
adherence to the theory of Royal Development applied by the panel
raised four issues. n First, strict adherence prevents panels from
according the NLRB the deference it is due. 4' Second, it interferes
Noonan filed a concurrence emphasizing that en banc review should be undertaken in
order to adopt Deklewa. See id. (Noonan, J., concurring).
134. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council, 861 F.2d 1124, 1126
(9th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
135. See id. at 1129-31.
136. See id. at 1131-34. The court concluded that the legislative history of § 8(f)
supported Deklewa's non-repudiation rule as opposed to the rule of R.J. Smith, which
allows unilateral repudiation of § 8(f) agreements. See id. at 1131.
137. See id. at 1134.
138. See id.
139. Id. at 1134-35. The court noted that prior panels have adopted changing NLRB
interpretations in other areas without feeling restrained by prior precedents. See id. at
1135. Compare NLRB v. Brooks Cameras, Inc., 691 F.2d 912, 919 (9th Cir. 1982)
(adopting the NLRB's "all-the-circumstances" test for deciding if an interrogation
violated the Act), with J.M. Tanaka Constr., Inc. v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1029, 1037 (9th Cir.
1982) (adopting the NLRB's rule that interrogations are per-se violations of the Act), and
Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 11 v. NLRB, 760 F.2d 1006,
1009 (9th Cir. 1985) (re-adopting the NLRB's use of the "all-the-circumstances" test).
140. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1135-36.
141. See id. at 1135.
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with the NLRB's ability to apply the same policies nationwide. 4
Third, it would increase the ambiguity of what law the courts will
apply in cases in which the NLRB interpretation has changed,
thereby inviting unnecessary appeals and delays. 43 Fourth, the court
noted that the limited availability of en banc review should not be
wasted in such an inefficient manner.144
Four justices dissented from the majority opinion. Judge
Wallace, writing alone, was convinced that Higdon and McNeff
formed an authoritative interpretation of § 8(f); therefore, the proper
analysis in this case should end at the first step of the Chevron test.45
Judge Hug, whose dissent was joined by two judges,'4 6 did not agree
that the issue was so clear but reached the same result. 47 He
believed that Higdon and MeNeff represented a definitive
construction of § 8(f), although the Supreme Court may have given
some level of deference to the NLRB's view in making its decision. 4 '
Judge Hug noted that the question was still one of pure statutory
interpretation for a court to decide and was to be accorded the
respect of stare decisis, even if in reaching the outcome the court
deferred to an agency interpretation. 49
Judge Kozinski, who joined Judge Hug's dissent, also wrote
separately.150 His dissent dealt with the broader issue of the role of
142. See id. at 1135-36.
143. See iL at 1136. The en banc court noted that under the panel's reading of Royal
Development Co., a panel would always apply old precedent and have to wait for an en
banc decision to change the outcome. See id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 1137 (Wallace, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 65-73 and
accompanying text (describing the two-step test of Chevron). Judge Wallace noted that it
was unclear exactly what the Supreme Court meant by the prior cases. See Mesa Verde,
861 F.2d at 1137 (Wallace, J., dissenting). However, his analysis of this issue did not
probe deeply: Judge Wallace simply noted that the prior Supreme Court decisions were
"conclusive[] and authoritative[]." Id. (Wallace, J., dissenting).
146. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1137 (Hug, J., dissenting).
147. See id. at 1138 (Hug, J., dissenting).
148. See id. (Hug, J., dissenting).
149. See id. at 1140 (Hug, J., dissenting). Judge Hug noted the numerous references in
McNeff to the voidable nature of § 8(f) agreements. See id. at 1143-44 (Hug, J.,
dissenting) (citing Jim McNeff, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 260, 267-71 (1983)). As to the
plain statement in Higdon that the NLRB's view was acceptable, "although perhaps not
the only tenable one," NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural &
Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978) (Wilkins, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), Judge Hug said this represented deference of the Supreme Court
before it decided to impose its own interpretation of § 8(f). See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at
1143 (Hug, J., dissenting).
150. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1146 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (joined by Judge
Brunetti).
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the judiciary and the wisdom of Chevron deference. Seeing the
majority's decision as representing a shift of power from the judicial
branch to the executive branch,"' he believed that agencies would
change positions more often than courts and subject the
interpretation of laws to "shift[s] in the political winds."'52
Despite the strong views of the dissenters, the Mesa Verde en
banc court reached the same result as the Third Circuit in Deklewa
and adopted the new interpretation of § 8(f).153 Shortly thereafter, a
number of other circuits followed its lead. In NLRB v. W.L. Miller
Co.,154 the Eighth Circuit easily deferred to the NLRB's new
interpretation and determined that Higdon and McNeff did not bar
such a result.55 The Seventh Circuit reached a similar outcome in
NLRB v. Bufco Corp.,56 as did the First Circuit in C.E.K. Industrial
Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB. 57 In addition, the Fifth
Circuit assumed, but did not decide, that Deklewa was the law
because it held that Deklewa should not apply retroactively.
5 8
151. See id. (Kozinski, J., dissenting); see also supra note 4 and accompanying text
(quoting Judge Kozinski's suggestion that the majority had tortured the reasoning of
Marbury v. Madison).
152. Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1147 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). He also commented that
"agencies can change their outlook as often and easily as a chameleon changes its color."
Id. at 1146 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
153. See id. at 1126.
154. 871 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1989).
155. See id. at 748.
156. 899 F.2d 608, 609 (7th Cir. 1990).
157. 921 F.2d 350,357 (1st Cir. 1990).
158. See Union Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local Union 953 v. Mar-Len, Inc., 906
F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1990). The Fifth Circuit noted that prior panels of the circuit had
upheld the prior interpretation of § 8(f), but because the adoption of Deklewa was not
briefed or argued before the court, it thought that the "close, complex issues" did not
need to be reached. Id. at 203 & n.2. The Fifth Circuit also failed to reach the issue in
NLRB v. Catalytic Industrial Maintenance Co., 964 F.2d 513, 521 n.11 (5th Cir. 1992),
noting again that the issue had not been briefed or argued before the court.
Regarding retroactive application of Deklewa, the circuits that have adopted
Deklewa have split on the issue. Compare NLRB v. Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc., 979
F.2d 1384, 1396-97 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying retroactively), NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899
F.2d 608, 611-12 (7th Cir. 1990) (same), NLRB v. Miller Co., 871 F.2d 745, 748-50 (8th
Cir. 1989) (same), and Deklewa, 843 F.2d 770, 780-81 (3d Cir. 1988) (same), with C.E.K.
Indus. Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 358 (1st Cir. 1990) (denying
retroactive effect), Mesa Verde Constr. v. Northern California Dist. Council, 895 F.2d
516, 519 (9th Cir. 1990) (same), and Mar-Len, 900 F.2d at 203 (same). See also Howard
Douglas Fineman, Note, The Retroactive Application of Deklewa: Inequitable and Unjust
Results for Construction Industry Employers, 8 HOFsTRA LAB. L.J. 417, 474-88 (1991)
(arguing that retroactive application produces manifestly unjust results). The Eighth
Circuit's decision in W.L. Miller Co. spent more effort considering whether Deklewa
should be applied retroactively than whether Deklewa was applicable. See W.L. Miller
Co., 871 F.2d at 748.
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Finally, in 1992 the Tenth Circuit, in NLRB v. Viola Industries-
Elevator Division, Inc.,"' also adopted Deklewa,6 ° although it issued
its opinion en banc.161 The Tenth Circuit similarly interpreted
Higdon and McNeff as only deferring to the NLRB's prior § 8(f)
position. 162 This decision brought the number of circuits that had
addressed Deklewa to seven, with no rejections. 63  Furthermore,
although the D.C., Second, and Sixth Circuits have not explicitly
adopted Deklewa, references to it in the opinions of those circuits
provide a strong inference that they assume Deklewa is good law.
6
In the face of this widespread acceptance, the Eleventh Circuit
rejected Deklewa in February 1997 in Local Union 48 Sheet Metal
Workers v. S.L. Pappas & Co. ("Pappas").165 Echoing the initial
panel decision in Mesa Verde,'66 the court decided that the "prior
159. 979 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1992).
160. See id. at 1394-95.
161. See id. at 1388. The panel that first heard the case never issued an opinion. See
id. at 1386. Instead, it was reheard en banc primarily because the court wanted to ensure
a proper reading of Higdon and McNeff. See id. Judge Baldock, the lone dissenter,
discussed the same policy concerns over the proper role of the judiciary in statutory
interpretation that Judge Kozinski highlighted in Mesa Verde. See id. at 1397 (Baldock,
J., dissenting) (citing Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council, 861 F.2d
1124, 1146-49 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)); supra notes 150-52
(discussing Judge Kozinski's dissent). The Viola case is also discussed in Pierce, supra
note 8, at 2256, and Phillip F. Smith, Jr., Note, Administrative Law Survey, 71 DENV. U. L.
REV. 801, 802-11 (1994).
162. See Viola, 979 F.2d at 1395.
163. See id. at 1394-95; Mar-Len, 906 F.2d at 203; C.E.K., 921 F.2d at 357; Bufco, 899
F.2d at 609; W.L. Miller Co., 871 F.2d at 748; Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1126; International
Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB, 843 F.2d 770, 780-81
(3d Cir. 1988).
164. The D.C. Circuit seems to have implicitly accepted Deklewa, although it has
never explicitly decided the issue. See Bentson Contracting Co. v. NLRB, 941 F.2d 1262,
1269 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (citing Deklewa and recognizing the NLRB's current law regarding
§ 8(f) bargaining agreements); Corson and Gruman Co. v. NLRB, 899 F.2d 47, 49-50
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that the union was barred from raising Deklewa on appeal
because it never raised it before the NLRB). The Second Circuit has only cited to
Deklewa once-noting its existence but holding that it was inapplicable to the case before
it because the § 8(f) agreements at issue existed under the pre-Deklewa interpretation.
See Benson v. Brower's Moving & Storage, Inc., 907 F.2d 310, 315 & n.3 (2d Cir. 1990).
In the Sixth Circuit, one case appeared to assume that Deklewa applied, and it was relied
on without discussion. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local 110 Pension Trust Fund
v. Dane Sheet Metal, Inc., 932 F.2d 578, 581-82 (6th Cir. 1991) ("[C]urrent [Board]
doctrine makes pre-hire agreements binding in accordance with their terms."). Also, in
Fox Painting Co. v. NLRB, 919 F.2d 53 (6th Cir. 1990), the Sixth Circuit upheld the
NLRB's decision not to apply Deklewa retroactively when an appellate court had already
determined liability. See id. at 56.
165. 106 F.3d 970, 975, reh'g denied, 114 F.3d 1204 (11th Cir. 1997).
166. See Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d
1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 1987), withdrawn, 832 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1987), reheard en banc, 861
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panel rule" forbade application of Deklewa.167 The court held that
because a prior Eleventh Circuit decision had adopted McNeff,'6s and
because" '[t]he law in this circuit is emphatic that "only a decision by
this court sitting en banc or the United States Supreme Court can
overrule a prior panel decision," ' "169 it was bound by the prior
precedent.1 70  The court did not mention Chevron or deference to
agency interpretations, nor did it address the reasoning of the other
circuits that had reached different results. 7  It simply concluded that
because the court must follow prior precedents, it need not address
the applicability of Deklewa in the circuit. 172
In light of the history of § 8(f) and how Deklewa has fared in the
courts of appeals, Industrial TurnAround raises a number of
interesting issues. First, it is arguable that the Fourth Circuit's result
was incorrect, in light of the overwhelming contrary, but not
binding, 7 4  authority in other circuits. 75  Second, Industrial
TurnAround (and Pappas), will make it difficult for the NLRB to
apply the Act consistently nationwide. 7 6 In fact, based on these two
concerns, the § 8(f) issue is one that the Supreme Court may decide
to address in the future.7 7  Finally, Industrial TurnAround may
reflect discontent with the deference required by Chevron and the
role of the judiciary in such a scheme. 7
The correctness of the result in Industrial TurnAround turns on
a proper reading of Clark v. Ryan,7 9 the Fourth Circuit case that
applied the R.J. Smith interpretation of § 8(f). 180 Under the first step
F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988); supra notes 129-33 and accompanying text.
167. See Pappas, 106 F.3d at 975.
168. See id. (citing Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 72 v. John Payne Co., 850 F.2d
1535, 1541 (11th Cir. 1988)).
169. Id. (quoting United States v. Woodard, 938 F.2d 1255, 1258 (11th Cir. 1991)
(quoting United States v. Machado, 804 F.2d 1537, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986))).
170. See id.
171. Notably, the court did not address the fact that the Mesa Verde en banc court had
rejected such a reading of the prior panel rule. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1134-36.
172. See Pappas, 106 F.3d at 975.
173. See supra notes 123-72 and accompanying text.
174. See Allan D. Vestal, Relitigation by Federal Agencies: Conflict, Concurrence and
Synthesis of Judicial Policies, 55 N.C. L. REv. 123, 162-63 & n.246 (1976) (noting that
conflicts between circuit courts develop because decisions of one circuit are not thought
to bind other circuits).
175. See infra notes 179-98 and accompanying text.
176. See infra notes 199-210 and accompanying text.
177. See infra notes 211-17 and accompanying text.
178. See infra notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
179. 818 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1987).
180. See id. at 1106-07; see also supra notes 111-15 (discussing Clark).
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of Chevron, if Clark adopted the interpretation of § 8(f) as compelled
by the plain meaning of the statute, a court would have no choice but
to follow Clark.' But on the other hand, if Clark merely deferred to
a reasonable interpretation of the statute, the approach of the Mesa
Verde court and other circuit courts suggests that the Deklewa
interpretation should be given deference." This deference would
not conflict with the prior panel decision rule if the prior precedent
only holds that the interpretation it faced was a reasonable one."8 3
The view that Clark spoke to § 8(f) definitively is not without
merit. The Clark opinion does not mention deference, and it quotes
the more authoritative-sounding language of McNeff'1
4
Furthermore, there is no hint in the Clark opinion that McNeff and
Higdon were based on deference, as other circuits have reasoned. 15
Clark appears merely to accept McNeff and Higdon as the law.186 As
a result, the Industrial TurnAround court reasonably could have felt
restrained by Clark, even if the reasoning of Clark was flawed."8
A stronger argument can be made, however, that Clark is not a
bar to the adoption of Deklewa. Simply put, if Higdon was a
demonstration of deference, and McNeff was simply derivative of
Higdon,188 it could follow that Clark was derivative of both of those
decisions.8 9 In this light, Clark never explicitly decided that the pre-
181. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984); see also Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of
Laborers, 861 F.2d 1124, 1136 (9th Cir. 1988) (en bane) (holding that precedent is binding
on a panel only if it held that the prior agency interpretation is the only possible
interpretation).
182. See NLRB v. Viola Indus.-Elevator Div., Inc., 979 F.2d 1384, 1394 (10th Cir.
1992) (en banc); Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136. In Mesa Verde, the Ninth Circuit noted
that prior precedent exhibiting deference to agency interpretation does not bar adoption
of a new interpretation. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136; see also supra notes 129-53 and
accompanying text (discussing Mesa Verde).
183. See Mesa Verde, 861 F.2d at 1136.
184. See Clark, 818 F.2d at 1107 (quoting Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 271
(1983)).
185. See, e.g., C.E.K. Indus. Contractors, Inc. v. NLRB, 921 F.2d 350, 357 (1st Cir.
1990) (rejecting the contention that the Supreme Court had adopted the R.J. Smith rule as
its own); International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers v. NLRB,
843 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir. 1988) (same).
186. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
187. Cf Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 820 F.2d
1006 (9th Cir.) (Noonan, J., concurring), withdrawn, 832 F.2d 1164 (9th Cir. 1987),
reheard en banc, 861 F.2d 1124 (9th Cir. 1988). Judge Noonan felt constrained by prior
Ninth Circuit precedent but urged the en banc court "to correct this law." Id. at 1013
(Noonan, J., concurring).
188. See supra notes 94-110 and accompanying text.
189. Cf. NLRB v. Bufco Corp., 899 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Seventh Circuit had applied the R.J. Smith interpretation of § 8(f) in a prior case but
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Dekleva interpretation of § 8(f) was the only reasonable one;
therefore, it would not bar adoption of Deklewa.190 Serendipitous
events have made it clear that this interpretation of Clark is quite
tenable. In Clark, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case to the
district court to determine if the agreement at issue was a § 8(f)
agreement and when it was revoked.191 On remand, District Judge
Kiser noted in an unpublished opinion that he thought he had
received "a straightforward contract interpretation case."" g
However, he found that the NLRB's new ruling in Deklewa
"complicate[d] matters."'93  At that time, the Third Circuit had
already enforced Deklewa, applying it retroactively, and the Seventh
Circuit had likewise followed suit. 94 Judge Kiser then decided that
the Deklewa interpretation of § 8(f) should apply retroactively.9 5
Though his discussion was brief, he relied on the "well-reasoned
opinions from the Third and Seventh Circuits, as well as this Court's
natural deference to the NLRB concerning matters within its
particular purview.' 96 Because the case apparently never made it
past this point, the Fourth Circuit never addressed it again.
While this unpublished opinion is not binding on any court, it is
interesting for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that one judge who
addressed the exact issue did not consider the Fourth Circuit's Clark
accepting Deklewa (citing International Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron
Workers v. Higdon Constr. Co., 739 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Higdon I"))). The court
reached this result even though the prior circuit decision clearly said that "[p]rehire
agreements such as the one here, while valid under § 8(f), are voidable until the union
reaches majority status." Higdon 11, 739 F.2d at 282. The Bufco court recognized that
nothing in that decision "constituted more than our agreement that it was an acceptable
reading of the Act." Bufco, 899 F.2d at 610 n.5.
190. See Jahan Sharifi, Comment, Precedents Construing Statutes Administered by
Federal Agencies After the Chevron Decision: What Gives?, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 223, 228-
29 (1993). Sharifi argues that when a court looks at a pre-Chevron decision to decide if it
should be regarded as precedent after Chevron, it could look to "1) presence of language
suggesting that the court believed it was effectuating congressional intent, and 2) absence
of language that indicates deference to the relevant agency." Id. at 237-38. Under this
approach, Sharifi notes that the Mesa Verde court was able to parse the language of
McNeff. See id. at 238. Of course, Clark was decided after Chevron, but the same type of
test could apply to post-Chevron decisions which plainly should have implicated Chevron
analysis.
191. See Clark, 818 F.2d at 1107.
192. Clark v. Ryan, Civ. A. No. 83-852-R., 1989 WL 517501, at *1 (W.D. Va. Sept. 6,
1989) (unpublished memorandum opinion).
193. Id. Judge Kiser admonished the parties for "utterly fail[ing] to provide any
guidance." Id.
194. See id. at *2.
195. See id. at *3.
196. Id. at *4. Judge Kiser noted that because the submitted briefs were not helpful,
he had "the unpleasant task of determining the correct application of Deklewa." Id.
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decision to bar application of Deklewa. Second, it raises the ironic
point that even the actual litigants in Clark were not subject to the
rule by which the court felt bound in Industrial TurnAround.197
Therefore, in light of the results that other circuits have reached, in
addition to the odd history of Clark itself, a strong case can be made
that Clark did not definitely construe § 8(f), and that the result of
Industrial TurnAround is incorrect.
198
Correctness aside, Industrial TurnAround (and Pappas in the
Eleventh Circuit) might make it difficult for the NLRB to apply the
Act consistently nationwide. If the NLRB has to apply varying
interpretations of § 8(f) in different circuits, the Act's "goal of
promoting a uniform national labor policy would be undermined."'199
It is unclear whether the NLRB could even attempt such a strategy.
The venue provisions of the Act allow the aggrieved party of a
NLRB action to seek review either in the circuit where the case
arose, any circuit where it resides or conducts business, or in the D.C.
Circuit.210  Therefore, at times, the NLRB will not know what law to
apply.20' In the past, the absurdity of such a task has led the NLRB to
follow a policy of "nonacquiescence" from circuit decisions with
which it does not agree.2 2 Nonacquiescence means that the NLRB
could decide to continue to defend the Deklewa rule before circuits
197. Furthermore, Judge Kiser is not the only district judge who thought Deklewa
would control in the Fourth Circuit. In Trustees of the National Automatic Sprinkler
Industry Pension Fund v. American Automatic Fire Protection, 680 F. Supp. 731 (D. Md.
1988), then-District Judge Motz (who is now on the Fourth Circuit) recognized Deklewa
but declined to apply it retroactively. See id. at 734-35. More recently, in Local Union
No. 666, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. C & C Electrical Service Inc.,
896 F. Supp. 574 (E.D. Va. 1995), the court found Deklewa controlling in light of the
submitted briefs, oral argument, and independent research. See id. at 576. The court
specifically noted that Clark no longer applied. See id.
198. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit is arguably not bound by its prior panel decision in
Plumbers & Pipefitters Local Union 72 v. John Payne Co., 850 F.2d 1535 (11th Cir. 1988).
The John Payne case does not contain language suggesting that R.J. Smith was the only
possible interpretation of § 8(f)-it merely cites to other authorities such as Higdon. See
id. at 1539-40.
199. White, supra note 4, at 665. Professor White suggests that this rule would allow
areas of the country to "compete for industry on the basis of more hospitable circuit law."
Id.
200. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1992).
201. See White, supra note 4, at 649 (discussing Arvin Automotive, 285 N.L.R.B. 753,
757 (1987) (noting that the NLRB could not know if the Eleventh Circuit would review
the order)). Professor White notes that aggrieved parties could shop for a circuit with
favorable law in order to prevail on appeal. See id. at 679.
202 See id. at 639.40. This policy has been followed by the NLRB for almost 50 years.
See id. at 646.
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that have rejected it.203 An example of this occurred when the NLRB
defended the R.J. Smith interpretation of § 8(f) before the D.C.
Circuit in Higdon when the D.C. Circuit had already rejected that
interpretation. ° Similarly, perhaps the NLRB's proposed judgment
after remand of Industrial TurnAround demonstrates its unhappiness
with the outcome in the Fourth Circuit. The proposed judgment is
identical to the prior judgment, except that the date of repudiation
was changed to May 6, 1993, to reflect the Fourth Circuit's holding.0 5
While recognizing the authority of the Fourth Circuit, this judgment
would leave ITAC subject to the original remedy.
Industrial TurnAround is a case ripe for nonacquiescence by the
NLRB. Following oral argument, the court ordered that the NLRB
explain its position on its obligation to follow the decisions of the
circuit.0 6 In the NLRB's response, the Acting Solicitor defended the
policy of relitigating issues in circuits with adverse precedent. 07 The
response noted that the NLRB's decisions can be reviewed by
multiple circuits and that acquiescence to circuit decisions is only
feasible for an agency that knows which circuit will be reviewing its
decision."' It recognized that under the reviewing scheme of the Act,
"[s]erious disagreements over important issues of law and policy are
an inevitable feature" of the relationship between the NLRB and the
judiciary which will create conflict until resolved by a Supreme Court
decision.20 9 Therefore, it appears that Industrial TurnAround will not
affect the NLRB's position on § 8(f) in future cases in the Fourth
Circuit. 10 But it also would seem doubtful that the NLRB would
203. See id.
204. See Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural, & Ornamental
Workers v. NLRB ("Higdon"), 535 F.2d 87, 89 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd and remanded sub
nom., 434 U.S. 335 (1978). Typically, when this situation arises, the NLRB will follow a
circuit's decision for an individual case, but will give it no broader effect. See White,
supra note 4, at 642.
205. See Petitioner's Objection to NLRB's Proposed Judgment at 1, Industrial
TurnAround (Nos. 96-1783 & 96-1926).
206. See Letter from Jeffrey D. Wedekind, Acting Solicitor, National Labor Relations
Board, to Patricia S. Connor, Clerk, United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit 1-2 (Feb. 6, 1997) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). This order
apparently was in follow-up to oral argument. See id. at 1 (noting that at oral argument,
"Judge Luttig questioned the Board's counsel at length concerning the extent to which
the Board's decisions are based on decisions of the [Circuit]").
207. See id. at 12.
208. See id. at 17. The response notes that an agency that knows where its decisions
will be reviewed is in the same position as a district court, which is bound by circuit
precedents. See id.
209. Id. at 18.
210. The response to the Fourth Circuit did point out that the NLRB's policy of
nonacquiescence "is no way disrespectful to the courts of appeals." Id.
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petition the Fourth Circuit for enforcement of a Deklewa issue after
Industrial TurnAround.
Because Industrial TurnAround and Pappas have created a
sharp circuit split on the applicability of Deklewa, this issue is one the
Supreme Court could address in the future' If either Industrial
TurnAround or Pappas reaches the Supreme Court, it would provide
the Court an additional opportunity to demonstrate the proper
application of Chevron to the interpretation of § 8(f). 2 The Court
also could end the debate over the correct interpretation of Higdon
and McNeff. Recent Supreme Court precedent suggests that
Industrial TurnAround would be overturned. In Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc.,211 for example, the Supreme Court noted that the
NLRB has "primary responsibility for policing the collective
bargaining processes. '214 In Brown, the Court wanted to avoid "a
web of detailed rules spun by many different nonexpert antitrust
judges and juries" in favor of "a set of labor rules enforced by a single
expert administrative body."2 5  According to one commentator,
Brown is an indication of "strong support" for Chevron deference.1 6
Deference to the NLRB, based on a desire for a single administrator
of a coherent body of labor law, appears to be equally desirable in
the context of Industrial TurnAround. Considering that a majority of
the circuit courts addressing the issue have determined that adoption
of the NLRB's interpretation of § 8(f) is not barred by prior
precedent, coupled with Brown's recent affirmations of Chevron
deference by the Supreme Court, it appears that if the Supreme
Court addressed the issue, it would likely adopt Deklewa without
having to overrule Higdon or McNeff21 7
211. One of the Supreme Court's criteria for granting certiorari is the existence of a
conflict between the circuit courts of appeals. See SUP. CT. R. 10. In addition, when such
a conflict occurs in regard to a federal agency policy of general importance, and the
government's position has not prevailed in a recent decision, the Solicitor General is apt
to request, and likely to receive, a grant of certiorari from the Supreme Court. See
Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Resolved
Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. Pirt. L. REV. 693,746 (1995).
212. Neither side has sought a writ of certiorari in Industrial TurnAround. The case
might reach the Supreme Court after rulings in the compliance phase of the case, but this
is a remote possibility.
213. 116 S. Ct. 2116 (1996).
214. Id. at 2121.
215. Id. at 2123.
216. KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD L. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 3.4, at 30 (3d ed. Supp. 1997).
217. The contrast between the deferential language of Higdon and the "we giveth the
law" language of McNeff is odd. Compare NLRB v. Local Union No. 103, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 341 (1978) (characterizing
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Finally, Industrial TurnAround reflects the discontent of courts
with the world of Chevron deference and the role of the judiciary in
such a scheme. While the final interpretation of § 8(f) may not keep
judges awake at night, a suggestion that "federal judges should plan
to take a long holiday and observe from afar as the body of federal
law develops without their meaningful input" does not sound
especially palatable. 18 Of course, the accepted and traditional role of
the judicial branch under the Constitution has been to "say what the
law is. ' 219 Because the special rule of deference to agencies dictated
by Chevron has been viewed by some as usurping the traditional role
of the judiciary,' it is not surprising that judges may, at times, prefer
to construe a prior precedent as a definitive interpretation of a
statute instead of an example of deference. While the courts of
appeal may typically still adhere to Chevron," Industrial
TurnAround may serve as a reminder that not all judges are content
the R.J. Smith interpretation of § 8(f) as reasonable "although perhaps not the only
tenable" interpretation), with Jim McNeff, Inc. v. Todd, 461 U.S. 260, 270 (1983)
(recognizing the "undoubted right to repudiate a pre-hire agreement"). One might
suspect that Chief Justice Burger, who wrote the opinion in McNeff, was trying to back
away from the deferential language of Higdon. Chief Justice Burger revealed some
discontent with deference to agencies in other opinions. See, e.g., Charles D. Bonanno
Linen Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 423 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("The
Court's deferral to the Board's conclusion that its rules advance the national labor policy
... represents just the kind of uncritical judicial rubberstamping we have often
condemned."); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 451-53 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that in a Title VII action dealing with
criteria for validating employment tests, deference to agency guidelines was improper
because Congress did not refer to them in legislative history). To the extent that
McNeffs language is inconsistent with allowing deference to the NLRB over
interpretations of § 8(f), the Court may want to clarify what McNeff held. If the NLRB's
failure to seek certiorari in Industrial TurnAround can be interpreted to mean anything, it
may suggest that adoption of Deklewa by the Supreme Court is not a foregone conclusion.
218. Mesa Verde Constr. Co. v. Northern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 861 F.2d
1124, 1149 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
219. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
220. See Claust-Ellenbogen, supra note 4, at 759, 783; see also Cynthia R. Farina,
Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 452, 456 (1989) ("The danger of Chevron's song lies in its apparent obliviousness
to the fundamental alterations it makes in our constitutional conception of the
administrative state."); Abner J. Mikva, How Should the Courts Treat Administrative
Agencies?, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1986) (suggesting that Chevron could lead to an
erosion of the duty "to ensure that the law is obeyed by all, including the agencies");
Abner J. Mikva, Tribute: The Real Judge Bazelon, 82 GEO. L.J. 1, 4 (1993) (suggesting
that former Chief Judge Bazelon of the D.C. Circuit would have disliked Chevron
because he "believed that judicial review was an absolutely essential safeguard to
bureaucratic excesses").
221. See DAVIs & PIERCE, supra note 216, § 3.6, at 70 (noting that a highly deferential
approach to agency decisions "still seems to be the norm in circuit court
decisionmaking").
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with that state of affairs. 2
In conclusion, Industrial TurnAround demonstrates the tension
that results from balancing stare decisis against a policy of deference
to interpretations of agency-administered statutes. Because
Industrial TurnAround may cause inconsistent nationwide
application of collective bargaining statutes, it should be scrutinized
carefully if it returns to an appellate court. Until that occurs, the
Fourth Circuit is now in a distinct minority that permits unions and
employers to repudiate pre-hire collective bargaining agreements
unilaterally. Because agencies can change their interpretation of
statutes, and because courts must also uphold their "duty to say what
the law is,"'  conflicts between agencies and the Fourth Circuit are
now more likely to occur as a result of Industrial TurnAround. 4
J. MITCHELL ARMBRUSTER
222. Judge Williams, who authored the opinion in Industrial TurnAround, appears to
be among those who are unhappy. She filed a concurring opinion in Case Farms, Inc. v.
NLRB, 128 F.3d 841 (4th Cir. 1997), which enforced an NLRB order certifying a union
election. See id. at 849-50 (Williams, J. concurring). Though Judge Williams agreed with
the result, she took issue with the NLRB's use of a prior NLRB order as precedent
without citation to any decisions of the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 850 (Williams, J.,
concurring). She admonished that the "Board is not free.., to automatically assume that
its decisions, whether enforced or not, are the law in this Circuit." Id. (Williams, J.,
concurring) (citing Industrial TurnAround, 115 F.3d at 254). In Glenmark Assocs., Inc. v.
N.L.R.B., 1998 WL 324522, Nos. 97-1403, 97-1404,97-1514 & 97-1515, at *1 (4th Cir. June
19, 1998), Judge Williams noted the existence of questionable Board positions in recent
cases. See id. at *6 n.8. She warned the Board to "reconsider its single-minded pursuit of
its policy goals without regard for the supervisory role of the Third Branch." Id. Judge
Luttig, also on the Industrial TurnAround court, has voiced displeasure with agency
assertions of the power to interpret statutes. See United States Dep't of Energy v. FLRA,
106 F.3d 1158, 1166 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment) ("I, as a judge of
this Court, am bound by the prior decisions of this Court. I am not free, as the agency
believes it is, to conduct myself unconstrained by law."). See also Exxel/Atmos, Inc. v.
NLRB, Nos. 97-1417 & 97-1418, 1998 WL 336523, at *7 (D.C. Cir. June 26, 1998)
(Sentelle, J., concurring) ("The time has long since come for the [NLRB] to recognize not
only the constraints of precedent, but its statutory and constitutional duty to obey the law
as interpreted by the courts.").
223. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
224. The conflict over the interpretation of § 8(f) between the Fourth Circuit and the
NLRB may dissipate, however, if the NLRB decides to change its position again. See
NLRB Considers Pre-hire Policy, ENGINEERING NEWs-REc., Nov. 25, 1996, at 16
(describing "[a] quiet struggle" at the Board over whether Deklewa should be
overturned).
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State v. Lea: Attempt Plus Felony-Murder Does Not Equal
Attempted Felony Murder
Under the felony-murder rule, a defendant who kills another
during the commission of a felony is guilty of murder.' The rule
operates to confer upon a defendant the consequences of a murder
conviction regardless of the defendant's mental state during the
commission of the crime.2 Highly criticized for forsaking the
dependent relationship between criminal liability and moral
culpability that characterizes the rest of criminal law,3 the felony-
murder rule nonetheless has managed to endure as an effectual force
in American criminal law.4 Though the rule still retains much of its
force and efficacy, over time, increasing limitations have curtailed its
application.'
1. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 31.06, at 479
(2d ed. 1995). For North Carolina's version of the felony-murder rule, see North Carolina
General Statutes § 14-17, which makes any murder "committed in the perpetration or
attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping,
burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon"
murder in the first degree. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997).
2. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06, at 479; infra note 57 and accompanying text.
3. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 452 (1985) ("[T]he punishment of a
killing as murder where subjective culpability is lacking clashes with modern definitions of
murder."); James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of
the Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429, 1437 (1994)
("[l]t is the widely accepted view today that criminal liability must rest on proof of a
recognized level of mental fault for every essential element of an offense."). See infra
notes 57-59 and accompanying text (citing further support).
4. Only four states have completely abolished the felony-murder rule. See HAW.
REV. STAT. § 707-701, 707-701.5 (Repl. 1993); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507.020(1)(a)
(Michie 1990); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304,326 (Mich. 1980); State v. Harrison, 564
P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1977). Criticism of the rule has come from both the scholarly
community, see, e.g., Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 446 ("Perhaps the most that can be
said for the rule is that it provides commentators with an extreme example that makes it
easy to illustrate the injustice of various legal propositions."), and the courts, see, e.g.,
People v. Lee, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1214, 1221 (Ct. App. 1991) (describing felony murder as
a "highly artificial concept"); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 314 (Mich. 1980)
(describing the operation of the rule as having no "sound principle"); State v. Price, 726
P.2d 857, 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (observing that "felony murder is not a popular
doctrine").
5. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. ScOTr, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5, at
622-25 (2d ed. 1986) (discussing limitations placed on the rule including narrowing the list
of felonies that can trigger the rule, requiring a closer causal relationship between the
felony and the ensuing death, mandating a closer temporal relationship between the
felony and the commission of the killing, and adding an independent felony limitation).
ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER
In a recent North Carolina Court of Appeals case, State v. Lea,6
North Carolina carved out another important limitation in this state's
felony-murder doctrine. In Lea, the defendants were involved in a
high-speed chase with another car.' One of the defendants fired
shots at the other car, causing it to swerve into oncoming traffic.9 As
a result, the car collided with an oncoming car, injuring three
people.Y The defendant Colon, who had fired the shots, was
convicted of three counts of attempted first-degree murder based on
a theory of attempted felony murder." A necessary element of
attempted murder is the specific intent to kill." However,
proceeding under the felony-murder theory, the prosecution in Lea
gained the conviction without having to prove that the defendant
intended to kill the victims.3 The court of appeals reversed the
conviction, holding that attempted felony murder would require a
defendant to intend to commit an unintentional act, which was not
logically possible.'4
This Note discusses the facts of Lea and the court of appeals'
resolution of the felony-murder issue in the case. 5 The Note then
provides a brief overview of the two relevant concepts of law, felony
murder and criminal attempt, focusing on the development of these
two concepts in North Carolina law. 6 Following this overview, the
Note merges the two concepts, considering North Carolina's
resolution of the attempted felony-murder issue as well as the
resolution of this issue in other states.'7 The Note concludes by
arguing that the court's ruling was a rational and appropriate
limitation on the felony-murder rule.'Y
On the evening of February 24, 1995, Shawn Massey and
Christopher Overman drove to the Scottish Inn Motel in Burlington,
6. 126 N.C. App. 440,485 S.E.2d 874 (1997).
7. See id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
8. See id. at 443, 485 S.E.2d at 876.
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 444, 485 S.E.2d at 876. The felony of discharging a firearm into
occupied property served as the basis of the attempted felony murder charge. See id.
12. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 449,485 S.E.2d at 880.
13. See id. at 444, 485 S.E.2d at 876.
14. See id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
15. See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 46-100 and accompanying text (felony murder); infra notes 101-34
and accompanying text (criminal attempt).
17. See infra notes 135-93 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 194-97 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina, to visit some friends. 19 Upon leaving the motel a few
hours later, the two young men encountered the defendants, Orlando
Lea and Lacy Colon, in the motel parking lot.20 An argument ensued
among the four men.2' The parties exchanged heated words,
including racial slurs, but no violence occurred at that time.
22
According to Massey, defendant Colon told him in parting, "I'm
going to see you again and I'm going to kill you."'
On the following afternoon, Overman and Massey drove
Overman's black Chevrolet Nova to a car wash.24 Upon leaving the
car wash, the two met Lea and Colon in a white Ford Mustang. 2 The
Mustang began following the Nova.26 A high-speed chase ensued
that led eventually onto a four-lane highway where Lea and Colon
were able to catch up to Massey and Overman. 27 While still traveling
at a high rate of speed, Lea and Colon pulled the Mustang alongside
the Nova and defendant Lea began yelling and shaking his fist out of
the window at Massey and Overman.28 Defendant Colon then raised
himself out of the passenger-side window and, leaning across the roof
of the Mustang, fired five shots at the passenger compartment of the
Nova.29 Afraid he would be shot, Overman ducked down in the seat
while applying the brakes. 30 The Nova swerved into oncoming traffic
where it collided with a vehicle driven by Beatrice Ward.3' Overman,
Massey, and Ward all suffered injuries in the collision,32 but none of
the three was actually wounded by a bullet.
33
At the joint trial of the two defendants, Colon testified that he
had fired shots at Overman's car in self defense. 4 He stated that
Overman swerved his vehicle threateningly toward Lea's car and that
he shot at the car to prevent his car from being run off the road.35
19. See State-Appellee's Brief at 3, Lea (No. COA96-229).












32. See id.; Drive-By Shooting Leads to Collision, Serious Injury, GREENSBORO
NEWs & REc., Feb. 27, 1995, at B2.





Colon also testified that he aimed only at the vehicle itself and not at
the occupants. 6
The Alamance County Superior Court found Colon guilty of,
among other things, three counts of attempted first-degree felony
murder.37 The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could find
Colon guilty of attempted first-degree murder either on the basis of
malice, premeditation, and deliberation, or under the felony-murder
rule, or both. On the verdict form, the jury responded affirmatively
to the felony-murder charge but failed to give an answer as to
whether or not it found the defendant guilty on the basis of
premeditation and deliberation. 9
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals vacated
Colon's conviction for attempted felony murder, holding that the
offense does not exist under North Carolina law.40  The court
declared that the crime of attempted felony murder is a "logical
impossibility" because a person cannot intend to commit an
unintentional crime.41 Intent is not an element of felony murder; the
State may convict a person of murder under the rule simply by
showing that a death occurred during the course of a felony.4'
However, to convict a person of criminal attempt, the State must
show that the person specifically intended to commit the crime
36. See id.
37. See id. at 444, 485 S.E.2d at 876. Colon also was found guilty of two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill. See id. Lea was convicted of three
counts of attempted second-degree murder, two counts of assault with a deadly weapon,
one count of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and one count of
discharging a firearm into occupied property. See id.
38. See id. at 451, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
39. See id. at 452, 485 S.E.2d at 881. The jury form first asked whether the defendant
was guilty of attempted first-degree murder. See id. at 451, 485 S.E.2d at 881. If an
answer of "yes" was given to this question, the form posed two further questions. See id.
First, it asked whether the defendant was guilty of "first degree murder on the basis of
malice, premeditation and deliberation." Id. The jury left this question blank. See id.
Second, the form asked whether the defendant was guilty of "attempted first degree
murder under the first degree felony murder rule." Id. The jury answered "yes" to this
question. See id.
40. See id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880. Although the court of appeals overturned the
felony murder conviction, Colon was not acquitted of the attempted murder charge at
that time. See id. Because the jury had not answered "yes" or "no" to whether the
defendant was guilty of attempted first-degree murder on the basis of premeditation and
deliberation, the court could not determine whether the jury had considered this question.
See id. at 452, 485 S.E.2d at 881. On remand, the court stated that Colon could be retried
for attempted murder under this alternate theory. See id. at 453, 485 S.E.2d at 882.
41. See id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
42- See id. at 449,485 S.E.2d at 880.
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charged.43 Therefore, attempted felony murder would require the
State to prove that a defendant specifically intended to commit an
unintentional crime.44 According to the court of appeals, such crime
cannot exist.45
The current North Carolina first-degree murder statute defines
felony murder as "a murder which shall be ... committed in the
perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or a sex
offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or
attempted with the use of a deadly weapon."4 6 While traditional first-
degree murder involves the unlawful killing of another with malice
aforethought,47 premeditation and deliberation are not necessary
elements of felony murder.48 The State is also not required to prove
that the defendant intended to cause death.49 To secure a conviction,
the State must only prove that the defendant intended to commit the
underlying felony.50
Proponents of the felony-murder rule offer several arguments in
its defense. As a matter of theory, proponents contend that the rule
is justified on the basis of constructive malice, also known as the
transferred intent doctrine.5' This doctrine asserts that the intent to
43. See id.
44. See id. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880.
45. See id.
46. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997). The first-degree murder statute also
includes murders that "shall be perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait,
imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and
premeditated killing." Id. First-degree murder is classified as a Class A felony,
punishable by the death penalty or life imprisonment. See id.
47. See id.; LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 622; Kevin Cole, Killings During
Crime: Toward a Discriminating Theory of Strict Liability, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 73, 74
(1991).
48. See State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658, 666, 462 S.E.2d 492, 498 (1995); State v.
Johnson, 317 N.C. 193, 202, 344 S.E.2d 775, 781 (1986); State v. Wall, 304 N.C. 609, 613,
286 S.E.2d 68, 71 (1982) (citing State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 407, 226 S.E.2d 652, 669
(1972)).
49. See State v. Avery, 315 N.C. 1, 29, 337 S.E.2d 786,802 (1985); State v. Thompson,
280 N.C. 202, 213, 185 S.E.2d 666, 673-74 (1972). To qualify for a felony murder
conviction, the killing may be, but is not required to be, intentional. See State v. Gibbs,
335 N.C. 1, 51,436 S.E.2d 321, 350 (1993); State v. Shrader, 290 N.C. 253, 261, 225 S.E.2d
522, 528 (1976).
50. See Richardson, 341 N.C. at 666-67,462 S.E.2d at 498.
51. See Commonwealth v. Matchett, 436 N.E.2d 400,407 (Mass. 1982) ("The effect of
the felony-murder rule is to substitute the intent to commit the underlying felony for the
malice aforethought required for murder."); People v. Gladman, 359 N.E.2d 420, 422
(N.Y. 1976) ("By operation of law, the intent necessary to sustain a murder conviction is
inferred from the intent to commit a specific, serious, felonious act, even though the
defendant, in truth, may not have intended to kill"); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284
S.E.2d 811, 814 (Va. 1981) (stating that" '[m]alice inheres in the doing of a wrongful act
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commit the felony is imputed as the malice necessary for common-
law murder.52 Supporters also assert policy arguments in support of
the felony-murder rule. First, proponents argue that the possibility of
a murder conviction deters persons from entering into dangerous
criminal ventures when it is foreseeable that death could ensue.
53
Second, proponents argue that felony murder is justified by the
principle that felonies which result in death should be punished more
severely than felonies which do not result in death. 4 Third,
intentionally or without just cause or excuse, or as a result of ill will'" (quoting Dawkins
v. Commonwealth, 41 S.E.2d 500, 503 (Va. 1947))); Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 455
(describing the doctrines as closely related and observing that both are frequently used in
support of felony murder liability).
52. See State v. Gardner, 315 N.C. 444,457,340 S.E.2d 701,710 (1986) (stating that in
felony murder the malice from an intended felony is transferred to the unintended
homicide, and "[a]s a result of the fictional transfer, the homicide is deemed committed
with malice"). The transferred intent and constructive malice rationales have been
criticized as a basis for the felony-murder rule. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 7.5,
at 622 n.2 (characterizing the notion of constructive malice as "pure fiction" and urging
that felony murder be recognized as a category of murder separate from intent-to-kill
murder); Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 453-57 (criticizing both the transferred intent
and constructive malice rationales).
53. See United States v. Tham, 118 F.3d 1501, 1509 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting felony
murder's policy rationale of deterring the commission of certain dangerous felonies);
United States v. Martinez, 16 F.3d 202, 207 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that "liability for
felony murder ... serves the practical function of deterring felons from using lethal
weaponry, more broadly from committing the kind of felony in which someone is likely to
be ... injured (and hence possibly killed), by punishing them severely should death
result-to anyone"); State v. Hoang, 755 P.2d 7, 8 (Kan. 1988) (stating that "[tihe purpose
of the felony murder doctrine is to deter all those engaged in felonies from killing
negligently or accidentally") (citing State v. Brantley, 691 P.2d 26, 28 (1984)); Richardson,
341 N.C. at 666, 462 S.E.2d at 498 (noting that "[t]he felony murder rule was promulgated
to deter even accidental killings"); DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[B][2], at 480
(describing deterrence as the most common defense of the felony-murder rule);
Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1449 (distinguishing the two strains of the deterrence
argument: the threat of murder liability discourages the commission of the felony itself
and encourages greater care during the performance of the felony).
Opponents of felony murder contend that the deterrence argument is logically flawed
and not supported by empirical evidence. See id. at 1448-58, 1460 (referring to the
"deterrence delusion"). These critics contend that there is no statistical proof that felony
murder liability deters the commission of serious crimes. See Roth & Sundby, supra note
3, at 452. They also argue that punishing a person for an act the person did not intend to
commit cannot deter future conduct. See id. The North Carolina Supreme Court has
stated that proper attempts at deterrence should focus on "'the harm intended by the
criminal rather than at the greater harm possibly flowing from his act which was neither
intended nor desired by him.'" State v. Bonner, 330 N.C. 536, 546,411 S.E.2d 598, 603-04
(1992) (quoting Norval Morris, The Felon's Responsibility for Lethal Acts of Others, 105
U. PA. L. REV. 50, 67 (1956)). This view led the court to forbid the use of the felony-
murder rule against a defendant when someone other than the defendant or the
defendant's co-felon commits a killing. See id. at 545, 411 S.E.2d at 603; infra notes 89-98
and accompanying text.
54. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[B][3], at 481 (observing that the criminal
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proponents argue that the availability of felony murder assists the
prosecution in those cases where circumstances make it difficult to
prove intent.5
Despite these arguments in favor of the felony-murder rule, it
has faced heavy criticism.56 The primary criticism is that the rule
punishes the defendant without regard to the defendant's individual
culpability. 7 Removing intent as an element of the crime, in essence,
"establish[es] a per se rule of accountability for deaths occurring
during the commission of felonies."5' Whether the defendant acts
involved in a felony causing death has a greater debt to pay to society); Michelle S.
Simon, Whose Crime is it Anyway? Liability for the Lethal Acts of Nonparticipants in the
Felony, 71 U. DET. MERCY L. REv. 223, 225 (1994) (stating that the viability of the rule
"reflects the societal judgment that a felony resulting in a death, even if that death was
not intended, should be punished more severely than a felony not resulting in a death").
55. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[B][5], at 482. The prosecutor does not have
to prove that the defendant intended to kill the victim or that the felon was aware that his
conduct was extremely dangerous to human life. See id. at 483. Instead, the prosecutor
must show only that the defendant committed the felony and that the death occurred
during its commission. See id. The easing of the prosecutor's burden in proving the
State's case produces a greater number of convictions and promotes politically desirable
law and order. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1463 (stating that the felony-murder rule
is viewed by some as "harsh, tough, and designed to protect us against those who
introduce unwarranted and unnecessary threats of death into our daily lives").
56. See Head v. State, 443 N.E.2d 44, 48-49 (Ind. 1982); see also State v. Branson, 487
N.W.2d 880, 882 (Minn. 1992) (noting that "the rule has been severely criticized for its
mechanical operation, penalogical purposes, and its intrinsic unfairness"); Roth &
Sundby, supra note 3, at 446 (observing that "[c]riticism of the rule constitutes a lexicon
of everything that scholars and jurists can find wrong with a legal doctrine").
57. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (noting that the felony-
murder rule has faced criticism because "in almost all the cases in which it is applied it is
unnecessary and ... erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability);
People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 334 (Mich. 1980) (Ryan, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (noting that felony murder fails "to correlate, to any degree, criminal
liability with moral culpability" and that "[i]t permits one to be punished for a killing,
usually with the most severe penalty in the law, without requiring proof of any mental
state with respect to the killing"); Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 452 ("[T]he
punishment of a killing as murder where subjective culpability is lacking clashes with
modem definitions of murder."); Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1435-38 (arguing that felony
murder is inconsistent with contemporary principles of culpability and fault, such as the
principle that the actor must possess the requisite mens rea for the offense charged).
Outside the felony murder context, homicide is punished according to the degree of
mental fault of the defendant. See id. at 1437-38. For example, the unintentional killing
of another without malice through a negligent act or omission may constitute involuntary
manslaughter, see State v. McCoy, 122 N.C. App. 482,485,470 S.E.2d 542,544 (1996), the
killing of another with malice but without specific intent to kill constitutes second-degree
murder, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997), and the killing of another with
premeditation and deliberation constitutes first-degree murder, see id. On the other
hand, under felony murder, even an accidental death committed with no intent is
punished as first-degree murder. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1438-39.
58. State v. Bell, 338 N.C. 363, 386, 450 S.E.2d 710, 723 (1994); see also State v. Price,
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with specific intent to kill the victim, with reckless indifference
toward the victim, or accidentally kills the victim, all defendants
receive the same punishment.5 9 Coupled with accomplice liability,
6
the rule can lead to arbitrary and even bizarre results.61
Despite these criticisms, some form of the felony-murder rule
remains in forty-six states.62 However, most states, including North
Carolina, have limited the application of the rule.63 The following
section discusses the development of the felony-murder rule and
some limits placed on the rule by the legislature and courts of North
Carolina.64
726 P.2d 857, 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986) (describing the felony-murder doctrine as result-
oriented); Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 457-60 (criticizing the strict liability nature of
felony murder).
59. See State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202,213,185 S.E.2d 666,674 (1972).
60. Accomplice liability involves the placement of criminal responsibility on persons
who are party to a crime for acts committed by a principal in the perpetration of the
crime. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 5, §§ 6.7-6.9, at 576-602.
61. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal. 1965) (providing the example
that if two persons rob a store and then flee in opposite directions and the owner of the
store follows and kills one felon, the other felon could be guilty of murder under the
felony-murder rule); People v. Powell, 561 N.Y.S.2d 837,837 (App. Div. 1990) (sustaining
the defendant's murder conviction even though the defendant served only as the lookout
during a burglary and took no part in the killing); Commonwealth v. Bolish, 138 A.2d 447,
449 (Pa. 1958) (sustaining first degree murder conviction for the death of the defendant's
accomplice in an arson fire set by that accomplice); Richard W. Garnett, Note, Depravity
Thrice Remove& Using the "Heinous, Cruel, or Depraved" Factor to Aggravate
Convictions of Nontriggerman Accomplices in Capital Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 2471, 2473
("[T]he nontriggerman convicted of felony murder is three times removed from the locus
of blame: the killing is murder by reason of the felony murder rule, the defendant is
responsible for the killing under accomplice liability principles, and he faces the
executioner because of the manner in which another person killed.").
62. Only four states have abandoned the rule altogether. See HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 707-701, 707-701.5 (Repl. 1993) (eliminating the felony-murder rule); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 507.020(1)(a) (Michie 1990) (same); People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304,326 (Mich.
1980) (same); State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1977) (adopting the "natural
and probable consequences" test for lesser-degree felonies). Commentators have
marveled at the irrepressibility of the felony-murder doctrine. See Cole, supra note 47, at
74 (noting that the rule has proved "quite durable"); Simon, supra note 54, at 225 ("The
felony-murder doctrine, although much maligned, is still a frequently used theory of
liability.").
63. See Head v. State, 443 N.E.2d 44,49 (Ind. 1982) (noting several limitations placed
on the felony-murder rule by various states including reducing the degree of murder and
punishment, requiring mens rea beyond the intent to commit the underlying offense,
restricting applicability to deaths caused by the perpetrator of the underlying felony,
limiting application to only certain felonies, and requiring that the decedent be someone
other than a co-felon); LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 623-25 (observing
limitations placed on the common-law felony-murder rule); Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at
1467 (stating that "[a]n unlimited felony-murder rule... is not the law of our land").
64. Professor Tomkovicz has argued that, while most commentators believe
limitations on the felony-murder rule evidence a distaste for the rule and foreshadow the
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The felony-murder rule is a product of English common law.65
While the rule's exact origins are unclear,66 by the eighteenth century
it was well-established in England that a killing committed during the
course of a felony constituted murder. 67  Justifications for the
development of the common-law rule are also ambiguous.3 One
suggested justification is that it enabled the punishment of attempted
felonies during the course of which death ensued.69 At common law,
attempts of felonies were punished as misdemeanors, while felonies
themselves were punished by death.7  The felony-murder rule
allowed the courts to punish unsuccessful or incomplete felonies to
the same extent as successful felonies.71
rule's imminent abolition, limitations on the rule have removed it's rough edges and thus
have legitimized the rule and ensured its continued survival. See Tomkovicz, supra note
3, at 1465-66.
65. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1, at 61-63
(2d ed. 1986). Under the common-law rule of felony murder, a person who causes death
during the commission or attempted commission of a felony is guilty of murder,
regardless of her intent. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[A], at 479.
66. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 449 (discussing three possible historical
sources of the rule); Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1442 (noting that commentators have
attributed the origin of the felony-murder rule to a variety of sources).
67. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 622; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
65, § 2.1, at 62; see also Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1442-48 (providing a brief overview of
the rule's ambiguous origins).
68. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 448 (noting that the purpose of the rule at
common law is vague); Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1445 (stating that the felony-murder
rule is not a rule "with either solid, ancient ancestry or unimpeachably logical
underpinnings").
69. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 450.
70. See id. At common law, only those crimes that involved inherent moral wrong
(mala in se), were considered felonies. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1445-46.
Therefore, only a small number of acts could actually serve as the basis of a felony-
murder charge. See id. at 1446 (stating that "the typical effect of the rule was to brand as
murderers only those who had performed seriously immoral acts of a life-threatening
nature").
71. See Roth & Sundby, supra note 3, at 450. Professors Roth and Sundby have
contended that, if the punishment of attempted felonies was the justification of the
common-law felony-murder rule, this justification no longer has merit under modern
statutory schemes that punish attempted crimes severely. See id.; see, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-2.5 (Supp. 1997) (punishing an attempt to commit a felony under the
classification that is lower than that of the offense which the offender attempted to
commit). Also, since at common law all felonies were punishable by death, the imposition
of the felony-murder rule would not have violated principles of culpability. See Redline v.
Commonwealth, 137 A.2d 472, 476 (Pa. 1958) (noting that a possible explanation for the
origin of the doctrine is that "at early common law many crimes, including practically all,
if not all, felonies were punishable by death so that it was of no particular moment
whether the condemned was hanged for the initial felony or for the death accidentally
resulting from the felony"); Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1451 (observing that when the
felony-murder rule originally arose, problems of culpability would not have existed).
Today, the commission of a felony is not considered a sufficient crime to warrant death.
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While felony murder eventually was abolished in England72 the
doctrine was imported to the United States where it continues to
thrive.73 In North Carolina, the felony-murder rule was a common-
law rule74 until it was codified by the General Assembly in 1893.7s
This murder statute provided that the defendant could be convicted
of felony murder for a homicide that occurred during the commission
of "arson, rape, robbery, and burglary, or other felony. "76
One of the first limitations placed on felony murder in North
Carolina involved interpretation of the statutory phrase "or other
Therefore, placing first-degree murder liability on a person who participates in, for
example, a robbery risks punishing persons in excess of their culpability.
72. See English Homicide Act, 1957,5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 11, § 1.
73. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 641 ("[T]here is reason to believe
that the felony-murder doctrine will continue to exist ... for many years to come.");
Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1458-79 (offering four explanations for the survival of the
felony-murder rule in the United States: historical roots of the rule, political support for
the doctrine, limitations on the rule that diminish the rule's especially egregious
applications, and popular understandings of culpability that differ from scholarly
understandings).
74. Under the common law of North Carolina, a killing committed in the perpetration
or attempted perpetration of a felony constituted murder. See State v. Covington, 117
N.C. 834, 865, 23 S.E. 337, 353 (1895). The codification of felony murder, see Act of Feb.
11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-17 (Supp. 1997)), did not provide a new definition of felony murder but simply
included this type of homicide in the category of first-degree murder. See State v. Banks,
143 N.C. 652,656,57 S.E. 174, 176 (1907).
75. In 1893, when the General Assembly divided murder into two degrees, felony
murder was placed in the first degree. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess.
Laws 76, 76-77 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997)); State v.
Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 422, 290 S.E.2d 574, 588 (1982); State v. Streeton, 231 N.C. 301, 305,
56 S.E.2d 649, 652 (1949). At common law, murder had not been distinguished according
to degrees. See Streeton, 231 N.C. at 304, 56 S.E.2d at 652. Rather, any unlawful killing of
another with malice aforethought constituted murder. See id. The 1893 statute singled
out murders committed by more heinous means of perpetration and classified them as
first degree. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77 (1893)
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997)); Streeton, 231 N.C. at 305,
56 S.E.2d at 652. All other murders constituted second degree murder. See Act of Feb.
11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76, 76-77; Streeton, 231 N.C. at 305, 56 S.E.2d at
652. Murder in the first degree was punishable by death while murder in the second
degree was punishable by imprisonment. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess.
Laws 76, 76-77 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997)); State v.
Dalton, 178 N.C. 779,783, 101 S.E. 548,549-50 (1919).
76. See Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893 N.C. Sess. Laws 76,76-77 (1893) (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997)). Prior to 1893, any intentional and
unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, express or implied,
constituted murder punishable by death. See Streeton, 231 N.C. at 304, 56 S.E.2d at 652.
The murders included in the first-degree category were divided into three basic groups:
(1) murders perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or
torture, (2) premeditated murder, and (3) killings occurring in the commission of certain
specified felonies "or other felony." See Davis, 305 N.C. at 423, 290 S.E.2d at 588.
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felony," so as to limit the acts which could serve as the foundation of
a feloiny-murder conviction.77 In 1972, in State v. Thompson,78 the
North Carolina Supreme Court interpreted "other felony" to include
felonies that create a "substantial foreseeable human risk and
actually result[] in the loss of life. '79 This inferred limitation ensured
that murder liability could attach only to sufficiently violent acts
involving the potential for loss of life.8" The Thompson decision was
superseded by statute in 1977 when the General Assembly amended
the felony-murder statute by striking the phrase "or other felony" in
favor of "or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a
deadly weapon."8'
77. A majority of states limit the felonies that can serve as the basis of a felony-
murder conviction to a specifically enumerated group. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at
1467. In State v. Thompson, 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972), the defendant was
charged with killing the victim during a felonious breaking and entering and felonious
larceny. See id. at 204, 185 S.E.2d 668. According to the court, a homicide was first-
degree murder if it occurred during the perpetration of one of the four enumerated
felonies or during "any other felony inherently dangerous to human life." Id. at 209, 185
S.E.2d at 671. The category of felonies which created a "substantial foreseeable human
risk" that death could ensue included, but was not limited to, felonies that were
"inherently dangerous to life." Id. at 211, 185 S.E.2d at 672. Quoting Professor Perkins,
the court said,
"One who is perpetrating a felony which seems not of itself to involve any
element of human risk, may resort to a dangerous method of committing it ....
If the dangerous force thus used results in death, the crime is murder just as
much as if the danger was inherent in the very nature of the felony itself."
Id. at 211-12, 185 S.E.2d at 672-73 (quoting ROLLIN M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 34
(1957)). In Thompson, breaking into a house while armed with a pistol created "a
substantial foreseeable human risk[]." Id. at 212, 185 S.E.2d at 673.
78. 280 N.C. 202, 185 S.E.2d 666 (1972).
79. 1& at 211, 185 S.E.2d at 672. For a list of felonies that have been held to be
inherently dangerous to life, see State v. Swift, 290 N.C. 383, 408, 226 S.E.2d 652, 669
(1976) (listing breaking, entering, and larceny; robbery; escape from prison; kidnapping;
and arson). See also Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, What Felonies are Inherently or
Foreseeably Dangerous to Human Life for Purposes of Felony-Murder Doctrine, 50
A.L.R.3D 397 (1973) (providing an overview of felonies considered by courts to be
inherently or foreseeably dangerous to human life for purposes of the felony-murder
rule); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 65, § 1, at 63 (noting that the felonies usually
included in this category are arson, rape, robbery, and burglary).
80. This limitation, adopted by several states, often is described as the "inherently
dangerous felony" limitation. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[C][1], at 483-84;
LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 623-25; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 65,
§ 2.1(c), at 65-66.
81. Act of May 19, 1977, ch. 406, § 1, 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws 407, 407 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997)). By virtue of the amendment, a
felony could serve as the basis of a felony murder conviction only if the felony is specified
in the statute or the felony was committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon.
See State v. Davis, 305 N.C. 400, 423-24,290 S.E.2d 574, 588 (1982).
In State v. Fields, 315 N.C. 191, 337 S.E.2d 518 (1985), the supreme court held that
this statute does not mandate that the crime actually be committed by the physical use of
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The court also has limited felony murder by requiring a temporal
relationship between the felony and the killing.' If the killing is to
be included under the felony-murder rule, there cannot be a break in
the chain of events leading from the initial felony to the act causing
death, so that the homicide is part of a series of incidents that form
one continuous transaction.8 Under this approach, it is immaterial
whether the killing occurs before or after the commission of the
felony, but the two must be part of the same sequence of events.
84
In State v. Thomas,8 the state supreme court further limited the
reach of the felony-murder rule when it held that there are lesser
included offenses to first-degree murder even when first-degree
murder is prosecuted and submitted to the jury solely under a theory
of felony murder.86 The court indicated that second-degree murder,
a weapon. See id. at 199, 337 S.E.2d at 523. Rather, the court held that mere possession
of a deadly weapon involves a psychological use that is within the purview of the statute.
See id. For a detailed discussion of the Fields case, see Elizabeth Kelly, Note, State v.
Fields: Felony Murder and Psychological Use of a Deadly Weapon, 65 N.C. L. REV. 1220
(1987).
82. See, e.g., State v. Tucker, 347 N.C. 235,240,490 S.E.2d 559,562-63 (1997); State v.
Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 345, 279 S.E.2d 788, 803 (1981); Thompson, 280 N.C. at 212, 185
S.E.2d at 673. For example, in Hutchins, police officers were called to investigate a
domestic disturbance at the home of the defendant. See Hutchins, 303 N.C. at 327, 279
S.E.2d at 793. Two officers who arrived in separate vehicles at the defendant's home
were each shot and killed by the defendant. See id. In the police chase which followed,
the defendant shot and killed a third police officer. See id. at 328-29, 279 S.E.2d at 794.
The defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder on the basis of
felony murder for the deaths of the second and third officers. See id. at 345, 279 S.E.2d at
803. The killing of the first officer served as the underlying felony for the felony-murder
charge for the latter two deaths. See id. The court determined that the action beginning
with the killing of the first officer and culminating with the killing of the third constituted
an unbroken chain of events. See id.
83. See State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 51-52,436 S.E.2d 321, 350 (1993) (recognizing that
there must be an unbroken chain of events); State v. Handy, 331 N,C. 515, 529, 419 S.E.2d
545, 552-53 (1992) (upholding felony-murder conviction where taking of property and
killing were found by jury to be part of "one continuous chain of events"); State v.
Thomas, 329 N.C. 423,434,407 S.E.2d 141,150 (1991) (supporting felony-murder liability
on evidence that the sexual act forming the basis for felony murder "was committed
during a continuous transaction that began when the victim was alive"); State v. Shrader,
290 N.C. 253, 261, 225 S.E.2d 522, 528 (1976) (finding that the defendant's kidnapping
and subsequent shooting of the victim constituted "an unbroken chain of events").
84. See Handy, 331 N.C. at 529, 419 S.E.2d at 552-53 (1992) (holding in regards to a
robbery that the temporal order of the killing and the taking of the property was
immaterial as long as the theft and killing were "aspects of a single transaction"). In
addition, the intent to commit the felony can be formed before or after the killing. See id.;
State v. Faison, 330 N.C. 347,359,411 S.E.2d 143,150 (1991).
85. 325 N.C. 583,386 S.E.2d 555 (1989).
86. See id. at 591, 386 S.E.2d at 559-60. According to the court, the jury must be
instructed as to a lesser-included offense when (1) all the essential elements of the lesser-
included offense are contained in the indictment for the greater offense and (2) there is
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voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter could each
constitute lesser-included offenses if supported by the indictment and
evidence.87 While this holding did not limit the scope of the felony-
murder rule, it offered the possibility that fewer persons would be
convicted of felony murder by providing juries an alternative to first-
degree murder liability.s
One of the most unsettled areas of the relatively stable felony-
murder rule concerns whether the rule should be used to convict a
felon of murder for deaths caused by a non-felon. 9 This issue arises
most often in situations where a person resisting the felony, such as
the victim or a police officer, causes the death of either a felon or an
innocent bystander.9 State courts are divided over whether the
felony-murder rule should be applied in this circumstance, 91 but all
evidence to support a conviction of the lesser-included offense. See id. at 590, 386 S.E.2d
at 559.
87. See icL at 591-94, 386 S.E.2d at 559-61. Allowing the jury to convict the defendant
of some lesser offense removes the burden on the jury to decide between the extremes of
either a first-degree murder conviction or absolute acquittal. See id. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at
564. In reaching its holding, the Thomas court acknowledged the United States Supreme
Court's observation in Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980), that instructing as to lesser-
included offenses benefits both the prosecution and defense. See id. at 644-45; Thomas,
325 N.C. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564. The rule helps the prosecution when its proof is weak
on an element of the larger offense, and the defendant is benefited because the jury is
offered "'a less drastic alternative than the choice between conviction of the offense
charged and acquittal.'" Thomas, 325 N.C. at 599, 386 S.E.2d at 564 (quoting Beck, 447
U.S. at 633). For a discussion of the Thomas case, see David George Hester, Note, State
v. Thomas: The North Carolina Supreme Court Determines That There Are Lesser
Included Offenses of Felony Murder, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1127 (1990).
88. See Hester, supra note 87, at 1143.
89. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (noting a split among the jurisdictions
regarding whether felony-murder liability vests in this situation).
90. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[C][4], at 487-88 (discussing killings
perpetrated by non-felons).
91. The majority of states considering this issue have found no felony-murder liability
when a non-felon commits the killing. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 134 (Cal.
1965) (co-felon killed by robbery victim); Alvarez v. District Court, 525 P.2d 1131, 1132
(Colo. 1974) (en banc) (victim mistaken for robber and shot by police); Weick v. State,
420 A.2d 159, 162 (Del. 1980) (co-felon killed by robbery victim); State v. Crane, 279
S.E.2d 695, 696 (Ga. 1981) (accomplice killed by burglarized homeowner); State v.
Garner, 115 So. 2d 855, 864 (La. 1959) (bar patron accidentally killed bystander while
defending bystander against assault); Campbell v. State, 444 A.2d 1034, 1042 (Md. 1982)
(no felony murder where co-felon is killed by victim or police); Commonwealth v. Balliro,
209 N.E.2d 308, 314 (Mass. 1965) (police officer accidentally shot bystander); State v.
Branson, 487 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Minn. 1992) (bystander killed by shot fired by someone in
group adverse to the defendant); Sheriff of Clark County v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768
(Nev. 1973) (victim of attempted murder killed co-felon); Jackson v. State, 589 P.2d 1052,
1053 (N.M. 1979) (victim of robbery killed co-felon); State v. Jones, 859 P.2d 514, 515
(Okla. Crim. App. 1993) (express language of felony-murder statute precludes
prosecution when death is caused by one other than defendant or accomplices);
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courts considering the issue generally have chosen to'follow either of
two theories of felony-murder liability: agency theory or proximate
cause theory.92 Under the agency theory of felony murder, either the
defendant or an accomplice must cause the death of the victim if the
defendant is to be liable for felony murder. 3  Other states have
Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 A.2d 472,483 (Pa. 1958) (co-felon shot by police); State v.
Severs, 759 S.W.2d 935, 938 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988) (co-perpetrator of crime killed by
victim); State v. Hansen, 734 P.2d 421, 427 (Utah 1986) (accomplice killed by opponent of
felony); Wooden v. Commonwealth, 284 S.E.2d 811, 816 (Va. 1981) (robbery victim shot
accomplice).
A minority of states have extended felony-murder liability to killings within the
course of the felony not caused by the defendant or an accomplice. See State v. Lucas,
794 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (shooting of co-felon by victim); Mikenas v.
State, 367 So. 2d 606, 609 (Fla. 1978) (per curiam) (killing of defendant co-felon by police
officer during robbery); People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (Ill. 1997) (killing of a
bystander by robbery victim); State v. Baker, 607 S.W.2d 153, 156 (Mo. 1980) (en banc)
(killing of defendant's accomplice by intended robbery victim); State v. Martin, 573 A.2d
1359, 1373 (N.J. 1990) (stating in dicta that legislature adopted proximate cause theory);
People v. Hernandez, 624 N.E.2d 661, 665 (N.Y. 1993) (stating that defendants could be
convicted of murder even though police officer was shot by a fellow officer); State v.
Chambers, 373 N.E.2d 393, 395 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977) (finding that the legislature
intended to adopt proximate cause theory of criminal liability); Miers v. State, 251 S.W.2d
404, 408 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) (involving a victim attempting to thwart felon
accidentally killing himself); State v. Oimen, 516 N.W.2d 399,404 (Wis. 1994) (involving a
victim killing the defendant's co-felon).
92. See Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Criminal Liability Where Act of Killing Is Done
by One Resisting Felony or Other Unlawful Act Committed by Defendant, 56 A.L.R.3D
239, 242 (1974). See generally DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[GJ[4][b],[c], at 487-89
(examining the rationales underlying agency and proximate cause theory); LAFAVE &
ScoIr, supra note 5, § 7.5, at 628-32 (same); David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In
Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359, 383-87 (1985)
(same); Simon, supra note 54, at 241-47 (same); Paul J. Arougheti, Note, Imposing
Homicide Liability on Gun Battle Participants for the Deaths of Innocent Bystanders, 27
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBs. 467, 489-99 (1994) (discussing the alternate theories and
advocating the use of agency theory); Michael J. Roman, Comment, "Once More Unto the
Breach Dear Friends, Once More": A Call to Re-Evaluate the Felony-Murder Doctrine in
Wisconsin in Wake of State v. Oimen and State v. Rivera, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 785, 809-10
(1994) (same).
93. Several rationales have been extended in favor of the agency theory. First, it is
argued that when a non-felon commits the killing, the felony-murder concept of
constructive malice fails. See Wooden, 284 S.E.2d at 815. When a nonparticipant
commits the killing, no malice can be imputed to him because he is not acting with
felonious intent. See id. Therefore, no person in the causal chain has both the requisite
mens rea and culpability for the actus reus. See id. Second, supporters of agency theory
argue that felony-murder liability was intended to apply only to killings committed in
furtherance of the felony. See Weick, 420 A.2d at 162; Campbell, 444 A.2d at 1038-39;
Redline, 137 A.2d at 476; Simon, supra note 54, at 241-42. When a person ancillary to the
crime commits the killing, the killing cannot serve as the basis of a felony-murder
conviction. See Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541, 544-45 (7 Allen 1863). Third,
it is argued that punishing the felon for killings committed by non-participants
discriminates among felons not on the basis of their own conduct, but on the fortuitous
responsiveness of their victim. See Washington, 402 P.2d at 133; Campbell, 444 A.2d at
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applied the felony-murder rule more broadly, choosing to follow a
proximate cause theory of felony murder that holds the defendant
and accomplices liable for any death that is proximately related to
the commission of the felony, regardless of who actually killed the
decedent. 4
The North Carolina Supreme Court considered this issue in State
v. Bonner,95 where a security guard of a restaurant shot and killed two
of the four armed felons attempting to rob a restaurant. The two
robbers who survived the shoot-out were subsequently charged with
and convicted of first-degree murder for the deaths of their two
accomplices. 97 The Court joined the majority of states following the
agency theory by holding that "'the doctrine of felony murder does
not extend to a killing, although growing out of the commission of the
felony, if directly attributable to the act of one other than the
defendant or those associated with him in the unlawful enterprise.' -98
In sum, the North Carolina legislature and courts have over the
past years, as other states, narrowed in certain respects the
application of the felony-murder rule. This has been accomplished
through proscribing the felonies that can serve as the basis of a
felony-murder charge, requiring a temporal connection between the
felony and the resulting death, requiring an instruction concerning
lesser-included offenses, and holding that the felon or his co-felon
must be responsible for the killing, have narrowed the application of
the felony-murder rule in North Carolina. 99  Despite these
limitations, however, around its periphery, the rule remains a viable
part of the state's homicide law.100 The following section examines
the concept of criminal attempt in North Carolina, the second legal
1041. Because the felon has no control over the victim's response, punishing the
defendant for the victim's act serves as no deterrent. See Washington, 402 P.2d at 133;
DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 31.06[C[4], at 488.
94. Courts that have followed proximate cause theory have concluded that when a
person engages in a felony, the likelihood of resistance is foreseeable to the extent that
the person should bear responsibility for the results of acts of resistance. See Chambers,
373 N.E.2d at 397; Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336, 340 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963). These
jurisdictions also have contended that broad application of the felony-murder rule in this
instance does lead to deterrence by discouraging felons from entering upon violent crimes
where it is reasonably foreseeable that death could ensue. See United States v. Martinez,
16 F.3d 202,207 (7th Cir. 1994); People v. Lord, 532 N.E.2d 711,719 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
95. 330 N.C. 536,411 S.E.2d 598 (1992).
96. See id. at 537,411 S.E.2d at 598.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 544-45, 411 S.E.2d at 603 (quoting State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 23 (N.J.
1977) (citations omitted)).
99. See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text.
100. See State v. Richardson, 341 N.C. 658,666,462 S.E.2d 492,498 (1995).
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component underlying attempted felony murder. t,
The existence of attempt as a distinct, substantive crime is a
relatively modern development in the common law. 1' Not until the
early nineteenth century did English courts accept that a person
could be punished for the mere attempt to commit a crime.1 2 At
common law, attempt consisted of two elements, "an intent to do an
act or bring about certain consequences which would in law amount
to a crime ... and ... an act in furtherance of that intent which ...
goes beyond mere preparation." 03 Whether a person attempted to
commit a felony or a misdemeanor, the crime of attempt was
punished at common law as a misdemeanor)°4
The primary rationale for punishing attempts is not to deter the
commission of completed crimes, but to subject to corrective action
persons who have sufficiently manifested their dangerousness. 05
Even if a person's attempt does not succeed, by attempting the
criminal action, the person has manifested an imminent threat to the
community. 6 Punishment is warranted to prevent the repetition of
the criminal conduct.' 7 Such punishment also gives law enforcement
101. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 495; Ira P. Robbins, Double
Inchoate Crimes, 26 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 9 (1989).
102. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 496-97. Before the development of
attempt as a distinct crime, the primary way to punish conduct that preceded a criminal
offense was through the use of assault and burglary. See id. Under the ancient common
law, an attempt to do harm was not an offense. See id. at 495 n.2.
103. Id. at 495.
104. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.02, at 348; LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5,
§ 6.2, at 497; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 65, § 3, at 611.
105. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5 cmt., at 294 (1985) ("General deterrence is at most
a minor function to be served in fashioning provisions of the penal law addressed to ...
inchoate crimes; that burden is discharged upon the whole by the law dealing with the
substantive offenses."); DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.04[A][1], at 355-56 (discussing
utilitarian and retributivist justifications for the punishment of criminal attempts);
Robbins, supra note 101, at 12 ("The threat posed by the sanction for an attempt is
unlikely to deter a person willing to risk the penalty for the object crime."). There are
generally two rationales concerning the punishment of criminal attempt. See Kyle S.
Brodie, The Obviously Impossible Attempt: A Proposed Revision to the Model Penal
Code, 15 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 237, 242 (1995). The subjectivist approach focuses on the
actor; punishing attempt seeks to counter the actor's ability to further commit offenses.
See id. The objectivist approach, on the other hand, focuses on the punishment of the
dangerous acts themselves. See id.
106. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5 cmt., at 294 (1985) (noting that "[c]onduct designed
to cause or culminate in the commission of a crime obviously yields an indication that the
actor is disposed towards such activity, not alone on this occasion but on others");
DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.04[A][1], at 355; LAFAvE & ScOTr, supra note 5, § 6.2, at
499 (observing that "in some circumstances a person whose criminal scheme has
miscarried on a particular occasion may present a greater continuing danger than the
person who succeeded").
107. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.04[A][1], at 355; see also LAFAVE & SCOTT,
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officers a legal basis to intervene and prevent the completion of
crimes.' A final rationale in support of criminalizing attempt is that
a person whose attempt fails may be as morally culpable as a person
whose attempt succeeds. 09 In other words, a person should not
escape punishment simply because he is a bad shot.110
The mental state required for the crime of attempt is a specific
intent to commit a certain offense.' As one commentator has
stated: "The word 'attempt' means to try; it implies an effort to bring
about a desired result. Hence an attempt to commit any crime
requires a specific intent to commit that particular offense." ' When
supra note 5, § 6.2, at 499 (noting that prosecution for attempt places rehabilitative and
restraint measures upon the criminal that ultimately serve to protect the public).
108. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 498-99 (noting that attempt law
provides police with an opportunity to take preventative action before the defendant
comes close to committing the intended crime); Robbins, supra note 101, at 7 (observing
that punishing attempt provides the police with a means to prevent the consummation of
substantive offenses).
109. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.04[A][2], at 355-56; LAFAVE & ScoTT, supra
note 5, § 6.2, at 499. Professors LaFave and Scott have demonstrated this point using the
example of four persons, A, B, C, and D, who all set out to murder their respective
enemies. A succeeds, but the others fail: B's aim is bad, C's gun misfires, and D is
intercepted by the police just as she is about to fire her gun. While A is liable for a
greater offense than the other three, the other three will still be culpable of some wrong.
See LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 499.
110. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.04[A][2], at 356.
111. See LAFAVE & ScOTT, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 500; PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
65, § 6.3, at 637; CHARLES E. TORCIA, 4 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW § 741, at 565 (14th
ed. 1981); Robbins, supra note 101, at 8; Mark E. Roszkowski & Ralph Brubaker,
Attempted Monopolization: Reuniting a Doctrine Divorced from Its Criminal Law Roots
and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 73 MARQ. L. REv. 355, 391 (1990). Modern criminal
law generally identifies four levels of mental culpability: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence. See Paul H. Robinson, A Functional Analysis of Criminal
Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 857, 860 (1994). While the commission of the criminal act is
taking place, the actor may possess any of the four levels of mens rea. See id. at 863. For
example, during the commission of murder, the actor may be acting with (1) the desire or
specific intent to cause death (purpose); (2) the practical certainty that his conduct will
cause death (knowledge); (3) the awareness of a substantial risk that his conduct will
cause death (recklessness); or (4) a lack of awareness at a time when he should be aware
of a substantial risk that his conduct will cause death (negligence). See id. However,
when engaging in acts of future conduct, the only state of mind that it is possible for the
actor to possess is purpose. See id. at 864. It is not possible to commit attempt recklessly
or negligently. See id. at 864-65. For example, when one attempts to open a door, one
specifically intends (purpose) for this act to occur. While the fashion in which one goes
about the opening may be reckless or negligent, the act of engaging in the attempt can
occur only with purpose. This implies that if a person did not specifically intend for a
certain criminal event to occur, the person cannot be convicted for the criminal attempt of
the offense. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. 276,285,473 S.E.2d 362,368 (1996)
(holding that the intent necessary to sustain a conviction for criminal attempt is specific
intent).
112. Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Attempt and Related Problems, 2 UCLA L. REV. 319,
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a person endeavors to commit some act, the person must necessarily
intend for the act to occur. 3
Another commentator contends that, besides the etymological
rationale supporting attempt as a specific intent offense, the intent
requirement makes "penal sense" because it "is founded on the
heightened dangerousness of intentional wrongdoers.""' 4 A person
who intends to commit an offense but fails or is caused to discontinue
in the action is an on-going danger to the community because the
person is likely to try to commit the crime again.1 It therefore
makes sense to punish such persons who intend to commit crimes and
who act in furtherance of their intent."6 On the other hand, persons
who act recklessly or negligently may not be an on-going threat."7
For example, a person who drives recklessly could be convicted of
voluntary manslaughter if the person's driving causes an accident. 8
But the incident of driving dangerously, in and of itself, is not a
sufficient basis to convict the person of attempted murder." 9
Therefore, recklessness is not sufficient to support a charge of
attempt. 2
0
In North Carolina, the crime of attempt remains a common-law
offense. Since at least 1891, "it has been the law of this jurisdiction
that '[u]pon the trial of any indictment the prisoner may be convicted
of the crime charged therein... or of an attempt to commit the crime
so charged.' "1 Under North Carolina's system of structured
sentencing,'23 an attempt to commit a felony or misdemeanor is
340 (1955); see also Robinson, supra note 111, at 864 (stating that "[m]ost prominently,
attempt liability requires that the actor must intend, must have the 'purpose,' to engage in
the conduct constituting the offense" (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c))).
113. See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 65, § 6.3, at 637 n.42. The Model Penal Code
commentary states that for criminal attempt "the general principle is ... that the actor
must affirmatively desire to engage in the conduct or to cause the result that will
constitute the principal offense." MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01 cmt., at 301 (1985).
114. DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.05[B][2], at 359.






121. See NORTH CAROLINA CRIMES: A GUIDEBOOK ON THE ELEMENTS OF CRIME
29 (Thomas H. Thornburg ed., 4th ed. 1995). Although North Carolina has not codified a
definition of attempt, most states have made criminal attempt part of their statutory
scheme. See Robbins, supra note 101, at 10.
122. State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 59, 431 S.E.2d 188, 191 (1993) (quoting N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15-170 (1983)).
123. Passed in North Carolina in 1993, see Act of July 24, 1993, ch. 53, 1993 N.C. Sess.
Laws 2298 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1340.10 to -1340.23 (1997)), structured
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punishable under the next lower classification as the offense
attempted, unless the statute specifically states a different
classification. 24
Criminal attempt in North Carolina consists of three elements:
(1) the intent to commit the substantive offense and (2) an overt act
done for that purpose which goes beyond mere preparation, (3) but
falls short of the completed offense." These elements are
demonstrated in the context of attempted murder in State v.
Collins,126 in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree
murder for shooting the victim in the chest with a rifle. 27 The victim
did not die until a month following the shooting, but evidence
suggested that the victim's death resulted from causes unrelated to
the shooting." The supreme court held that the trial court had erred
in not offering the jury an instruction concerning attempted
murder . 29  Because substantial evidence existed in support of each
element of attempted murder-the defendant intended to kill the
victim, he shot the victim in the chest for that purpose, and the
actions of the defendant fell short of the completed offense of
sentencing mandates the sentences that judges can issue according to the seriousness of
the crime and the defendant's past criminal record. See Ronald F. Wright & Susan A.
Ellis, A Progress Report on the North Carolina Sentencing and Policy Advisory
Committee, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 421, 436-37 (1993). The system is intended to
promote consistency and predictability in sentencing. See id. at 437.
124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2.5 (Supp. 1997). For example, an attempt to commit a
Class C felony would be punishable as a Class D felony. See id. For a few offenses, the
defining statute provides that an attempt is to be punished as if the offense had been
actually committed. For example, under § 14-87, armed robbery is classified as a Class D
felony and attempted robbery is also classified as a Class D felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-87 (1993). Before being superseded by structured sentencing, absent a statutory
direction to the contrary, an attempt to commit a felony constituted a misdemeanor. See
State v. Hageman, 307 N.C. 1, 8, 296 S.E.2d 433, 438 (1982). However, certain
misdemeanors could be punishable as Class H felonies if the misdemeanor was
"infamous, done in secrecy and malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-3(b) (1997).
125. See State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658, 667, 477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996). Criminal
attempt requires specific intent. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 449, 485 S.E.2d at 880. The
requirement of an "overt act" necessitates that
"the act must reach far enough towards the accomplishment of the desired result
to amount to the commencement of the consummation. It must not be merely
preparatory .... [W]hile it need not be the last proximate act ... it must
approach sufficiently near to it to stand either as the first or some subsequent
step in a direct movement towards the commission of the offense."
State v. Price, 280 N.C. 154, 158, 184 S.E.2d 866, 869 (1971) (quoting State v. Parker, 224
N.C. 524,525-26,31 S.E.2d 531,531-32 (1944)).
126. 334 N.C. 54,431 S.E.2d 188 (1993).
127. See id. at 56-57, 431 S.E.2d at 190.
128. See id. at 57,431 S.E.2d at 190.
129. See id. at 60,431 S.E.2d at 192.
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murder-the defendant was entitled to a charge, concerning the
lesser-included offense.
130
North Carolina and other state courts131 have emphasized that a
showing of specific intent to commit the substantive offense is
necessary in order to sustain a criminal attempt conviction. 32  In
Collins, the court alluded to this requirement by noting that the
defendant shot the victim for the purpose of murdering the victim.
133
Although a North Carolina court has never directly addressed the
question, presumably if the defendant shot the victim accidentally or
through reckless behavior, the defendant could not be convicted of
attempted murder because the defendant would not have had the
specific intent to murder the victim. 34 Because an actor must
specifically intend to bring about the death of his victim in order to
commit attempted murder, an issue arises as to whether the
commission of a felony alone can provide the basis for an attempted
murder conviction. The next section of this Note considers this issue.
At first glance, attempted felony murder appears to be an
acceptable union of two criminal law concepts: attempt and felony
130. See id. at 61, 431 S.E.2d at 192.
131. See, e.g., People v. Patterson, 257 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that a defendant cannot be convicted of attempted murder absent a finding of specific
intent to kill); People v. Burress, 505 N.Y.S.2d 272,273 (App. Div. 1986) ("[Tjhere can be
no attempt to commit a crime that does not involve a specific intent."); State v.
Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1996) ("The nature of an attempt ... is that it
requires a specific intent.").
132. See, e.g., State v. Weaver, 123 N.C. App. 276, 285, 473 S.E.2d 362, 368 (1996);
State v. Brayboy, 105 N.C. App. 370,374,413 S.E.2d 590,593 (1992); State v. Rushing, 61
N.C. App. 62,67,300 S.E.2d 445,449 (1983).
133. See Collins, 334 N.C. at 60,431 S.E.2d at 192.
134. See Robinson, supra note 111, at 890-91 (criticizing the elevation of culpability
required for attempt over that necessary to commit the substantive offense). Robinson
offers the following example:
Assume an actor places a bomb in a Selective Service office knowing it will kill
the persons therein. He does not want to kill such persons-his object is only to
destroy the building-but he knows that when he pushes the detonator the
people are practically certain to be killed. If he is caught by police after the
explosion causes deaths, he will be liable for murder. If he is caught just before
he presses the detonator, he will not be liable for attempted murder. He will not
be liable even though the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
it was his purpose to engage in the conduct constituting the offense, pushing the
detonator, and can prove that he has the culpability required for murder,
knowledge that his conduct is practically certain to cause deaths. He may be
liable for other offenses but will escape liability for attempted murder because it
is not his conscious object to cause death.
Id. at 891; see also State v. Robinson, 883 P.2d 764,768 (Kan. 1994) ("One cannot intend
to commit an accidental, negligent, or reckless homicide. The specific intent to commit a
crime is a more culpable mental state than negligence or recklessness.").
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murder.135 A defendant is guilty of felony murder if she participates
in a felonyduring which a death occurs.136 If the defendant purposely
carries out an overt act that falls short of the completed criminal
offense, she is guilty of criminal attempt. 37 Thus, if during the course
of a felony, an overt act occurs that could have caused death, the
defendant is guilty of attempted felony murder. Because the event
that could have caused death occurred during the commission of a
felony, the felony-murder rule makes the person responsible for
attempted murder.138 However, as the court in Lea demonstrated,
the combination of attempt and felony murder does not produce a
separate crime but, rather, no crime at all.
1 39
The analysis of the attempted felony-murder issue in Lea is
simple and straightforward. The court first laid out the elements of
felony murder and the elements of attempted murder. 40 The court
noted that the crime of felony murder does not require that the
defendant intended to kill. 4' Rather, the State must show only that
the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony. 42 While a
felony-murder conviction does not require proof of intent to murder,
the court emphasized that criminal attempt does require "proof that
the defendant specifically intended to commit the crime that he is
charged with attempting.' ' 43  The court noted that " '[a]lthough a
murder may be committed without an intent to kill, attempt to
commit murder requires a specific intent to kill.'"' Hence, the
crime of attempted felony murder is logically impossible in that it
135. In instructing the jury as to attempted felony murder, the court in State v. Darby,
491 A.2d 733 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984), said that the trial judge "read to the jury
the statutory definitions of criminal attempt and felony murder and then undertook to
weave those definitions together." Id. at 735 (citations omitted).
136. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (Supp. 1997).
137. See State v. Miller, 344 N.C. 658,677,477 S.E.2d 915, 921 (1996).
138. The theoretical issue here concerns whether felony murder's constructive malice
device could vitiate the criminal mental element of attempt as it vitiated the mental
element of murder. See J. Rafael Rodriguez, Attempted Felony Murder-An Improbable
Legal Fiction Meets Its Demise, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 63, 64.
139. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 449-50,485 S.E.2d at 879-80. The defendant could still
be charged with attempted murder, however. See id. at 453, 485 S.E.2d at 882.
140. See id. at 449-50, 485 S.E.2d at 879-80. In State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 431 S.E.2d
188 (1993), the North Carolina Supreme Court held that attempted first-degree murder is
a crime in North Carolina. See id. at 59,431 S.E.2d 191. For the purposes of punishment,
attempted first-degree murder is classified as a Class B2 felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 14-2.5 (Supp. 1997).
141. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 449,485 S.E.2d at 879.
142. See id.
143. Id. (citing State v. McAlister, 59 N.C. App. 58, 60,295 S.E.2d 501,502 (1982)).
144. Id. at 449-50, 485 S.E.2d at 880 (quoting Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344,
351 (1991)).
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would require the defendant to intend an unintentional result.1 45
The court of appeals in Lea used reasoning previously relied on
by thirteen other states which similarly have held that attempted
felony murder is not a crime. 4 6 Some states have intimated that
attempted felony murder extends the felony-murder doctrine beyond
its intended goals.147 These states contend that felony murder was
intended to be used only when death occurs." If no death occurs,
the doctrine has no applicability. 49  For example, in State v.
Robinson,5 ' the Kansas Supreme Court overturned a conviction for
attempted felony murder when a robbery victim was shot several
times at close range by the defendant but did not die.'5' The court
noted that the legislative rationale behind the state's felony-murder
rule was to deter foreseeable deaths that occur during an inherently
145. See id. If the defendant did, in fact, intend to kill the victim, but the crime did not
come to fruition, the defendant could be charged with attempted murder. See Collins, 334
N.C. at 59,431 S.E.2d at 191 (1993). On the other hand, if the defendant did not intend to
kill the victim, there can be no charge of attempt. See id.
146. Of the 19 states that have considered this issue, 18 states, including North
Carolina, have held that attempted felony murder is not a crime. See People v. Patterson,
257 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1989); People v. Meyer, 952 P.2d 774, 775-76 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1998); State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552, 552-53 (Fla. 1995); State v. Pratt, 873 P.2d 800,
812 (Idaho 1993); People v. Viser, 343 N.E.2d 903, 910 (Ill. 1975); Head v. State, 443
N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind. 1982); State v. Robinson, 883 P.2d 764, 767 (Kan. 1994); State v.
Allen, 571 So.2d 758, 761 (La. Ct. App. 1990) (per curiam); Bruce v. State, 566 A.2d 103,
106 (Md. 1989); State v. Darby, 491 A.2d 733,736 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1984); State
v. Price, 726 P.2d 857, 860 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986); People v. Burress, 505 N.Y.S.2d 272,273
(App. Div. 1986); Commonwealth v. Griffin, 456 A.2d 171, 178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983);
State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 892 (Tenn. 1996); State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390, 393
(Utah 1989); Goodson v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 848, 856 (Va. Ct. App. 1998); State
v. Briggs, 579 N.W.2d 783, 786 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). Lea cited 15 cases in support of its
holding. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 450, 485 S.E.2d at 880. Actually, only 13 of these 15
states had at the time of Lea directly addressed the felony murder issue. However, the
two other states, in slightly different circumstances, employed similar logic to dismiss
convictions. See State v. Dahlstrom, 150 N.W.2d 53, 58 (Minn. 1967) (holding that the
legislature did not intend to create a crime of attempted third-degree murder because
third-degree murder involved depraved-mind murder and therefore no element of intent);
State v. Carter, 170 N.W.2d 681, 682-83 (Wis. 1969) (holding that there was no crime of
attempted second-degree murder because second-degree murder had no element of
intent).
147. See, e.g., Robinson, 883 P.2d at 767 ("We have declined to extend the [felony-
murder] doctrine beyond its legislative rationale of deterring foreseeable deaths that
occur during an inherently dangerous felony."); Price, 726 P.2d at 860 ("To acknowledge
the crime would entail broadening the scope of the felony-murder doctrine when the
trend has been to narrow or to abolish the applicability of the doctrine.").
148. See Price, 726 P.2d at 859; Head, 443 N.E.2d at 51.
149. See Price, 726 P.2d at 859.
150. 883 P.2d 764 (Kan. 1994).
151. See id. at 766.
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dangerous felony." Invoking the felony-murder rule in situations
where a homicide did not take place extended the rule past its
intended aims. 5 3 The court held that felony-murder liability could
not be triggered without a death.154
Other courts have refused to expand felony murder's use of
constructive malice to vitiate the need to prove specific intent in an
attempt conviction. 5 5 In Head v. State,56 the defendant was
convicted of attempted felony murder when he seriously wounded a
convenience store clerk during the course of a robbery.1 57 The
Supreme Court of Indiana observed that extrapolating the
constructive malice theory onto situations when only serious bodily
injury occurred unjustifiably extended the doctrine and provided
excessive freedom for the prosecution to exploit the rule.153 The
court stated that "[ilt does not follow that in purely arbitrary
circumstances, the legislature intended to create a discretionary
vehicle whereby the state could seek a conviction for attempted
murder without an obligation to prove the intent to kill." 159
Indeed, another problem in recognizing attempted felony
murder as a crime stems from the inherent difficulty in determining a
rational basis for when the prosecution should be able to charge the
defendant with such a crime. 60 For example, how serious must the
victim's injury be, or how close to killing the victim must the
defendant come, before the prosecution can dispense with having to
prove intent?16' While wounding a victim during the course of a
152. See id. at 767.
153. See id.
154. See id.; see also People v. Patterson, 257 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that if a killing did not occur, the felony-murder rule did not apply and therefore
was inapplicable to attempted murder); Head v. State, 443 N.E.2d 44, 50 (Ind. 1982)
(stating that "the felony-murder rule cannot be applied unless the death of another
occurred by virtue of the commission or attempted commission of the underlying
felony").
155. See People v. Collie, 634 P.2d 534, 545 (Cal. 1981); People v. Harris, 377 N.E.2d
28, 31 (II1. 1978); State v. Price, 726 P.2d 857, 859 (N.M. Ct. App. 1986).
156. 443 N.E.2d 44 (Ind. 1982).
157. See id. at 47.
158. See id. at 50. The court noted that extending the doctrine "would create a rule
unrelated to the mental state or moral culpability of any particular defendant." Id. at 50-
51; see also State v. Amlotte, 456 So. 2d 448, 451 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., dissenting)
("Further extension of the felony murder doctrine so as to make intent irrelevant for
purposes of the attempt crime is illogical and without basis in law."), overruled by State v.
Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
159. Head, 443 N.E.2d at 51.
160. See DRESSLER, supra note 1, § 27.05[B][3], at 360.
161. See id. at 360-61.
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felony would probably trigger the attempted felony-murder offense,
would simply frightening the victim be sufficient? 62 Requiring that a
death occur before the felony-murder doctrine can be used at least
maintains a bright-line limit on the unwieldy doctrine. 163
Some states have analogized the nonrecognition of attempted
felony murder to the nonrecognition of attempt versions of crimes
requiring a mens rea of negligence or recklessness. 164 For example, in
State v. Kimbrough,165 the Tennessee Supreme Court compared the
logical inconsistency in attempted felony murder to a similar
inconsistency in attempted involuntary manslaughter. 6 6  The
Kimbrough court cited a previous decision in which a Tennessee
court had refused to recognize attempted involuntary manslaughter
because such a crime "'would require proof that one intended a
result that accidentally occurred.' "'67 At least one pair of
commentators has argued that a defendant cannot be convicted of an
attempt to commit a crime that consists of recklessly or negligently
causing a certain result because, if there were an intent to bring about
a certain result, the attempt would involve an intentional act.168
I Although attempted felony murder fails in theory, policy in
support of the doctrine's application has, at times, been known to
trump theory. 69 However, it has been argued by one court that
162. See Rodriguez, supra note 138, at 65.
163. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 883 P.2d 764, 767 (limiting application of felony-
murder rule to only those cases where an actual homicide occurs).
164. See LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 500-01. LaFave and Scott offer a
helpful example regarding the different intents under which one may be convicted of
murder, but not convicted of attempt:
Some crimes, such as murder, are defined in terms of acts causing a particular
result plus some mental state which need not be an intent to bring about that
result. Thus, if A, B, C, and D have each taken the life of another, A acting with
the intent to kill, B with an intent to do serious bodily injury, C with a reckless
disregard of human life, and D in the course of a dangerous felony, all three [sic]
are guilty of murder because the crime of murder is defined in such a way that
any one of these mental states will suffice. However, if the victims do not die
from their injuries, then only A is guilty of attempted murder; on a charge of
attempted murder it is not sufficient to show that the defendant intended to do
serious bodily harm, that he acted in reckless disregard for human life, or that he
was committing a dangerous felony. Again, this is because intent is needed for
the crime of attempt, so that attempted murder requires an intent to bring about
that result described by the crime of murder (i.e., the death of another).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
165. 924 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. 1996).
166. See id. at 891.
167. Id. (quoting Hull v. State, 553 S.W.2d 90, 94 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1977)).
168. See LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 5, § 6.2, at 502.
169. See Tomkovicz, supra note 3, at 1460-65 (discussing popular political support as a
rationale for the endurance of the felony-murder rule).
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policy considerations are insufficient to extend the felony-murder
doctrine to the attempted murder context.1 70 Because the State seeks
to deter individuals from engaging in dangerous felonies where it is
foreseeable that death could occur, the State allows the prosecution
to disregard the element of intent in a felony-murder conviction.'
When death does not occur, the detriment placed on defendants by
the felony-murder rule outweighs and overcomes the benefit the
State receives in being able to ignore intent.172
A final rationale for not recognizing attempted felony murder
articulated by some states, including the North Carolina court in Lea,
is that attempted felony murder is an unnecessary crime in a
thorough criminal statutory scheme. 73 The Lea court noted that
"each aspect of the misconduct allegedly engaged in by defendant
Colon here is punishable under at least one other criminal statute
duly enacted by our General Assembly."'74 If a defendant actually
intends to kill the victim, the defendant can be charged with
attempted first-degree murder.75 Otherwise, if a defendant wounds
and seriously injures the victim but does not act with a specific intent
to kill, a defendant can be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon
inflicting serious injury. 76 Punishing criminals under the current
scheme promotes a closer connection between moral culpability and
criminal conduct in that the defendant is punished according to his
actual mens rea as opposed to a mens rea imputed to him by the
170. See Head v. State, 443 N.E.2d 44,50 (Ind. 1982).
171. See id. at 48.
172. See id. at 50.
173. See Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 450,485 S.E.2d at 880; see also Head, 443 N.E.2d at 50-
51 (observing that the statutory code allowed the punishment to be increased for felonies
during which bodily injury occurred); State v. Price, 726 P.2d 857, 860 (N.M. Ct. App.
1986) (noting that the recognition of attempted felony murder as a crime was not
necessary because the defendant could have been charged with more appropriate crimes);
State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tenn. 1996) (observing that the legislature had
already provided for instances in which bodily injury occurred during the commission of a
crime); Barbara Kritchevsky, Criminal Attempt-Murder Two: The Law in Tennessee After
State v. Kimbrough, 28 U. MEM. L. REv. 3, 50 (1997) (noting that the elimination of
attempted felony murder as a crime involves little practical consequence since the
prosecutor can still charge the defendant with attempted murder if the defendant
intended to kill).
174. Lea, 126 N.C. App. at 450,485 S.E.2d at 880.
175. See State v. Collins, 334 N.C. 54, 60, 431 S.E.2d 188,191 (1993). For the purposes
of punishment, North Carolina classifies attempted first-degree murder as a Class B2
felony. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-2.5 (Supp. 1997). If the defendant used a weapon in
commission of the crime and caused serious injury, the defendant could be charged with
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury. See id. § 14-32
(1993). This crime is punished as a Class C felony. See id. § 14-2.5.
176. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-32.
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felony-murder doctrine.
Despite these several arguments made against the recognition of
attempted felony murder, until a few years ago, two states, Arkansas
and Florida, continued to explicitly recognize the crime. 7 However,
in 1995, in State v. Gray,17 the Florida Supreme Court overruled
Amlotte v. State,17 9 which, eleven years earlier, had recognized
attempted felony murder as a crime. 80 Providing little rationale for
its decision, the court in Amlotte specified the elements of attempted
felony murder as: (1) the perpetration of or the attempt to
perpetrate an enumerated felony, and (2) an intentional overt act
which could, but does not, cause the death of another.' The court
held that if the attempt occurred during the commission of a felony,
the law would presume the existence of the specific intent required to
prove attempt. 82 In overruling Amlotte, the Florida court in Gray
echoed the reasoning of the Kansas court in Head v. State that the
felony-murder rationale should not be used to presume an intent to
murder when there is no completed act of homicide. 8 The Gray
court decided to recede from Amlotte because "[t]he legal fictions
177. See White v. State, 585 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Ark. 1979); State v. Amlotte, 456 So. 2d
448, 450 (Fla. 1984) (Overton, J., dissenting) (regretting that "[t]he majority has arrived
at an indefensible conclusion which gives Florida the dubious distinction of being one of
the very fev states to recognize such a crime"), overruled by State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552
(Fla. 1995). A few other states do recognize a crime referred to as "attempted felony
murder." See State v. S.P., 608 So. 2d 232, 235-36 (La. Ct. App. 1992); State v. Holley,
Nos. CA 8195,8224, 1983 WL 2554, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 28, 1983). However, these
states have felony-murder statutes that require the killing be committed during the course
of the felony and with specific intent. See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (West 1997)
(requiring in its first-degree murder statute that the defendant must have the "specific
intent to kill ... and [be] engaged in the perpetration of [these named felonies]").
Therefore, the defendant cannot be convicted of attempted felony murder without proof
that the defendant specifically intended to kill the victim. See Holley, 1983 WL 2554, at
*5.
178. 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
179. 456 So. 2d 448 (Fla. 1984), overruled by State v. Gray, 654 So. 2d 552 (Fla. 1995).
180. See Gray, 654 So. 2d at 554; Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 449.
181. See Amlotte, 456 So. 2d at 449.
182. See id. at 449-50.
183. See Gray, 654 So. 2d at 554; State v. Head, 443 N.E.2d 44, 50-51 (Ind. 1982)
(refusing to presume intent to murder in the absence of a homicide); see also supra notes
156-59 and accompanying text (discussing Head). In Gray, the actual issue concerned not
whether the crime of attempted felony murder existed, but what constituted an "overt
act" sufficient to warrant attempted felony murder. See Gray, 654 So. 2d at 552. During
a chase with police, the defendant's car ran a red light and hit another car, seriously
injuring the driver. See id. at 553. The precise issue on appeal concerned whether the
defendant's running of the red light constituted a sufficiently "overt act" to form the basis
of an attempted felony murder charge. See id. at 552. The court bypassed ruling on the
overt-act question in favor of reversing the holding in Amlotte altogether. See id. at 552-
53.
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required to support the intent for felony murder are simply too
great.p184
Thus, Arkansas is the only state that currently recognizes
attempted felony murder.- In White v. State,18 the state court
established its position by sustaining the defendant's conviction of
attempted felony murder committed during the course of burglary
and rape.18 6 After breaking, in which the court sustained the
defendant's conviction of attempted felony murder committed during
the course of burglary and rape."8 In White, after breaking into the
home of the victim's family, the defendant continuously threatened
to kill members of the family.1 s The defendant pointed his gun at
different family members and fired two shots that barely missed the
father, but no one was injured during the attack."9 Although the
facts of the case suggest that the State could have proved attempted
murder under the traditional theory of criminal attempt, 190 the
conviction rested on the basis of felony murder.191 Revealing little
rationale for its decision, the court simply concluded that the jury
could reasonably find that the elements required to prove intent had
been satisfied. 9 The court determined that the shots fired by the
defendant constituted a " 'substantial step in a course of conduct
intended to culminate in the commission of [the] offense' of murder
'in the course of and in the furtherance of the' commission of the
felonies of burglary and rape 'under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to the value of human life.' "193
184. Gray, 654 So. 2d at 552-53. One commentator has noted that "abrogation of the
crime of attempted felony murder will greatly lessen the potential harshness of the felony
murder doctrine itself." Mark M. Dobson, Criminal Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20
NOVA L. REv. 67, 96 (1995).
185. 585 S.W.2d 952 (Ark. 1979).




190. The Arkansas statute allowed a person to be convicted of criminal attempt if the
person "purposely engage[d] in conduct that constitute[d] a substantial step in course of
conduct intended to culminate in the commission of an offense." ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-
701(1)(b) (Michie RepI. 1977).
191. See White, 585 S.W.2d at 953.
192. See id. at 954.
193. Id. (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 41-701, 41-1502(1)(a) (Michie Repl. 1977)). The
White decision has been cited seldomly in subsequent Arkansas cases. In one subsequent
case, Swaite v. State, 612 S.W.2d 307 (Ark. 1981), the court acknowledged that the crime
of attempted capital murder consisted of the combined usage of the attempt statute and
the capital murder statute. See id. at 310. The court stated that in the circumstance of
attempted felony murder, the intent to kill is immaterial. See id.
2386 [Vol. 76
ATTEMPTED FELONY MURDER
As supported by the vast majority of states that have refused to
recognize attempted felony murder as a crime,194 the North Carolina
Court of Appeals correctly decided State v. Lea. As a matter of
theory, attempted felony murder is a legal contradiction.195 As a
matter of policy, the extension of the felony-murder rule is
unnecessary in light of preexisting statutory provisions capable of
punishing felons according to their individual culpabilities 96 The
court's ruling demonstrates once again its desire to maintain felony
murder within controlled bounds.Y7
BRIAN D. ROARK
194. See supra note 146 (citing cases).
195. See State v. Kimbrough, 924 S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tenn. 1986) (describing charge of
attempted felony murder as "inherently inconsistent"); supra notes 135-45 and
accompanying text.
196. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 77-98 and accompanying text (discussing limitations placed on the
felony-murder rule by the North Carolina courts).
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State v. Adams: When Mommy Talks, You Better Pay
Attention... and, if No Indictment Has Been Issued, You Can
Use Her Uncounseled Statements Against Her in Court
Initially, the Massiaht exclusionary rule seems fairly simple to
explain: the Sixth Amendment of the Constitution gives a person
accused of a crime the right to counsel at trial.2 The Supreme Court
has specified that this right is not limited to the trial context.3 So,
when a person faces criminal charges, incriminating statements that
she makes to the police without her lawyer present cannot be used
against her in court In its most elementary form, this is the Massiah
rule.
The rule is not, of course, so simple. The major requirements
should not pose too much confusion because they are fairly objective.
The person must have been accused of a crime to invoke the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.5 Additionally, formal prosecutorial
proceedings must have commenced against the accused;6 that is, an
indictment or formal charges must have been issued, or a preliminary
hearing or arraignment must have taken place.7 Furthermore, the
court may extend the right to counsel to cover statements regarding
not only the indicted offense, but also offenses for which formal
proceedings have not yet begun, but which are so "closely related" to
the indicted offense as to be factually and legally indistinct.8
The situation becomes somewhat more complex for the parent
suspected of abusing a child. The parent who is accused of child
abuse or neglect will likely stand before the court in two separate
proceedings. In one proceeding, a civil abuse or neglect action
1. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right ... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."). For a lively discussion
of the purpose and meaning of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 705-11 (1996). See generally
CHARLES E. TORcIA, 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, §§ 364-74, at 239-44 (13th
ed. 1991 & West Supp. 1997) (discussing the right to counsel).
3. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45,57 (1932).
4. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205-06.
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972).
7. See id.
8. See United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir. 1997); see also infra notes
127-81 (discussing the development of the "closely related" exception in the federal and
state courts).
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brought by social services agents, the court will determine whether
the child should remain with the parent, perhaps under the
supervision of caseworkers, or if the child should be removed from
the home and placed in foster care.9 Separately, the parent may also
face criminal prosecution for child abuse and possibly
imprisonment. 10 Of course, the gravity of the parent's situation
increases immensely when the district attorney commences a criminal
abuse proceeding, thus triggering the procedural safeguards provided
by the Constitution." These constitutional protections do not apply
equally in the civil abuse context, however.' 2 As one commentator
has stated succinctly, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel "has no
place in civil litigation" of any variety. 3
A number of states have recognized, however, that the interests
of the parent during the civil abuse proceeding also may require
special protection. 14 These jurisdictions have prescribed by statute
that a parent against whom a petition of abuse' 5 has been filed is
9. See Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making,
24 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 315, 316-17 (1987); see also id. at 319-21 (discussing the
inadequacies of the protective services system).
10. See id. at 321 ("We might well decide that protecting children from serious
physical harm is worth the risk [of separating family members through foster care]. But
foster care is often used when the child could be adequately protected by jailing the
offending parent."); see also id. at 333-36 (discussing factors that influence a local
prosecutor's decision to begin a criminal action).
11. The safeguards, rooted in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, include the right to
remain silent and limitations on the admissibility of confessions, the requirement of the
presence of counsel at post-formal charge identification lineups, and the right to counsel
during questioning and at trial. See JOSEPH G. COOK, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF
THE ACCUSED §§ 6:1-6:40, at 6-4 to 6-268 (concerning confessions); § 7:2, at 7-9 to 7-24
(concerning post-charge lineups); and §§ 8:1-8:23, at 8-3 to -160 (concerning right to
counsel) (3d ed. 1996).
12. For example, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination will not
absolve a mother from presenting her allegedly abused child to a juvenile court when
ordered to do so. See Baltimore City Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 559-
62 (1990).
13. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting Laws and Attorney-Client
Confidences: The Reality and the Specter of Lawyer as Informant, 42 DUKE L.J. 203, 271
(1992); see also State v. Adams, 345 N.C. 745, 748, 483 S.E.2d 156, 157 (1997) ("By its
terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases.").
14. The Supreme Court expounded on this interest in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S.
745 (1982):
The fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child does not evaporate simply because they have not
been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.
Even when blood relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.
Id. at 753-54.
15. In North Carolina, an abuse, neglect, or dependency action commences upon the
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entitled to the assistance of counsel.16 Moreover, once the prosecutor
commences a criminal action, Sixth Amendment rights will attach,
including the prophylactic exclusionary provision prohibiting the
admission of statements made in contravention of the right to
counsel.
17
In State v. Adams, 8 the North Carolina Supreme Court
examined a situation marking the intersection of these civil and
criminal rights.19 The court held that once social services caseworkers
have filed a civil abuse petition, but before the district attorney has
obtained an indictment for criminal abuse, a parent may not rely on
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to suppress inculpatory
statements made to police officers during their investigation."
This Note discusses the factual background and reasoning of the
North Carolina Supreme Court in Adams.2' It then surveys the Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court and
the development of the "closely related" exception in the lower
federal courts and state courts.22 Finally, the Note undertakes a
critical examination of the North Carolina Supreme Court's rejection
of the "closely related" exception for the parent subject to an abuse
petition but not yet subject to formal criminal proceedings,
evaluating the court's conclusion in light of illustrative decisions
handed down by other courts.23
Heather Gullick was born on June 28, 1992.24 Six months later,
filing of a petition, the pleading in the case. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-559 (1995). The
petition primarily serves two purposes: (1) it invokes the juvenile court's jurisdiction; and
(2) it serves as an official statement of the facts of the case. See In re Green, 67 N.C. App.
501, 504, 313 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1984).
16. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 307.4 (West Supp. 1998); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46b-135(b) (West 1995); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2304(b)(1) (1997); MD.
CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 3-821 (1995); MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.4(6)
(West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43 (West 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-587 (1995);
42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN., § 6337 (West 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-110(B) (Law Co-
op. 1985); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-266(C) (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 49-6-2 (1996).
Idaho's provision differs in that the presiding judge decides whether the presence of
counsel would be beneficial to a parent. See IDAHO CODE § 16-1618(a) (Supp. 1997).
17. See infra notes 69-76 and accompanying text (discussing Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964), in which the United States Supreme Court first employed this
exclusionary rule).
18. 345 N.C. 745,483 S.E.2d 156 (1997).
19. See id. at 747, 483 S.E.2d at 157.
20. See id. at 748,483 S.E.2d at 158.
21. See infra notes 24-67 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 68-189 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 190-265 and accompanying text.
24. See Affidavit of Susan Seahorn, Record at 8, State v. Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538,
470 S.E.2d 838 (1996) (No. 9412SC559).
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the child, after being admitted to Cape-Fear Valley Medical Center in
Fayetteville because she was suffering from anal fissures, 2 was
referred to Duke University Hospital for evaluation for sexual and
physical abuse.26  A physician determined that Heather had
numerous injuries to her vaginal area as well as a broken femur and
two broken ribs. 7 About a week later, on December 7, 1992, Linda
Parlett of the Cumberland County Department of Social Services
("DSS") telephoned Detective Jo Autry of the Sex Crimes Unit of
the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department, who commenced an
investigation into the matter.' On December 9, 1992, DSS filed a
petition of abuse and neglect in the Juvenile Section of the
Cumberland County District Court. 9 The court appointed attorney
Gerri Spates to represent Mary Clara Adams, Heather's mother, in
the juvenile proceeding. °
On December 22, 1992, Detective Autry contacted Mary
Adams's mother, who informed the officer that her daughter had an
attorney and that her attorney had instructed her not to speak with
the police.31 Detective Autry later convinced Spates to bring Mary
Adams to the Sheriff's Department for an interview and polygraph
test.32  Three weeks later, Detective Autry requested another
meeting. After speaking with her client, Spates told Detective Autry
that Mary Adams did not want another interview.33 Mary Adams had
no further contact with her attorney until they appeared in juvenile
court on March 24, 19 93 . 4
Detective Autry then began attempting to contact Ms. Adams
directly.35 Eventually, Detective Autry called Ms. Adams at work
25. See id.
26. See Brief for the State at 2-3, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
27. See id.
28. See id.; Affidavit of Susan Seahorn, Record at 9, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
29. See Affidavit of Susan Seahorn, Record at 9, Adams (No. 9412SC559). North
Carolina's comprehensive definition of an abused juvenile includes infliction of serious
physical, sexual, or emotional injury on a child under age 18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-
517(1) (1995). A juvenile may be classified as neglected for a number of reasons
including abandonment, lack of proper supervision or care by a parent or guardian, or
living in a hazardous home environment. See id. § 7A-517(21).
30. See Affidavit of Susan Seahorn, Record at 9, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
31. See Brief for the State at 3, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
32. See id.
33. See Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 2, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
34. See id. at 2-3.
35. See Order of Superior Court, Record at 14, Adams (No. 9412SC559). The State
disputed this claim, stating instead that Detective Autry spoke with Ms. Adams by phone
on one occasion, but otherwise had no contact with her until the March 4 meeting. See
Brief for the State at 3, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
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and told her that she needed to discuss the results of the polygraph.36
Detective Autry also called Ms. Adams's father and told him his
daughter would be arrested if she did not come to the Law
Enforcement Center.37 Mr. Adams encouraged his daughter to meet
with the officer, telling her that she could not risk being arrested
while at work."
Without her attorney, Ms. Adams went to the Law Enforcement
Center on March 4, 1993, but Detective Autry was not present. 39 Ms.
Adams left a note stating that she would return the following day.4"
She returned the next day with Heather's father, but without her
attorney, and participated in an interview.41 During the interview,
Detective Autry left the room.4' While the detective was gone, Ms.
Adams confessed to another officer to having harmed the child and
repeated the statement to Detective Autry upon her return.43 She
stated that "she had squeezed the child to help her have a bowel
movement; that she had put her knee on the child and had pushed the
child's leg between the cushions and the couch when she would not
be still during changing."'  Ms. Adams further explained that she
"cleaned the child with a Q-tip, washrag and her finger. '45 After
making the statement, Heather's mother learned that she would face
criminal abuse charges.46
Mary Adams was charged with a first-degree statutory sexual
offense and two counts of felonious child abuse.47 Ms. Adams moved
to suppress her statements to the police on the ground that her Sixth
36. See Order of the Superior Court, Record at 14, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See Defendant-Appellee's Brief at 3, Adams (No. 9412SC559).
40. See Order of the Superior Court, Record at 14,Adams (No. 9412SC559).







47. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 746, 483 S.E.2d at 156. Under § 14-27.4(a)(1), a person
who is at least 12 years of age commits a first-degree sexual offense by engaging in a
sexual act with a child under age 13 and at least four years younger than himself. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.4(a)(1) (1993). A parent or caregiver commits felonious child
abuse by "intentionally infiict[ing] any serious physical injury upon or to [a child under 16
years of age] or ... intentionally commit[ting] an assault upon the child which results in
any serious physical injury." Id. § 14-318.4(a). Additionally, a parent who commits a
sexual act upon a child under age 16 is guilty of felonious child abuse. See id. § 14-
318.4(a2).
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Amendment right to counsel had been violated, rendering the
statements inadmissible." The trial court granted her motion and
excluded the statements.4 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision, holding that, after the filing of a juvenile abuse petition,
"'the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified'
and the parent faces 'the prosecutorial forces of organized society' in
such a way as to trigger the defendant's right to counsel. This is so
because of the unique nature of the juvenile proceedings."50 In North
Carolina, the court explained, DSS and law enforcement have a
"reciprocal duty" to notify each other of suspected child abuse,
resulting in "parallel civil and criminal" actions "both operat[ing]
against the defendant."51 Even though the two actions have different
goals-punishment of the adult offender in the criminal forum and
protection of the child victim in the civil-"the distinctions between
48. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 746, 483 S.E.2d at 156. Specifically, Ms. Adams argued
that her "right to counsel was violated by law enforcement repeatedly contacting her,
pressuring her to be interviewed, and interviewing her without counsel after the accused
had been appointed counsel and had expressed a desire to deal with law enforcement
through her counsel." Affidavit of Susan Seahorn, Record at 11, Adams, 122 N.C. App.
538, 470 S.E.2d 838 (1996) (No. 9412SC559). Ms. Adams also claimed violations of the
Fifth Amendment and North Carolina Constitution, see Adams, 345 N.C. at 746, 483
S.E.2d at 156, but the superior court did not address these issues and neither party briefed
them to the supreme court, see id. at 747, 483 S.E.2d at 157.
49. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 746-77, 483 S.E.2d at 157; Order of the Superior Court,
Record at 15, Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538, 470 S.E.2d 838 (1996) (No. 9412SC559). The
superior court found, as a fact, that Ms. Adams's Sixth Amendment right to counsel had
attached at the point that the abuse and neglect petition was filed against her. See id.
The court therefore concluded as a matter of law that the interview had violated her
constitutional rights. See id.
50. Adams, 122 N.C. App. at 542, 470 S.E.2d at 841 (quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972)). Judge McGee wrote for an unanimous panel, which included
Judges Eagles and Walker. See id. at 545, 470 S.E.2d at 843.
51. Id. at 542-43, 470 S.E.2d at 841. By statute, North Carolina provides for extensive
interaction between the local DSS and law enforcement agencies. When DSS discovers
evidence of child abuse, it must report the evidence to the local district attorney's office
and law enforcement within 48 hours. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-548(a) (1995). Any
other person, including law enforcement, learning of an episode of child abuse is required
to report this information to DSS. See id. § 7A-543; see also Mosteller, supra note 13, at
211-24 (discussing the historical development and requirements of child abuse reporting
laws in 22 jurisdictions, including North Carolina). Moreover, DSS can enlist the help of
state and local law enforcement for its investigation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544.
Within 48 hours of notification by DSS, the local law enforcement agency must "initiate
and coordinate a criminal investigation with the protective services investigation being
conducted by [DSS]." Id. § 7A-548(a). See generally Besharov, supra note 9, at 323-33
(discussing reporting laws, police investigations, and procedures for placing children in
protective custody).
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the two actions often become blurred."52 Therefore, because of the
importance of "protect[ing] the rights of a defendant entangled in the
intricacies of both civil and criminal law," the court concluded that
the presence of counsel is required during police questioning after
the filing of a civil abuse petition against a parent.
Turning to the facts before it, the court specified that Ms.
Adams's Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached when the civil
petition was filed against her;5' therefore, the police interrogation on
March 5, 1993, amounted to a denial of this constitutional right as
well as of her statutory right to counsel,55 which, the court explained,
"extends to all contacts which occur 'following and as a consequence
of' and are 'directly related to' the proceedings for which counsel has
been appointed. ' 56 Consequently, the court of appeals held that Ms.
Adams's statements to the police were inadmissible against her.1
7
The North Carolina Supreme Court heard the case six months
later." Justice Webb, writing for a unanimous court, identified the
sole issue as "whether the initiation of a civil juvenile petition for
abuse and neglect is the equivalent of the initiation of formal,
adversarial proceedings for purposes of the invocation of the Sixth
Amendment right to the assistance of counsel. '59  The court
explained that in Kirby v. Illinois' the United States Supreme Court
clarified that the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment
attaches only at the initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings"
against a defendant-in the form of a preliminary hearing,
information, formal charge, arraignment, or indictment. 61 These
official proceedings solidify "the adverse positions of the government
and the defendant" and exemplify the government's commitment to
prosecute.6' It is only then that the need for defense counsel arises.
52. Adams, 122 N.C. App. at 544, 470 S.E.2d at 842. As an example, the court noted
that individuals serving as investigators in one proceeding can also serve in the other. See
id. (citing State v. Morrell, 108 N.C. App. 465,424 S.E.2d 147 (1993)).
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-587.
56. Adams, 122 N.C. App. at 544,470 S.E.2d at 842 (quoting In re Maynard, 116 N.C.
App. 616, 619-20, 448 S.E.2d 871, 873 (1994)).
57. See id. at 545, 470 S.E.2d at 843.
58. The court heard the case on December 10, 1996. The case was before the
supreme court on a grant of discretionary review pursuant to § 7A-31(c) as well as on
appeal of right of a constitutional question under § 7A-30(1). See Adams, 345 N.C. at 745,
483 S.E.2d at 156.
59. Adams, 345 N.C. at 747,483 S.E.2d at 157.
60. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
61. Adams, 345 N.C. at 747,483 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90).
62. Id. at 748,483 S.E.2d at 157 (discussing Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-90).
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With these considerations in mind, the court concluded that the State
had not yet committed itself to prosecute Mary Adams at the time
DSS filed the abuse and neglect petition against her.63
Moreover, according to the court, the Sixth Amendment is
applicable only to criminal matters.64 DSS's filing of an abuse and
neglect petition initiates only a civil case;65 a prosecutor has to
commence a criminal matter separately. Considering this distinction,
the court stated: "We cannot say, as did the Court of Appeals, that
the civil and criminal proceedings are so intertwined that the
commencement of a civil proceeding triggers the protection involved
in a criminal case. ' 66 As a result, the supreme court reversed the
decision of the court of appeals, concluding that it was "bound to
hold" under Kirby that Ms. Adams had no Sixth Amendment right to
counsel at the filing of the abuse petition.67
During the past thirty years, the United States Supreme Court
and other federal and state courts have sought to define the
requirements of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.68 In 1964, the
Supreme Court handed down the seminal decision in Massiah v.
United States. 69 In that case, federal agents placed a listening device
63. See id.
64. See id. ("By its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to criminal cases.").
65. See id.
66. Id. Professor Mosteller explains: "The Sixth Amendment right [to counsel] is
quite limited in coverage. It has no place in civil litigation, and attaches in criminal
litigation only when a suspect formally becomes the accused by indictment, preliminary
hearing, or other similar step in the criminal proceeding." Mosteller, supra note 13, at
271.
67. The court also concluded that Ms. Adams was not denied her statutory right to
counsel. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 748, 483 S.E.2d at 157. While the court of appeals had
relied on an earlier case in finding statutory violation, the supreme court explained that
the case concerned only representation during abuse and neglect proceedings-not
criminal matters. See id. at 748, 483 S.E.2d at 157-58 (discussing and distinguishing In re
Maynard, 116 N.C. App. 616, 448 S.E.2d 871 (1994)); see also infra notes 214-16
(discussing Maynard).
68. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's pre-Massiah Sixth Amendment right to
counsel jurisprudence, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 6.4 (1984 & Supp. 1991); see also ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 3-15 (1992) (discussing the
history of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel); FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTrrUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 3-34, 109-38 (1951)
(discussing the history behind the Sixth Amendment and early Supreme Court decisions
concerning the right to counsel); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL UNDER THE MASSIAH LINE OF CASES (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 661, 672-74 (1989) [hereinafter MASSIAH REPORT] (discussing the historical
development of the right to counsel).
69. 377 U.S. 201 (1964). For a contemporaneous critique of Massiah, see Arnold N.
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in a car belonging to the codefendant of a man who had been indicted
on federal drug charges, retained a lawyer, entered a plea of not
guilty, and had been released on bail.70 The defendant, Massiah, and
his codefendant had a long conversation in the car, during which
Massiah made several incriminating statements.71 The federal agents
recorded these statements and admitted them against Massiah at
trial.72  The Supreme Court held that the agents violated the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by obtaining
incriminating statements against him after his indictment and without
counsel's presence.73 The Court barred the prosecution's use of
Massiah's statements,74 effecting an exclusionary rule to the Sixth
Amendment.'
Eight years later, in Kirby v. Illinois,76 the Court revisited the
Enker & Sheldon H. Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and
Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 MINN. L. REv. 47,53-58 (1964). For a more recent analysis of the
decision, see OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION (1986), reprinted in
22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 437,485-88 (1989).
70. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201-03.
71. See id. at 203.
72. See id.
73. See id. at 206.
74. See id. at 207. The Court qualified its holding, however, by noting that it did not
"question that in this case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an
investigation of the suspected criminal activities of the defendant and his alleged
confederates, even though the defendant had already been indicted." Id.
75. Massiah marked the first instance in which the Court required the exclusion of
evidence based on a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The adversarial
system and the Sixth Amendment, the Court explained, contemplate a defendant aided at
trial by counsel. See id. at 204. When post-indictment statements are taken from a
suspect for the purpose of use at trial, counsel's presence is similarly required to protect
the accused. See id. The Court explained that using Massiah's incriminating statements,
"deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of counsel,"
id., amounted to a denial of the "basic protections" of the Sixth Amendment, id. at 206.
Further, the Court clarified that its holding required only that the prosecution refrain
from using the statements against Massiah in court. See id. at 207. For significant
criticisms of the reasoning behind the Massiah exclusionary rule, see MASSIAH REPORT,
supra note 68, at 684-96; Edwin Meese III, Promoting Truth in the Courtroom, 40 VAND.
L. REv. 271, 276-81 (1987); H. Richard Uviller, Evidence from the Mind of the Criminal
Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Restraint, 87 COLUM. L.
REV. 1137, 1154-95 (1987). But see James J. Tomkovicz, The Massiah Right to Exclusion:
Constitutional Premises and Doctrinal Implications, 67 N.C. L. REv. 751, 753-55 (1989)
(explaining the practical nature of the right to exclusion under Massiah); James J.
Tomkovicz, The Truth About Massiah, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 641, 654-83 (1990)
(critiquing the Office of Legal Policy's ). See generally Martin Bahl, Comment, The Sixth
Amendment as Constitutional Theory: Does Originalism Require That Massiah Be
Abandoned?, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 423 (1991) (analyzing Massiah and its
progeny from an originalist viewpoint).
76. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
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question of the scope of the Sixth Amendment in a different context.
Chicago police officers stopped Kirby and a companion on the street
and asked the two men for identification. When the men provided
suspicious reasons for possessing another person's traveler's checks
and identification, the police arrested them and took them to the
station.78  After learning that the owner of the identification and
checks had recently been robbed, the police brought him in,
whereupon he immediately identified Kirby and his associate as the
perpetrators.79 Both men were indicted six weeks later."0  At trial,
Kirby argued on Sixth Amendment grounds for the suppression of
the identification at his subsequent trial because it was made at a
time when no attorney was present.8' The trial court rejected this
motion, the identification was admitted, and the men were
convicted.' Affirming the admission, the United States Supreme
Court explained that "a person's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment
right to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary
judicial proceedings have been initiated against him." 3 The Court
noted that prior cases defined the initiation of "adversarial criminal
proceedings" as "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment,
information, or arraignment."'  The Court explained that only then
were the parties' positions fully established and, consequently, the
need for counsel apparent.8 The Sixth Amendment, the Court
concluded, does not apply to interactions, such as a pre-indictment
identification, that take place prior to a "'critical stage[]'" of the
prosecution. 6
77. See id. at 684.
78. See id.
79. See id. at 684-85.
80. See id. at 685.
81. See id. at 685-86.
82. See id. at 686.
83. Id. at 688 (citations omitted).
84. Id. at 689.
85. As the Court explained:
For it is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and
only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have
solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial
forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and
procedural criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the
commencement of the "criminal proceedings" to which alone the explicit
guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applicable.
Id. at 689-90 (citing Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201; Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)).
86. Id. at 690-91 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1968)). In
dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, would have required a
different analytical framework:
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Five years later, in Brewer v. Williams,' the Supreme Court
affirmed on Sixth Amendment grounds a federal district court's
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.81 In this case, known as the
"Christian burial speech" case,89 defendant Robert Williams, a recent
escapee from a mental hospital, was charged and arraigned in
Davenport, Iowa, for the abduction of a ten-year-old girl.9" A Des
Moines lawyer had previously informed officers there that he
represented Williams.91 After the arraignment in Davenport, another
lawyer instructed Williams not to speak to the police until he had
conferred with his lawyer in Des Moines and also instructed the
police that they were not to question Williams until that time.92
Williams was placed in the back seat of a squad car, and two officers
drove him to Des Moines. 93 During the trip, one of the officers,
Detective Learning, who knew Williams to be a former mental
patient and a deeply religious person, stated his belief " 'that the
parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for
the little girl who was snatched away from them on Christmas [E]ve
and murdered.' "94 A short while later, Williams directed the officers
to the location of the girl's body.95  Williams argued for the
suppression of his statements made in the car but eventually was
convicted of first-degree murder.96
The Supreme Court noted that judicial proceedings had been
initiated against Williams before the car ride9 and that he had been
"In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding cases requires that
we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair
trial as affected by his right meaningfully to cross-examine the witnesses against
him and to have effective assistance of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us
to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice."
Id. at 694 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967)).
87. 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
88. See icL at 406.
89. The term apparently arose in the briefs and oral argument of the attorneys. See
id. at 392.
90. See id. at 389-91.
91. See id. at 390.
92. See id. at 391-92.
93. See id. at 392.
94. Id. at 393 (alteration in original) (quoting Detective Leaming).
95. See id.
96. See id. at 394. The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. See State v.
Williams, 182 N.W.2d 396,406 (Iowa 1971).
97. See Brewer, 430 U.S. at 399. These proceedings, however, concerned the
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informed of his right to counsel.9  In addition, the Court
characterized Detective Leaming's action as "purposely [seeking]
during Williams's isolation from his lawyers to obtain as much
incriminating information as possible."9 9 Drawing on Massiah, the
Court explained that "[i]t thus requires no wooden or technical
application of the ... doctrine to conclude that Williams was entitled
to the assistance of counsel guaranteed to him by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments."'' 0 In affirming the issuance of the writ-
and effectively holding that Williams's statements were inadmissible
in the murder trial-the Court concluded that "so clear a violation of
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as here occurred cannot be
condoned." "
In Maine v. Moulton,"° decided eight years after Brewer, the
Court upheld the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
which reversed the defendant's burglary and theft convictions
pursuant to the Sixth Amendment. 0 3 In Moulton, defendants Perley
Moulton and Gary Colson were indicted on four counts of theft."°
Over a year and a half later, Colson contacted the local police,
confessed his role in the thefts, and agreed to cooperate in the
prosecution of Moulton. 5 During a later meeting, Colson, wearing a
hidden wire transmitter, was able to elicit several incriminating
statements from Moulton. 6 Subsequently, Moulton was convicted
despite his efforts to suppress the recorded statements.10 7 Moulton
appealed his convictions on the grounds that his Sixth Amendment
right to counsel had been violated when the statements were
obtained.108 Maine's highest court agreed and ordered a new trial.10 9
Affirming the state's high court, the Supreme Court explained
abduction charge, and not the later murder charge, for which Williams was convicted.
98. See id. at 404.
99. Id. at 399.
100. Id. at 401.
101. Id. at 406. For an extensive discussion of Brewer, see Yale Kamisar, Brewer v.
Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, 67
GEO. L.J. 1 (1978).
102. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
103. See id. at 180.
104. See id. at 162.
105. See id. at 162-63. In exchange for his help, the police told Colson that no
additional charges would be brought against him. Colson had informed the police that he
and Moulton not only had received stolen auto parts, but also had broken into a local car
dealership to steal the parts. See id. at 163.
106. See id. at 164-66.
107. See id. at 166-67.
108. See id. at 167.
109. See State v. Moulton, 481 A.2d 155, 161,166 (Me. 1984).
1998] 2399
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that "to deprive a person of counsel during the period prior to trial
may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial
itself."" 0 Moreover, the Court clarified, "the prosecutor and police
have an affirmative obligation not to act in a manner that
circumvents and thereby dilutes the protection afforded by the right
to counsel.""' Here, the police knew that Moulton's right to counsel
had attached with the theft indictments, yet they suggested that
Colson wear the wire and record his conversations with Moulton.112
As a result, the Court concluded that the police had denied
Moulton's Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel and
that Moulton's incriminating statements would be barred at his new
trial."
Six years later, in McNeil v. Wisconsin,"4 the Supreme Court
clarified the limitations of the protection provided by the Sixth
Amendment. Police arrested Paul McNeil in Omaha, Nebraska, for
an armed robbery in West Allis, Wisconsin. 5 He was then
transferred back to Wisconsin and represented by counsel at a first
appearance on the matter."6 Several days later, Detective Joseph
Butts questioned McNeil about an unrelated armed burglary,
murder, and attempted murder in Caledonia, Wisconsin." 7 McNeil
admitted that he had been involved in these events."8 Within a few
days, prosecutors formally charged him with the Caledonia crimes.119
McNeil unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements pertaining to
those offenses and was convicted of armed robbery, second-degree
murder, and attempted first-degree murder. 20  On appeal, McNeil
"contended that his courtroom appearance with an attorney for the
West Allis crime constituted an invocation of the Miranda right to
counsel, and that any subsequent waiver of that right during police-
initiated questioning regarding any offense was invalid.''
The Supreme Court acknowledged that his Sixth Amendment
110. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170.
111. Id. at 171.
112. See id. at 180 ("[W]e hold that the Maine police knowingly circumvented
Moulton's right to have counsel present at a confrontation between Moulton and a police
agent....").
113. See id.; see also Bahl, supra note 75, at 436-37 (discussing Moulton).
114. 501 U.S. 171 (1991).
115. See id. at 173.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 173-74.






right to counsel had attached and had been invoked for the initial
armed robbery charge, but stated that the right is "offense
specific.""l  As the Court explained, "[the right] cannot be invoked
once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a
prosecution has commenced."1" The Court concluded that because
McNeil made his statements before he had been formally charged,
arraigned, or indicted for the Caledonia crimes, his right to counsel
related to those offenses had not yet attached.124 Accordingly, the
Sixth Amendment did not bar admission of those statements.'2
Prior to McNeil, however, a number of other courts had begun to
recognize that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel may apply not
strictly to a single charged offense, but to other offenses as well. 26 In
People v. Clankie,'27 one of the first decisions in which Sixth
Amendment protection was extended in this way, the Illinois
Supreme Court explained that, in Maine v. Moulton, "the [United
States Supreme] Court also recognized that some technically distinct,
formally charged offenses are actually so closely related to certain
offenses for which formal charges have not been made that the right
to counsel for the charged offense cannot constitutionally be isolated
from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense."'" The Moulton
court implicitly recognized this principle, the Clankie court explained,
by vacating both the theft and burglary convictions of the defendant
122. See id. at 175.
123. Id.
124. See id. at 176.
125. See id. The Court went on to explain:
[I]f we were to adopt petitioner's rule, most persons in pretrial custody for
serious offenses would be unapproachable by police officers suspecting them of
involvement in other crimes, even though they have never expressed any
unwillingness to be questioned. Since the ready ability to obtain uncoerced
confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good, society would be the loser.
Id. at 181. For discussions of McNeil, see Craig R. Johnson, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin:
Blurring a Bright Line on Custodial Interrogation, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1643; Kenneth P.
Jones, Note, McNeil v. Wisconsin: Invocation of Right to Counsel Under Sixth
Amendment by Accused at Judicial Proceeding Does Not Constitute Invocation of Miranda
Right to Counsel for Unrelated Charge, 26 GA. L. REV. 1049 (1992); Patricia Ullman,
Note, Fifth and Sixth Amendments-The Right to Counsel in Multiple Charge
Arraignments, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 904 (1992).
126. See United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1342-43 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Louis, 679 F. Supp. 705, 709 (W.D. Mich. 1988); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d
448, 451-53 (Ill. 1988); People v. Hoskins, 523 N.E.2d 80, 83-84 (Ill. Ct. App. 1988).
127. 530 N.E.2d 448 (Ill. 1988).
128. Id. at 451.; see also Joseph C. Gergits et al., Survey of Illinois Law: Criminal Law
and Procedure, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 747, 754-57 (1994) (discussing Clankie and comparing it
to other Illinois cases involving confessions); Howard Suskin & Amy Rosenberg Small,
Criminal Procedure, 21 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 349, 376-77 (1990) (discussing Clankie).
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even though at the time of the incriminating statements Moulton had
not been charged with burglary.129 The court observed that this same
principle applied in Brewer v. Williams because the Supreme Court
barred the use of Williams's admission in his murder trial, even
though he had been indicted only for abduction at the time of the
"Christian burial speech."'3 °  The Illinois Supreme Court then
concluded that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has thus
apparently assumed that sixth amendment rights of one formally
charged with an offense extend to offenses closely related to that
offense and for which a defendant is subsequently formally
accused."'' The court therefore reversed Williams's burglary
convictions. 2
Although it might appear that the Supreme Court's opinion in
McNeil put an end to the "closely related" exception,133 the Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the principle just six months after McNeil was
decided. In United States v. Cooper,1M Clinton Ladon Cooper was
charged with aggravated robbery, a state offense. Six days later, a
federal agent visited Cooper while he was incarcerated and
interrogated him about his possession of a firearm during the
robbery.'35 Cooper confessed to possession of the unlicensed firearm
and subsequently was indicted on federal charges.13 6 Cooper argued
that the federal agent violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel
when he questioned Cooper about the robbery.137 The Fifth Circuit
held that even though the two prosecutions-federal and state-
would use essentially the same evidence, they involved different
conduct and therefore were not "extremely closely related. '138 In
129. See Clankie, 530 N.E.2d at 451 (discussing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159
(1985)).
130. See id. (discussing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)).
131. Id. at 452.
132. See id. at 452-53.
133. For purposes of clarity, this Note uses "closely related" to refer to this exception.
Courts have used the terms "closely related," "extremely closely related," and
"inextricably intertwined," all of which apparently mean the same thing. See United
States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 41 (3d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Carpenter, 963
F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1992) (equating "inextricably intertwined" and "extremely closely
related"); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (using
"inextricably intertwined"); Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 233 (Md. 1995) (using
"closely related"), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1148 (1996).
134. 949 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1991). For a discussion of Cooper and its relationship to
McNeil, see Jones, supra note 125, at 1064-67.
135. See Cooper, 949 F.2d at 740.
136. See id. at 740-41.
137. See id. at 743.
138. Id. at 744.
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effect, the court recognized the possibility of a "closely related"
exception, even though the facts before it did not support a reversal
of the defendant's conviction.139
After Cooper, a number of federal circuit courts recognized the
closely related exception and attempted to define its requirements.
4°
In United States v. Hines,'4 for instance, the Ninth Circuit stated that
"[a]n exception to the offense-specific requirement of the Sixth
Amendment occurs when the pending charge is so inextricably
intertwined with the charge under investigation that the right to
counsel for the pending charge cannot constitutionally be isolated
from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense."'' Here, the
court distinguished the defendant's activities in two separate months.
Even though the same offense was charged in both instances, the
time, place, and persons involved were all different. 43 As a result,
the court held that the charges were "separate and distinct" for Sixth
Amendment purposes.' 4
Similarly, in United States v. Kidd,4 5 the Fourth Circuit
recognized the exception and explained that "[i]n order to fall within
[it], the offense being investigated must derive from the same factual
predicate as the charged offense.' 46 Norman Kidd was indicted on
six drug charges 47 after government informants tape-recorded
approximately seven of Kidd's sales of cocaine base (crack).14 Kidd
139. The Fifth Circuit later stated that in Cooper it had "acknowledged that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel might well attach to a charge that 'was extremely closely
related to pending ... charges.'" United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir.
1993) (quoting Cooper, 949 F.2d at 744).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 1997) cert. denied,
118 S. Ct. 2299 (1998); United States v. Arnold, 106 F.3d 37, 40-41 (3d Cir. 1997); United
States v. Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 150 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30,33
(4th Cir. 1993); Williams, 993 F.2d at 456-57; Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099, 1104
(9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257-58 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam);
United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740-41 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Gary A.
Udashen & Robert Udashen, Criminal Procedure: Confession, Search, and Seizure, 46
SMU L. REV. 1237, 1257-59 (1993) (discussing the Fifth Circuit's decisions in Carpenter
and Cooper).
141. 963 F.2d 255 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam).
142 Id. at 257.
143. See id.
144. Id. at 257-58.
145. 12 F.3d 30 (4th Cir. 1993).
146. Id. at 33. Kidd was charged with five counts of cocaine possession and distribution
under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
cocaine base per 21 U.S.C. § 846. See id. at 31.
147. Kidd was charged with five counts of cocaine possession and distribution under 21
U.S.C. § 846. See id. at 31.
148. See id.
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was arrested on July 3, 1992, and counsel was appointed for him. 149
On August 26, an undercover informant who had no prior contact
with Kidd made a tape-recorded crack purchase from him.' From
this sale, the government obtained a superseding indictment,
including the August 26 transaction as a separate distribution charge
and extending the conspiracy period through August 26.151 Kidd later
pled guilty to one count of the superseding indictment, and the
government moved to dismiss the remaining six counts. 52 During his
sentencing hearing, Kidd objected to reference in the pre-sentence
report to the August 26 sale,'53 arguing that the informant's contact
with him after he had been indicted on drug distribution charges
violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.15 4 The court
concluded, however, that the informant's contacting Kidd on August
26, after he had been indicted for drug distribution, was "factually
distinct from, and independent of, the prior distribution offenses for
which the Sixth Amendment right had been invoked."'155
The Fourth Circuit explained that as of August 26, Kidd's right
to counsel had only attached in reference to the earlier drug
distribution offenses. 6  During the August 26 transaction, the
informant did not try to obtain information about the charges on
which Kidd had been indicted. 57  Instead, the investigation
concerned only new criminal activity.' In rejecting Kidd's right to
counsel claim, the Fourth Circuit explained that "[t]he Sixth
Amendment does not create a sanctuary for the commission of
149. See id.
150. See id. at 31-32.
151. See id. at 32.
152. See id.
153. The inclusion of the 0.15-gram sale on August 26 increased the total weight of
crack sold from 1.89 grams to 2.04 grams, and thus raised Kidd's offense level from 18 to
20. See id.; see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 2DI.1(C)(10)-(11)
(1997) (identifying the quantities of cocaine base (crack) that correspond to offense levels
20 and 18); id. § 5A (listing the guideline range applicable to each offense level and
criminal history category).
154. See Kidd, 12 F.3d at 32.
155. Id. (citing United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255,257 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
156. See id.
157. See id. at 32-33.
158. See id. at 33. The court distinguished the government's action here from other
cases in which the post-indictment activity resulted in new evidence concerning pending
charges. See id. at 32 (citing Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176-77 (1985); United States
v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1343 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Terzado-Madruga,
897 F.2d 1099, 1110 (11th Cir. 1990)). The court explained that "[t]he mere fact that both
the pending charges and the new offense involved drug distribution does not mean the
right to counsel attached to both. To hold otherwise would essentially permit charged
suspects to commit similar crimes with impunity." Kidd, 12 F.3d at 33.
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additional crimes during the pendency of an indictment. ' 15 9  The
court intimated that a Sixth Amendment violation would have
resulted if the exchange had not "involved a different purchaser-
informant, occurred at a different time, and took place in a different
location." 160  Moreover, barring reference to the August 26 sale
"'would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the
investigation of criminal activities.' "16
The Third Circuit's recent adoption of the closely related
exception in United States v. Arnold'62 differs from prior decisions in
that the court found the exception to be applicable to the facts before
it. Concerning separate charges of witness intimidation and
attempted murder, the Third Circuit held: "Given that Arnold's
central purpose and the intended results of both offenses were the
same, we cannot but conclude that the two offenses were sufficiently
related for purposes of the Sixth Amendment exception."'63  The
court indicated that it was significant that the events "arose from the
same predicate facts, conduct, intent and circumstances.""
A growing contingent of state courts now recognize the "closely
related" exception.'65 In In re Pack,'66 one of the first cases to apply
the exception after McNeil, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania held
"that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has interpreted the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, which is offense specific, to apply to all
the offenses arising from the same incident for which a defendant is
charged." 167 In Pack, a youth was formally charged with theft and
assigned an attorney, but an officer questioned him afterward
concerning a burglary charge and obtained incriminating
159. Id.
160. Id. The court did not, however, state that the absence of the features would
unequivocally result in a Sixth Amendment right to counsel violation.
161. Id. (quoting Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180).
162. 106 F.3d 37, 42 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We adopt the 'closely related' exception and hold
that it applies here.").
163. Id. at 42.
164. Id.
165. See, e.g., Whittlesey v. State, 665 A.2d 223, 232-36 (Md. 1995); Commonwealth v.
Rainwater, 681 N.E.2d 1218, 1223-24 (Mass. 1997); In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992). But see People v. Clair, 828 P.2d 705, 722 (Cal. 1992) (explaining that,
under McNeil, cases which employed early versions of the closely related exception "are
no longer vital") (citations omitted).
166. 616 A.2d 1006 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
167. Id. at 1010-11 (citing Commonwealth v. Santiago, 599 A.2d 200, 202 (Pa. 1991)).
The court paid respect to McNeil here in its description of the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as "offense specific." See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991) ("The
Sixth Amendment right, however, is offense specific.").
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statements. 16 The court held that these charges "arose from the
same incident" and that the court should have suppressed the
statement at trial.69 "To hold otherwise," the court explained,
"would allow the Commonwealth to circumvent the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel merely by charging a defendant with
additional related crimes.' 1
70
Three years later, the Supreme Court of Maryland, in Whittlesey
v. State,'7 1 discussed extensively the development of the exception,
although it concluded that the charges in question were not " 'closely
related.' "172 The court identified two instances in which the
exception would apply-one in the case of police misconduct, and
the other, extending from Clankie, which focused exclusively on
whether the two offenses stemmed from the same base of facts.174
The court examined the second line of cases, noting that while all the
courts require identity of "time, place, and conduct,"175 some also
require the same prosecuting sovereign for both charges, 76 and
others look to see if the incriminating statements served as evidence
for both charges.77 Relying on the analyses put forth in two prior
16& See Peck at 1007-08.
169. Id. at 1011.
170. Id.
171. 665 A.2d 223 (Md. 1995).
172. Id. at 236.
173. See id. at 234-35 (citing United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100, 1103-06 (9th
Cir. 1992); United States v. Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d 1329, 1339-45 (10th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Olsen, 840 F. Supp. 842, 848-53 (D. Utah 1993)). For example, in Mitcheltree,
police recorded a conversation between the defendant and a police informant after the
defendant had been indicted. See Mitcheltree, 940 F.2d at 1339. The Tenth Circuit
concluded that this conduct amounted to "'an impermissible interference with the right
to assistance of counsel.'" Id. at 1341 n.13 (quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
274-75 (1980)).
174. See Whittlesey, 665 A.2d at 235 (citing United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737,743-
44 (5th Cir. 1991); People v. Clankie, 530 N.E.2d 448, 451-52 (Ill. 1988); In re Michael B.,
178 Cal. Rptr. 291,295-96 (Ct. App. 1981)).
175. Id. (citing United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993); United States v.
Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam); Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d
1099, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 741 (5th Cir.
1992); Bruno v. State, 613 A.2d 440, 447 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992), affd, 632 A.2d 1192
(Md. 1993); Upton v. State, 853 S.W.2d 548,555-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc)).
176. See id. (citing United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Nocella, 849 F.2d 33, 37-38 (1st Cir. 1988); United States v. Olsen, 840 F. Supp.
842, 849 (D. Utah 1993)). But see United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir.
1997) (holding that identity of sovereign is irrelevant); United States v. Laury, 49 F.3d
145, 150 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. Louis, 679 F. Supp. 705, 709 (W.D.
Mich. 1988) (same).
177. See id. (citing In re Pack, 616 A.2d 1006, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)).
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federal cases, 178 the Maryland court concluded that the defendant's
offenses-a murder charge and a charge of making false statements
to a state official-met neither the "time, place, and conduct test"
nor the "same evidence test."'179 As such, the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel had not attached for the later murder charge at the time
the defendant made incriminating statements. 8 °
Among the courts that have adopted and applied the "closely
related" exception, only the Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of New Jersey, in State v. P.Z.,'8' extended the exception beyond the
criminal context. On facts similar to those of Mary Adams's case, the
court examined the question of whether the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel protects a father, under investigation for child abuse, who
made incriminating statements to a social worker after the filing of
civil charges but before the commencement of criminal abuse
proceedings."" The State argued that even though a statutory right to
counsel had attached once the civil action began, under Kirby the
right to counsel in the subsequent criminal matter had not yet
arisen. 18 3 The court rejected the State's position, noting that the civil
abuse case, "although a civil matter, had very serious personal
consequences to all parties involved, including the defendant....
The State was defendant's adversary in that action, as well as during
the time when the statement in question was taken."" 4 In order to
ensure that child abuse investigations are comprehensive, the court
reasoned that parents would need assurance that their cooperation
would be protected from possible admission in a subsequent criminal
trial.185 The court concluded that extending the constitutional right to
counsel to cover these interactions with parents would best achieve
178. See id. at 235-36 (discussing United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 457 (5th Cir.
1993) and Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099,1104-05 (9th Cir. 1992)).
179. Id. at 236.
180. See id.
181. 666 A.2d 1000 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), rev'd, 703 A.2d 901 (N.J. 1997).
Note that Adams was decided by the North Carolina Supreme Court on April 11, 1997,
see Adams, 345 N.C. at 745, 483 S.E.2d at 156, while the New Jersey Supreme Court did
not reverse P.Z. until November 26, 1997, see State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 901 (N.J. 1997).
Accordingly, the New Jersey lower court's decision existed as persuasive authority at the
time of Adams. For a discussion of the New Jersey Supreme Court's reversal of P.Z., see
infra notes 258-64 and accompanying text.
182. See P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1001-03.
183. See id. at 1004. P.Z. was represented by an appointed attorney in the civil abuse
("Title Nine") matter pursuant to section 9.6-8.43 of the New Jersey Statutes. See P.Z.,
666 A.2d at 1002.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 1004-05.
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this goal.8 6 As such, the court held that statements made by parents
to social services officials during abuse and neglect investigations
would be inadmissible against them unless Miranda warnings had
been given and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as extended,
had been respected. 87
Thus, without directly adopting the "closely related" exception,
the P.Z. court effectively applied it, but in a new context. Rather
than limiting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to "all criminal
prosecutions,"'" the New Jersey appellate court broadened the right
to encompass civil matters that arose from identical facts and about
which society had a particularly strong concern." 9 Arguably, then,
the same reasoning could apply to the facts in Mary Adams's case.
Although the North Carolina Court of Appeals did not explicitly
adopt the "closely related" exception in Mary Adams's case, its
reliance on P.Z. implicitly demonstrated its acceptance of the
exception under such circumstances. 9 ' By contrast, the North
Carolina Supreme Court's resolution made no direct reference to the
exception or to P.Z., but relied solely on Kirby v. Illinois.191 The
court explained that because the filing of an abuse and neglect
186. See id. at 1005.
187. See id.
188. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
189. Here the concern was the effective investigation of child abuse allegations. The
court explained: "So too are we convinced that the threat of criminal prosecutions will
result in parents not cooperating with [Division of Youth and Family Services]
investigations, and therefore, fewer children receiving the protection that Title Nine
demands, and possibly being forced to continue suffering in an abusive environment."
P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1005. The right to counsel is certainly not the only right afforded by the
Sixth Amendment which garners special consideration in the child abuse context. See,
e.g., Julie A. Anderson, Comment, The Sixth Amendment: Protecting Defendants' Rights
at the Expense of Child Victims, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 767,790-801 (1997) (concerning
the right of confrontation and the right to self-representation). For a discussion of the
application of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in the context of civil
and criminal child abuse matters, see William Wesley Patton, The World Where Parallel
Lines Converge: The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Concurrent Civil and
Criminal Child Abuse Proceedings, 24 GA. L. REV. 473 (1990).
190. See State v. Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538, 542, 470 S.E.2d 838, 841 (1996) (citing
P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1001-05), rev'd, 345 N.C. 745, 483 S.E.2d 156 (1997); cf. United States v.
Arnold, 106 F.3d 37,42 (3d Cir. 1997) ("We adopt the 'closely related' exception and hold
that it applies here."). The court's use of language associated with the exception at least
indicates familiarity with it. See Adams, 122 N.C. App. at 543, 470 S.E.2d at 841
(characterizing civil and criminal abuse proceedings as "intertwined").
191. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 747-48,483 S.E.2d at 157 (citing Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 689-90 (1972)). In fact, counsel for Ms. Adams had fully briefed the court on the
Cooper line of cases, particularly P.Z. See Defendant-Appellee's New Brief at 14-15,
Adams (No. 293PA96) (discussing United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir.
1991) and P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1002-04).
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petition amounts to the beginning of a civil action, and because the
Sixth Amendment pertains only to criminal matters, there was simply
no constitutional protection of Ms. Adams's right to counsel under
the Sixth Amendment."9 The two proceedings were not sufficiently
"intertwined" to "trigger[] the protection involved in a criminal
case."
193
How meaningful, though, is the civil-criminal distinction in the
context of an abuse or neglect action against a parent by the State?
In most types of cases, the distinction is elementary. 9 4 There is a
significant difference, for instance, between a shareholder's
derivative suit and a charge of first-degree rape. The elements are
completely different,'95 even if the actions that gave rise to the
proceedings occurred contemporaneously. The sentencing and
remedial options before the factfinder are equally divergent. 9 6 In
almost no manner are the two actions alike.
Compare, however, criminal abuse and neglect proceedings with
those before a juvenile court. When an instance of child abuse is
alleged, the facts presented to the criminal and juvenile courts almost
always will be exactly the same, especially because, as in North
192 See Adams, 345 N.C. at 748,483 S.E.2d at 157.
193. Id.
194. For an insightful discussion of when the distinction becomes more complicated,
see Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve Criminal
Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1348-64 (1991); see also Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure:
Punishment Theory and the Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO L.J. 775, 782-809
(1997) (discussing "intellectual," "institutional," and "socio-cultural" challenges to the
civil-criminal distinction as well as the intricacies of punishment theory and differences
between civil and criminal procedural requirements).
195. In North Carolina, rape in the first degree occurs when:
[a] person ... engages in vaginal intercourse ... [w]ith another person by force
and against the will of the other person, and ... [e]mploys or displays a
dangerous or deadly weapon or an article which the other person reasonably
believes to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or ... [i]nfiicts serious personal
injury upon the victim or another person.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2(a) (1993). By contrast, derivative suits for shareholders have
been described as "the principal remedy by which defrauded minority shareholders may
call directors, officers, promoters, and controlling shareholders to account for
mismanagement, diversion of assets, and fraudulent manipulation of corporate affairs."
JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 15.1, at 398-99 (1997).
196. Because North Carolina defines first-degree rape as a Class B1 felony, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-27.2, a convicted offender with a prior record, under aggravating
circumstances, could face a maximum sentence of life in prison without parole. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.17 (1997). Plaintiffs in shareholder derivative suits, by contrast,
may demand a wide variety of actions of the court, including money damages and
dissolution of the corporation. See COX, supra note 195, at 404-05 (listing nine different
types of actions classified as derivative suits).
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Carolina, DSS and law enforcement likely will collaborate in
investigating allegations, 197 and the statutory definitions of criminal
and civil abuse are practically identical.1 98  Additionally, the
constitutional' 99 and statutory200 fights to representation by counsel
ensure that the adjudication will be adversarial. Consequently,
excluding the differences in possible dispositions-incarceration2'0 as
opposed to loss of parental custody2m or termination of parental
rights °3-and different burdens of proof-beyond a reasonable
doubt2° versus clear and convincing evidence 2 ---the actions are
fundamentally mirror images of each other: it is the State against a
parent.2 6
197. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-548(a) (1995) (requiring local law enforcement to
coordinate its criminal investigation of abuse with the protective services investigation of
DSS).
198. See supra note 29 (summarizing North Carolina's statutory definition of civil child
abuse); supra note 47 (summarizing North Carolina's statutory definition of felonious
child abuse).
199. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall... have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
200. For example, in North Carolina, "[i]n cases where the juvenile petition alleges
that a juvenile is abused, neglected or dependent, the parent has the right to counsel and
to appointed counsel in cases of indigency unless the parent waives the right." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-587 (1995).
201. Child abuse constitutes a felony offense under N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4
(1993). As a Class E felony, a conviction may result in imprisonment. See id. § 15-
1340.17 (1997).
202. A child may be removed from the home upon an adjudication of abuse or neglect,
but generally only after other dispositional alternatives, primarily home supervision, have
proven unhelpful or would place the child in continued danger. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-647 (1995). In such a case, the child may be placed with a relative or family friend,
or in foster care if necessary. See id.
203. For North Carolina's statutory requirements for terminating parental rights, see
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-289.32 (1995). The extreme option of terminating the rights of a
parent has been examined recently by the United States Supreme Court. See M.L.B. v.
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (holding that indigent parents are allowed a free trial
transcript upon appeal of the decision to terminate their parental rights); see also Mary
McCrory Krupnow, Note, M.L.B. v. S.L.J- Protecting Familial Bonds and Creating a New
Right of Access in the Civil Courts, 76 N.C. L. REV. 621, 646 (1998) (discussing "the
peculiar role of parental termination adjudication in the court system").
204. In an adult criminal matter, the prosecution must prove its case beyond a
reasonable doubt. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,427 (1979).
205. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-635 ("The allegations in a petition alleging abuse,
neglect, dependence, or undisciplined behavior shall be proved by clear and convincing
evidence."); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,770-71 (1982) (holding that, in the
context of parental rights termination proceedings, due process requires clear and
convincing evidence).
206. See State v. Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538, 542, 470 S.E.2d 830, 841 (1995) ("[T]he
parent faces the prosecutorial forces of organized society."). Professor Cheh points out
that the United States Supreme Court "has recognized that 'in terms of potential
consequences, there is little to distinguish... [a juvenile] adjudicatory hearing.., from a
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Despite these shared characteristics, North Carolina courts have
articulated and adhered to distinctions between juvenile and criminal
proceedings.a 7  The purpose of the juvenile court system, the
supreme court has specified," 'is not for the punishment of offenders
but for the salvation of children.' "208 Compared to criminal trials,
"[j]uvenile proceedings ... stand in a different light. Whatever may
be their proper classification, they certainly are not 'criminal
prosecutions.' "209 As such, due process requirements, even in
juvenile delinquency proceedings, 210 are less rigorous than when
applied to criminal matters.a
traditional criminal prosecution.'" Cheh, supra note 194, at 1362 (alteration in original)
(quoting Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 530 (1975)). A few commentators have recently
re-examined the nature of juvenile proceedings. See Robert 0. Dawson, The Future of
Juvenile Justice: Is It Time to Abolish the System?, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 136,
155 (1990) (concluding that, in the delinquency context, the juvenile and criminal systems
should remain separate); Meridith Felise Sopher, "The Best of All Possible Worlds":
Balancing Victims' and Defendants' Rights in the Child Sexual Abuse Case, 63 FORDHAM
L. REV. 633, 658-64 (1994) (advocating a "team approach" to sexual abuse prosecution).
207. Professor Cheh underscores the distinctive nature of criminal proceedings:
From this assessment, it follows that a matter can only be criminal if formally
intended to be and denominated as such: following the form of a criminal trial
and calling a person to account for action clearly named as criminal by the
legislature.... In other words, ... it is correct to say that proceedings are
criminal only if so labeled by the legislature. Being so labeled, [courts] must
follow the procedures that not only protect the defendant but also give weight
and meaning to the ceremonial aspect of guilt adjudication.
Cheh, supra note 194, at 1360.
208. In re Walker, 282 N.C. 28, 39, 191 S.E.2d 702, 709 (1972) (quoting
Commonwealth v. Fisher, 62 A. 198,199 (Pa. 1905)).
209. In re Burrus, 275 N.C. 517, 529, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886 (1969), affd, 403 U.S. 528
(1971); see also Walker, 282 N.C. at 37, 191 S.E.2d at 708 ("Whatever may be the proper
classification for a juvenile proceeding in which the child is alleged to be undisciplined, it
certainly is not a criminal prosecution within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment which
guarantees the assistance of counsel 'in all criminal prosecutions.'" (citing Burrus, 275
N.C. at 529,169 S.E.2d at 886-87) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. VI)).
210. North Carolina defines a "delinquent juvenile" as "[a]ny juvenile less than 16
years of age who has committed a crime or infraction under State law or under an
ordinance of local government, including violation of the motor vehicle laws." N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-517(12) (1995). For a general discussion of North Carolina juvenile
delinquency proceedings, including plea bargaining, adjudication, and disposition, see
ILENE B. NELSON, CHILDREN IN THE LAW: A CASEBOOK FOR PRACrICE 223-38 (Ilene
B. Nelson ed., 1992).
211. See, e.g., Walker, 282 N.C. at 37-38, 191 S.E.2d at 708-09 (explaining that juveniles
do not have the right to counsel in undisciplined child adjudications). According to
Professor Cheh, however, the United States Supreme Court's extension of constitutional
protections to juvenile matters almost amounts to treating them as criminal proceedings.
See Cheh, supra note 194, at 1361-62; Burrus, 275 N.C. at 528-30, 169 S.E.2d at 886-87
(explaining that due process does not require jury trials in juvenile delinquency
adjudications, but that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the
same as that in a criminal trial).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Adjusting the rules for due process seems to make sense when,
as in delinquent and undisciplined child proceedings, the juvenile
court's disposition of the case concludes the judicial role in the
matter.1 2 For an accused parent, however, the civil adjudication may
not be the final step. As in Mary Adams's case, after DSS has filed
its abuse or neglect petition, local law enforcement may choose to
pursue allegations in the criminal forum.1 3
Before filing charges, though, law enforcement officials may
need to conduct additional investigation, perhaps desiring to question
their primary suspect. Should the parent's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel attach only after the prosecutor has taken the allegations to
the courthouse, even though the State is relying on the same facts and
witnesses which gave rise to the civil petition? If so, it would appear
to conflict with limitations placed on state officials in recent cases.
For example, in In re Maynard,1 4 the North Carolina Court of
Appeals held that once a neglect petition has been filed against a
parent and the statutory right to counsel has attached, DSS case
workers cannot then urge the parent to sign adoption consent
documents in the absence of an attorney. 15 The Maynard court
expressly analogized the case to a criminal matter in which the
defendant invokes the right to counsel. 216 Similarly, at least one court
in a criminal proceeding has barred admission on Sixth Amendment
grounds of inculpatory statements made by a parent to a social
worker, acknowledging the interconnectedness of the criminal and
civil abuse investigations.217
212. Professor Cheh explains that "the [Supreme] Court has invoked the due process
requirements of fundamental fairness to say that, as a matter of due process of law, most,
but not all, protections associated with criminal trials apply to juveniles." Cheh, supra
note 194, at 1362 (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 541 (1971)). This
conclusion makes sense given the different goals of the criminal and juvenile systems:
punishment of offenders versus protection of children. See Walker, 282 N.C. at 39, 191
S.E.2d at 709.
213. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-548(a) (1995).
214. 116 N.C. App. 616,448 S.E.2d 871 (1994).
215. See id. at 619-21, 448 S.E.2d at 873-74. The court of appeals relied on Maynard in
its resolution of State v. Adams. See State v. Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538, 544, 470 S.E.2d
838, 842 (1995) ("[D]efendant was denied her [Sixth Amendment] right to counsel under
Maynard."), rev'd, 345 N.C. 745, 483 S.E.2d 156 (1997). The supreme court, however,
explicitly rejected this comparison, stating that Maynard was unhelpful because it did not
concern criminal proceedings. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 748, 483 S.E.2d at 157-58.
216. See Maynard, 116 N.C. App. at 620,448 S.E.2d at 874 (citing Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436,474 (1966)).
217. See State v. P.Z., 666 A.2d 1000, 1001-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), rev'd,
703 A.2d 901 (N.J. 1997). At a hearing held on a motion to suppress the defendant's
statements, the trial court judge explained his rationale behind granting the motion:
[T]he allegations clearly that they were talking about [in the civil proceeding], if
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Mary Adams's situation does not exactly parallel these
circumstances, of course. In contrast with both of these instances,
Ms. Adams was questioned not by a DSS worker, but by Cumberland
County police.218 She spoke directly to Detective Autry and other
officers in the Law Enforcement Center after having avoided contact
with them for some time. 19 Accordingly, there was little room for
assumption that she was unaware of her audience and their interests
in her."0 Yet, the court of appeals in Maynard compared the position
of a parent after a neglect action has been filed to that of a criminal
defendant, to whom constitutional protection is extended in dealing
with law enforcement officers."1 It would then seem more
reasonable to extend such an analogy to the situation in which a
parent, facing a petition of child abuse and its inherent criminal
implications, speaks to law enforcement directly and without the aid
of an attorney.
Even if such an analogy could be made, certain distinctions
between Mary Adams's case and cases that have employed the
"closely related" exception militate against a broader application of
the Sixth Amendment. First, in general, the North Carolina Supreme
Court appears less willing than other state courts to extend the Sixth
true, could have just as well been handled criminally.
And [the civil statute] recognizes that, because [it] say[s] ... let the
Prosecutor know immediately. Keep the Prosecutor informed.
It's a difficult bridge that we jump back and forth from.
The Prosecutor is in the case, the Prosecutor is out of the case, not really a
Criminal action.
No Criminal Complaints really filed, but they're there.
They're-and I don't mean to say this in any type of sinister way, they're
hovering, hovering, listening, hearing, talking to the DYFS people. Trying to do
their job. Looking to prosecute these people criminally, if that's appropriate.
But I think when they do that, they've got to be held to the standard,
which one is held to if a Complaint has, in fact been filed, and counsel has been
appointed.
Id. at 1001-02 (quoting trial court judge). A recent North Carolina case also identified an
agency relationship under similar facts between a DSS worker and law enforcement. See
State v. Morrell, 108 N.C. App. 465, 473-74, 424 S.E.2d 147, 152-53 (1987). But see State
v. Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 324-26, 354 S.E.2d 510, 514-15 (1987) (holding that a social
worker's conversation with a charged defendant in jail, after which the worker reported
incriminating statements to police, did not amount to agency relationship between the
police and DSS); State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 329, 331,354 S.E.2d 516, 518 (1987) (same).
218. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
220. Cf Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 321, 354 S.E.2d 510, 512 (1987) (recounting social
worker's testimony that he had informed the defendant that their conversation would not
be confidential and that he had an obligation to report information to the district
attorney).
221. See Maynard, 116 N.C. App. at 620-21,448 S.E.2d at 874.
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Amendment jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court.22 In
State v. P.Z., the appellate court distinguished the right to counsel
under the New Jersey Constitution from the right required by the
federal Constitution.' For example, New Jersey courts have
required more than a " 'perfunctory recitation of the right to counsel
and to remain silent'" in order to render valid a defendant's waiver
of these rights, while the federal high court has mandated
comparatively loose standards.2 4 The opinions of North Carolina
courts, on the other hand, tend to dovetail with the Sixth
Amendment pronouncements of the United States Supreme Court.2
In that regard, the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme Court in
Adams, in which it looked solely to Kirby v. Illinois' 6 for instruction
on the right to counsel question, appears consistent with its prior
jurisprudence and inconsistent with the holding in P.Z. 7
222. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
223. See P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1003 ("New Jersey has traditionally accorded greater
protection of the right to counsel than the United States." (citing State v. Sanchez, 609
A.2d 400, 407-08 (N.J. 1991))). The New Jersey Supreme Court, in its subsequent
resolution of P.Z., circumscribed this point:
Although this Court has held that the right to counsel found in Article I,
Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution can provide greater protection
than the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.... we have read Article I,
Paragraph 10 as consonant with the Federal Constitution on the issue of when
the right to counsel is triggered.
State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 913 (N.J. 1997) (citations omitted).
224. P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1003 (quoting Sanchez, 609 A.2d at 408). In Patterson v.
Illinois, 487 U.S. 285 (1988), the United States Supreme Court held that the provision of
the Miranda warnings validly informed a suspect in custody of the right to silence and
counsel. See id. at 299-300. According to the New Jersey Supreme Court, however,
"'[s]uch a recitation does not tell the defendant the nature of the charges, the dangers of
self-representation, or the steps counsel might take to protect the defendant's interest.'"
P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1003 (quoting Sanchez, 609 A.2d at 408). But see State v. Tucker, 645
A.2d 111, 123 (N.J. 1994) (declining to extend the right to counsel at a first appearance
before indictment when the invocation was unclear). For discussions of Patterson, see
John S. Banas, III, Note, Sixth Amendment-Waiver of the Sixth Amendment Right to
Counsel at Post-Indictment Interrogation, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 795 (1988);
Colin E. Fritz, Comment, Patterson v. Illinois: Applying Miranda Waivers to the Sixth
Amendment Right to Counsel, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1261 (1989).
225. See, e.g., State v. Gibbs, 335 N.C. 1, 43-44, 436 S.E.2d 321, 345 (1993) (following
Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972)); State v. Franklin, 308 N.C. 682, 687-89, 304
S.E.2d 579, 583-84 (1983) (same); State v. McDowell, 301 N.C. 279, 288-89, 271 S.E.2d
286, 293 (1980) (same); see also Franklin, 308 N.C. at 689 n.3, 304 S.E.2d at 584 n.3
(" 'The [United States Supreme] Court has extended the sixth amendment right to
counsel, as opposed to the Miranda right, backwards from the trial through the indictment
to the initiation of judicial proceedings, presumably the first appearance before a judicial
officer' and 'the Court is unlikely to extend the right any further.' " (alteration in original)
(quoting Kamisar, supra note 101, at 83)).
226. 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
227. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 748, 483 S.E.2d at 157 ("We are bound to hold, pursuant
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Second, two courts, one federal and one state court, have
recently scrutinized the derivation of the initial right to counsel in
determining whether to apply the "closely related" exception."
Examination of the nature of the right to counsel in North Carolina
may help reveal the parameters of its availability. In North Carolina,
the right to counsel for parents in abuse and neglect matters is wholly
a statutory provision. 9  Likewise, in New Jersey, parents are
statutorily entitled to the assistance of an attorney in such
proceedings."0 Additionally, once a complaint of abuse or neglect is
filed, the New Jersey Department of Youth and Family Services
("DYFS") may undertake an investigation, including having
preliminary conferences with involved parties. 1 In recognition of
"the fundamental injustice that might result from the use of self-
incriminatory statements made to DYFS agents where criminal
consequences are likely," 2 the New Jersey legislature also expressly
barred such use in a subsequent criminal proceeding of any statement
made by a party in a preliminary conference. 3  According to the
lower appellate court in P.Z., only when Miranda warnings are given
and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offered could the
prosecutor use an admission from a preliminary conference. z4
to Kirby, that the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an attorney did not attach at [the
time of the filing of the abuse and neglect petition]."); cf. P.Z. 666 A.2d at 1004 (rejecting
the State's argument that "Kirby ... requires that adverse 'criminal' proceedings be
instituted in order for the right to counsel to attach, and that because the proceedings in
the Title Nine action were civil, defendant did not have that right at the time he gave the
confession").
228. See United States v. Doherty, 126 F.3d 769,778-83 (6th Cir. 1997); P.Z., 666 A.2d
at 1004-05.
229. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-587 (1995).
230. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43 (West 1993). One difference between the North
Carolina and New Jersey statutes is that, whereas New Jersey allows for public defenders
to represent parents in civil abuse actions, see id., North Carolina expressly forbids the
appointment of public defenders for parents in civil abuse, neglect, and dependency
matters, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-587.
231. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.35.
232- P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1004.
233. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.36. In P.Z., the appellate court explained that "the
clear purpose of the Title Nine proceeding of protecting the abused child is a prime
consideration. DYFS investigations will undoubtedly be more productive in revealing
potential dangers to children, thereby permitting remedial action, if the fear of having
one's own statement used in a criminal prosecution is abated." P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1004.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, disagreed, stating that "acceptance of [this]
argument would shift the primary focus of Title Nine from the right of children to be
protected from abuse and neglect to the right of parents to the custody of their children."
State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901, 914 (N.J. 1997).
234. See P.Z., 666 A.2d at 1005. This rule would apply "although defendant was not in
a custodial situation and no adverse criminal proceedings had begun." Id. The New
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By contrast, North Carolina's provisions appear much more
limited. Although information compiled by the local DSS director
must remain confidential, there is no clearly identifiable bar on
information-sharing between DSS and the district attorney. 35
Moreover, unlike New Jersey, the North Carolina legislature has not
explicitly extended protection to admissions made to local DSS
agents. 6 Although it is possible for a North Carolina court, on facts
similar to those of P.Z., to interpret a legislative intent to protect
admissions made in the course of DSS investigations, not even the
opinion of the court of appeals in Adams drew that conclusion. 7
This distinction has been determinative in a recent federal case.
Six months after the North Carolina Supreme Court decided Adams,
the Sixth Circuit decided United States v. Doherty." In this case, a
Native American resident of a tribal reservation in Michigan, Ross
Allen Doherty, was convicted of sexually abusing two children?29
Jersey Supreme Court expressly rejected these conclusions in its subsequent resolution of
P.Z. See P.Z., 703 A.2d at 908-14 (discussing the Fifth and Sixth Amendments).
235. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-544 (1995) ("All information received by the
Department of Social Services, including the identity of the reporter, shall be held in
strictest confidence by the Department."); id. § 7A-548 ("[T]he Director shall make an
immediate oral and subsequent written report of the findings to the district attorney ...
and the appropriate law enforcement agency....").
236. See, e.g., State v. Nations, 319 N.C. 318, 324-26, 354 S.E.2d 510, 514-15 (1987)
(holding that a DSS official's act of informing local police of an admission made to him
did not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel). At trial in this case,
the DSS worker testified:
Mr. Nations asked me if my-if his conversation with me would be confidential.
I explained to him that I could not assure that, that my job was to protect
children and that that would be my first priority and that by General Statute,
whenever I learned that there had been a commission of a crime that I had an
obligation to report that to the District Attorney.
Id. at 321, 354 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting Bob Hensley, Supervisor of Protective Services of
the Rutherford County DSS, regarding his meeting with defendant); see also NELSON,
supra note 210, at 64-65 (listing as one reason for parents to have counsel in abuse,
neglect, or dependency matters the "recognition that their statements in a civil abuse or
neglect proceeding may be used in a criminal prosecution of abuse and neglect" (citing
HOWARD A. DAVIDSON, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT LITIGATION: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES 99 (1981))).
237. Specifically, the court, rather than drawing on legislative intent or wording, found
the right to counsel essentially on policy grounds:
[I]nvestigators involved on one side of civil/criminal abuse proceedings can be
involved on the other side.... Because of the blurring of the two actions, it is
particularly important to protect the rights of a defendant entangled in the
intricacies of both civil and criminal law. This protection is best provided by
counsel.
State v. Adams, 122 N.C. App. 538, 544, 470 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1996), rev'd, 345 N.C. 745,
483 S.E.2d 156 (1997) (citation omitted).
238. 126 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 1997).
239. See id. at 772. The defendant was convicted of "knowingly engaging in a sexual
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After arraignment by the tribal court, during which he invoked his
right to counsel,24 FBI agents questioned Doherty regarding federal
charges, and he confessed to having committed the sexual offenses.24'
Doherty sought to suppress his confessions in the subsequent federal
trial on Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds.2 4 Concerning the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the
existence of the "closely related" exception243 and held: "Given that
precisely the same underlying conduct formed the basis for both
charges, Doherty's Sixth Amendment right to counsel would have
attached with respect to the federal charges at the same time that it
did with respect to the tribal charges-if the tribal arraignment
created such a right."2' The court reasoned, however, that because
the tribal court arraignment did not bring with it a Sixth Amendment
right to counsel245 and because the right to counsel afforded by the
act with a child," 18 U.S.C. § 2243(a) (1994), applicable to Native American reservations
through 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). See id.
240. The Hannaville Indian Community Tribal Court charged Doherty with statutory
rape, which its criminal code defines as "includ[ing] sexual penetration of a child who is
older than 12 years of age by a person who is a member of the same household as the
child." See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 772. The molested children were Doherty's two
stepdaughters. See id. at 773.
241. See id. at 772-73.
242. See id. at 773, 775.
243. The court explained:
Thus, every court that has considered the issue has recognized that the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel extends to interrogations on new charges where
"the pending charge is so inextricably intertwined with the charge under
investigation that the right to counsel for the pending charge cannot
constitutionally be isolated from the right to counsel for the uncharged offense."
Id. at 776 (quoting United States v. Hines, 963 F.2d 255, 257 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam)).
Further, "[t]he mere fact that two charges are brought by different sovereigns is
irrelevant to this analysis, at least where the record suggests that officials of the two
sovereigns are cooperating in their respective investigations." Id. (citing United States v.
Laury, 49 F.3d 145, 150 n.11 (5th Cir. 1995)); United States v. Martinez, 972 F.2d 1100,
1105 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Rodriguez, 931 F. Supp. 907, 927 (D. Mass. 1996));
see also United States v. Louis, 679 F. Supp. 705, 709 (W.D. Mich. 1988) ("[T]he key to
analyzing whether a second charge is so related to the first that the Sixth Amendment
protection invoked pursuant to the first extends to the second, is not whether the criminal
charges are brought by the same sovereign."). But see United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d
451,457 (5th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he Sixth Amendment right to counsel might well attach to a
charge that 'was extremely closely related to pending ... charges,' at least where the
charges concerned 'the same' type of crime, 'victim, residence, time span, and
sovereign." (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 744
(5th Cir. 1991))).
244. Doherty, 126 F.3d at 776.
245. See id. at 777-78. The court explained that the provisions of neither the Bill of
Rights nor the Fourteenth Amendment apply to the Native American tribes. See id. at
777. "This is so because the tribes did not participate in the Constitutional Convention,
and never formally consented to join the union. Accordingly, the tribes exercise powers
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United States to defendants in Native American criminal proceedings
is limited,246 the FBI investigators were not obligated to ensure that
Doherty's attorney was present during questioning.247 The key
distinction between Doherty's ability to have counsel at his tribal
arraignment and during the later FBI interrogation was that the
statutory right to counsel, invoked at the tribal court arraignment, did
not separately require barring admission of uncounseled
statements.24 Because the federal statute granting Doherty a right to
counsel did not require suppressing his confession, the statement was
properly admitted in the federal trial.249
Similarly, while North Carolina granted Ms. Adams a statutory
of self-government not pursuant to a Constitutional grant of authority, but pursuant to
their status as sovereigns under principles of international law." Id. (citing Robert N.
Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 841, 845-46
(1990); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 31, 66
(1996)).
246. See id. at 778-81. In the Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA"), 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1994), Congress provided for a statutory right to counsel in tribal matters, see id.
§ 1302(6), "but [did] not extend that right to the limits of the Sixth Amendment."
Doherty, 126 F.3d at 778; see also id. § 1302(6) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of
self-government shall ... deny to any person in a criminal proceeding the right ... at his
own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense."). The court went on to
explain that Congress did not intend to alter the non-adversarial nature of tribal
proceedings, which a Sixth Amendment right to counsel would do. See Doherty, 126 F.3d
at 780. Moreover, in light of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1994), passed just after ICRA, the court explained that Congress had no
intention to extend the Massiah exclusionary rule to tribal courts. See Doherty, 126 F.3d
at 780-81 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3501).
247. See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 781.
248. The court explained:
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not attach until the "initiation of
adversary judicial proceedings," ... and before that right attaches, the mere
existence of a statutory right to counsel-where the statute does not
independently mandate the suppression of uncounseled confessions-does not
trigger the application of [the Sixth Amendment exclusionary rule of] Massiah
and Jackson.
Id. at 781-82 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187
(1984)). The court had explained earlier that "the mere fact that a statute's language is
similar to that found in the Constitution has never been considered to be conclusive proof
that Congress intended the statute to have the same meaning as the Constitutional
provision." Id. at 779 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
494-95 (1983)).
249. See id. at 782. The court explained:
Thus, where the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply, which would
require the suppression of an uncounseled confession, the mere existence of a
statutory right to counsel is not interpreted to carry with it the Jackson effect of
invalidating future confessions. Similarly, in the present case, Doherty
voluntarily confessed his crimes, and his invocation of his limited statutory right
to counsel in the tribal court was of no constitutional import.
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right to counsel in her abuse and neglect proceeding, the General
Assembly did not explicitly bar the admission of statements made
after that right to counsel had attached2 ° Such an express limitation,
or lack thereof, played a fundamental role in the outcome in P.Z. and
Doherty. Accordingly, the Adams court's failure to recognize a
violation of Ms. Adams's Sixth Amendment right to counsel may be
viewed as entirely consistent with P.Z. and Doherty.
Moreover, the argument for extending Sixth Amendment
protection to the confession in Doherty is more compelling than in
Adams. First, courts recognizing the "closely related" exception have
articulated that the facts forming each charge must be essentially the
same. 1 Both Adams and Doherty appear to satisfy this threshold
requirement. Additionally, however, as the North Carolina Supreme
Court noted, "by its terms, the Sixth Amendment applies only to
criminal cases. ''122 While Doherty concerned two criminal charges,
Adams involved statements made while a civil petition was pending
but before a criminal charge had been filed. Based on these two
criteria alone, the circumstances in Doherty would appear to mandate
application of the "closely related" exception. 3 As one court
observed, however, the exception should be applied "[o]nly under
extremely narrow circumstances." 4  One circumstance that extends
beyond this range, according to Doherty, is the absence of legislative
250.. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-587 (1995).
251. See, e.g., United States v. Kidd, 12 F.3d 30, 33 (4th Cir. 1993) ("In order to fall
within this exception, the offense being investigated must derive from the same factual
predicate as the charged offense."); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111, 121 (N.J. 1994) ("If the
offense under investigation is based on essentially the same factual context as the charged
offense, assertion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel on the charged offense should
bar police-initiated interrogation on the related offense.").
252. Adams, 345 N.C. at 748, 483 S.E.2d at 157; see also State v. P.Z., 703 A.2d 901,
914 (N.J. 1997) (holding that "the right to counsel guaranteed by ... the Sixth
Amendment ... applies by its terms to criminal prosecutions only"); Mosteller, supra
note 13, at 271 (same).
253. See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 776 ("Doherty was interrogated by federal agents with
regard to the identical activities that were the subject of the tribal court charge.").
254. United States v. Williams, 993 F.2d 451, 456 (5th Cir. 1993) (emphasis added)
(citing United States v. Carpenter, 963 F.2d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v.
Cooper, 949 F.2d 737, 743-44 (5th Cir. 1991)). In Williams, the court rejected defendant's
argument for application of the exception. See id. at 456-57. The defendant, against
whom an Arkansas bill of information had been filed on a drug charge, made false
statements about her drug activities before a federal grand jury. See id. at 454. She was
later convicted of perjury, but not of any federal drug offense. See id. The defendant
argued that her questioning before the grand jury constituted a violation of her right to
counsel. See id. at 456. The court concluded that the state drug charges and the federal
perjury allegations, "brought by different sovereigns and concerning different conduct,
[were] not 'extremely closely related.'" Id. at 457.
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interest in suppressing statements made after a defendant's statutory
right to counsel has attached2 51 The Sixth Circuit reached this
conclusion concerning a criminal proceeding, in which an arguably
constitutional right to counsel may exist under the Sixth
Amendment. 6  Ms. Adams's case, in comparison, involved a civil
matter, outside the purview of the Sixth Amendment. 7 Her right to
counsel was thus purely statutory and subject to the limitations
placed thereon by the legislature. Following the reasoning of
Doherty, because the North Carolina General Assembly did not
expressly provide for the suppression of statements made after the
attachment of the statutory right, and because no Sixth Amendment
provision had yet taken effect because only a civil matter had
commenced, the North Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of Ms.
Adams's case reflects an appropriate and logical analysis of the
statutory and constitutional rights to counsel.
Finally, and probably most significantly, eight months after the
North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the decision of the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in Adams, the New Jersey Supreme Court
followed suit, reversing the lower appellate court's ruling in State v.
P.Z. 8 The New Jersey court clarified, as had the North Carolina
court in Adams, that the right to counsel provision of the Sixth
Amendment applied strictly to criminal prosecutionsP 9 Moreover,
even though parents retain a "fundamental interest in the custody
and care of their children,""26 the court was unwilling "to expand the
[statutory] rights of respondents to include protections afforded
criminal defendants after they have been indicted or taken into
custody."26' To the contrary, according to the court, the extant
statutory provisions adequately protect the interests of parents.262 By
255. See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 782; cf. State v. P.Z., 666 A.2d 1000, 1004 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1995) (discussing the legislature's expressed intent to bar statements made
in preliminary conferences from admission in subsequent criminal proceedings), rev'd,
703 A.2d 901 (N.J. 1997).
256. Of course, as the Doherty court pointed out, the constitutional argument here
would be weak because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments do not apply to Indian
tribes. See Doherty, 126 F.3d at 777-78; supra note 245.
257. See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
258. 703 A.2d 901 (N.J. 1997). The North Carolina Supreme Court filed its opinion in
State v. Adams on April 11, 1997. See Adams, 345 N.C. at 745, 483 S.E.2d at 156. The
New Jersey Supreme Court handed down this decision November 26, 1997. See id. at 901.
259. See P.Z., 703 A.2d at 914 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45
(1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462 (1938); State v. Tucker, 645 A.2d 111 (N.J.
1994); State v. Sanchez, 609 A.2d 400 (N.J. 1992)).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. See id. (discussing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6-8.43(a) (West 1993)).
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requiring the trial court to inform parents of their right to counsel
upon the filing of a petition of abuse and neglect, the legislature
secured parents' fundamental interests in the care and custody of
their children and provided them a legitimate opportunity to voice
their positions in court. 63 Finally, the court explained that extending
Sixth Amendment protection in this circumstance would actually
hinder the goals of abuse investigators, namely the protection of
children.2 4
Thus, only months after the North Carolina Supreme Court
issued its opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court struck down the
most compelling argument against the decision in Adams. If any
question remained about the continuing validity of Ms. Adams's
assertion of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment, the
New Jersey court's action appears to have put it to rest. In the light
of these two subsequent extrajurisdictional decisions, Doherty and
P.Z., the reasoning of the North Carolina Supreme Court appears
reasonable and logical, if not constitutionally mandated.
Ever since the United States Supreme Court handed down the
Massiah decision in 1964, critics have argued that applying an
exclusionary rule to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel stifles
effective police work.265 Perhaps the same type of criticism could
have been leveled against the North Carolina Supreme Court if it had
extended this exclusionary rule to include Mary Adams's statement
to the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department. At the same time,
however, if the rule is intended to protect accused persons against
undue pressures of police questioning, then the circumstances here
might warrant an added degree of sympathy. A frightened, confused
parent who wants little more than to retain custody of a child
probably will make an admission to a police officer, or, as in P.Z., a
263. See id. ("Presumably, the Legislature considered that the right to counsel set
forth in the statute provides safeguards sufficient to protect persons alleged by DYFS to
have abused or neglected their children.").
264. See id. ("Forcing a DYFS caseworker to choose between providing Miranda
warnings and foreclosing the use in criminal proceedings of information obtained in the
course of an abuse and neglect investigation will not inure to the protection of children.").
265. As the United States Department of Justice, Office of Legal Policy, asserted
several years ago:
Massiah continues to thwart the search for truth in criminal investigations and
prosecutions by prohibiting the use of legitimate investigative techniques and by
requiring the exclusion of reliable and probative evidence whose use would not
deprive the defendant of a fair trial. In effect, the Massiah right not to be
questioned and the Massiah exclusionary rule amount to obstructions of justice.
Massiah Report, supra note 68, at 706; see also supra note 75 (listing additional
critiques of the exclusionary rule).
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social worker. After Adams, this parent is likely assured of several
devastating results: loss of the child to the state, a criminal
conviction, and probably prison time. On the other hand, however,
the goals of child protection and punishment for crime arguably are
best served when investigators, both for social services and for law
enforcement, have the benefit of any and all information. But is this
justification not the same argument for discarding the Massiah
exclusionary rule altogether?
Ultimately, no matter how this case was resolved, it would be
difficult to celebrate the result. In one sense, though, the rule applied
by the North Carolina Supreme Court does provide significant
clarity, and perhaps acts as a cautionary signal for parents accused of
abuse and their attorneys. Undoubtedly, however, given the
heightened emotional state of parents in such circumstances, it will
have little practical effect when a concerned mom or dad is willing to
do anything, to say anything, to reveal anything, in order to assure
the continued care, support, and love of a child.
PETER MARSHALL VARNEY
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Employee Beware-Relocation Does Not Remove the
Presumption of Employment-At-Will: Kurtzman v. Applied
Analytical Industries, Inc
To move or not to move for a new job:' this is the employment
dilemma of the down-sized2 1990s. When deciding whether or not to
move, employees will ponder the cost of living in a different place,
the difficulties in selling or buying a home, and the prospect of
choosing among different schools for their children.3  Many will
assume that their new job is secure, or might have been assured in
vague terms that their new position is long-term. Since the employee
uproots his life to accept the new position, it seems rational that the
1. See, e.g., Lini S. Kadaba, Pulling Up Stakes No Bull: Moving is No Fun,
GREENSBORO NEWS & REc., Dec. 4, 1994, at G1 (noting that the average cost of moving
a home-owning employee is more than $40,000, whereas relocating a home-owning new
hire may cost $30,000, and relocating a renting employee may cost $13,000). The Internet
can provide employees with a wealth of information on relocation. See, e.g., Employee
Relocation Council, Employee Relocation Council (last visited Aug. 23, 1998
<http://www.erc.org>; Relocation Journal & Real Estate News, Newsbreak, (last visited
Aug. 23, 1998) <http://www.relojournal.com>.
2. The phrase has become clich6, but one example is particularly poignant:
In 15 months, the CEO of Scott Paper Company, Al Dunlap, sold nearly $2.5
billion in assets, slashed one-third of the workforce and scored record earnings.
In July 1995 he engineered the company's merger with Kimberly-Clark. When
the merger is completed, Dunlap will personally walk away with about $100
million. He makes no apologies. He says, "That's the free enterprise system."
MARY F. COOK, THE HUMAN RESOURCES YEARBOOK 1996/1997, at 1.4 (1996).
Downsizing not only affects the employees and CEOs-it affects the surrounding
communities as well, reducing tax revenues and increasing the need for public
expenditures in areas hard hit by sudden and unexpected unemployment. See Mitchell
Lee Marks, Restructuring and Downsizing, in BUILDING THE COMPETITIVE
WORKFORCE: INVESTING IN HUMAN CAPITAL FOR CORPORATE SUCCESS 60,79 (Philip
H. Mirvis ed., 1993). As the job market improves, however, some workers may be happy
to be "downsized" so they can move on to new and perhaps better experiences. See, e.g.,
Leslie Kaufman & John McCormick, Year of the Employee, NEWSWEEK, July 20, 1998, at
38, 39. (reporting that many recipients of "pink slips" are thrilled to leave because
chances are good that laid-off workers will find a better-paying job within a month).
3. One author has described the modern relocation experience in detail:
A corporate relocation adviser hands an individual a package overflowing with
information on housing, schools, moving companies and more. The worker sifts
through all the material, consults with a relocation counselor and embarks on a
trip to the new locale to make arrangements for The Big Move. It's hectic,
distracting and often overwhelming-even when an employee receives plenty of
TLC.
Samuel Greengard, Move Easier with Online Assistance, WORKFORCE, Sept. 1, 1997, at
48.
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employer will not fire them anytime soon.4 Employees moving to
North Carolina and other employment-at-will states, however, should
consider an additional factor-if they have not negotiated for a
specific term of employment, then they are employees at-will,
terminable with or without cause.5
Under North Carolina law, absent a contractual agreement
specifying a definite term of employment, 6 the relationship is
presumed to be terminable at the will of either party, regardless of
the quality of the performance of either party.7 Federal and state
4. See, e.g., Manesh K. Rath, Left Standing at the Altar: How Relocation Affects the
Employment Relationship, 37 S. TEX. L. REV. 813, 842-43 (1996) (arguing that employees
in negotiations rarely will ask for contract terms that protect them in case of termination
because such a request implies the relationship is doomed before it begins).
5. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 347 N.C. 329, 334, 493 S.E.2d
420, 423-24 (1997). Employees who believe their termination was unlawful may sue their
employers under two different theories in North Carolina courts: a tort claim for
wrongful discharge based on the theory that the termination violated public policy, see
Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331, 342-43, 328 S.E.2d 818, 826-27 (1985), or a
contract claim that the termination breached an express or implied contract between the
parties, see id. at 344-45, 328 S.E.2d at 828. The difference is important because
recovering under a tort theory will allow the plaintiff to recover punitive damages, while
recovery in contract will not. See Victoria W. Shelton, Note, Will the Public Policy
Exception to the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Ever Be Clear?-Amos v. Oakdale
Knitting Co., 14 CAMPBELL L. REv. 123, 133 (1991). The North Carolina Supreme Court
has not explicitly recognized a bad-faith exception to the employment-at-will doctrine,
and the North Carolina Court of Appeals denies there is any such exception. See, e.g.,
Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 662, 412 S.E.2d 97, 103 (1991) ("We
hold that there is no independent tort action for wrongful discharge of an at-wvill
employee based solely on allegations of discharge in bad faith.").
6. A contract for a term indicates how long the parties want the employment
relationship to last. See 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee § 27(a) (1992). See generally 82
AM. JUR. 2D Wrongful Discharge § 3 (1992) (explaining that an employee who has a
contract for a term may not be terminated without "good cause" or "just cause"). The
terms may be expressed in specific amounts of time, or may depend on the happening of a
particular event. See Freeman v. Hardee's Food Sys., Inc., 267 N.C. 56, 62, 147 S.E.2d
590, 595 (1966) (determining that the plaintiff's award for breach of contract for term was
not limited by the commencement of an action). In Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co., 223 N.C.
148, 149, 25 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1943), the court first announced that a contract for
"permanent" employment implies an indefinite general hiring, terminable at will. See id;
see also 30 C.J.S. Employer-Employee § 27(c) (1992) ("[A]s a general rule, in the absence
of stipulations as to duration ... , a contract for permanent employment is no more than
an indefinite general hiring or hiring at will ..... (footnotes omitted)).
7. See, e.g., Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422 (citing Soles v. City of
Raleigh Civil Serv. Comm'n, 345 N.C. 443, 446, 480 S.E.2d 685, 687 (1997); Harris v.
Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987)). See generally J. Wilson
Parker, The Uses of the Past: The Surprising History of Terminable-At-Will Employment
in North Carolina, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 167, 186-95 (1987) (examining early
employment law cases and the role of the North Carolina Supreme Court in developing
the employment-at-will doctrine). Professor Parker has suggested that the popularity of
the employment-at-will doctrine can be attributed to laissez-faire economic theory and
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statutes limit the presumption by prohibiting discharge based on
discriminatory or retaliatory motives.8 Over time, the North Carolina
Supreme Court has recognized several public policy exceptions to the
employment-at-will doctrine,9 but such exceptions are confusing and
limited in nature. ° In general, these public policy exceptions reflect
Social Darwinism. See id. at 179. The doctrine of employment-at-will was a departure
from the English common law, where a year of employment was presumed. See Sides, 74
N.C. App. at 338, 328 S.E.2d at 824 (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*425).
Horace Wood first proposed the employment-at-will doctrine when he published a
treatise on master-servant relations in 1877. See HORACE WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877). At least one commentator has asserted that
Wood did not have any authoritative support for his proposed rule. See, e.g., Jay M.
Feinman, The Development of the Employment-at-will Rule, 20 AM. J. OF LEGAL HIST.
118, 126 (1976). Other scholars contend, however, that Wood did have authority and that
other cases supported his view. See Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful
Provenance of "Wood's Rule" Revisited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551,558 (1990) ("Horace Wood
did not make up the rule of employment-at-will. He just told it like it was."); see generally
HENRY H. PERRITF, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.4, at 10 (4th ed.
1998) (explaining that the Industrial Revolution led both employers and employees to
desire greater freedom to negotiate employment terms); Deborah A. Ballam, Exploding
the Original Myth Regarding Employment-At-Will: The True Origins of the Doctrine, 17
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 126-27 (1996) (concluding that the agricultural
economy and scarcity of labor in nineteenth-century America made the English annual
hiring rule impractical and made Wood's rule quite attractive).
8. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Supp. 1998) (prohibiting employment
discrimination based on age); 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e-2(a) to (d) (1994) (prohibiting
employment discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin); 42
U.S.C. § 12112(a) (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination against qualified
individuals with disabilities). North Carolina has created several statutory exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 95-241 (1993) (prohibiting
discharge in retaliation for filing worker's compensation claims, Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) claims, or similar claims); id. § 95-28.1A (Supp. 1997)
(prohibiting discrimination based on sickle cell anemia); id. § 95-83 (1993) (permitting
suits by employees who have been discharged because they joined or refused to join a
union). Under § 95-240 of the North Carolina General Statutes, "retaliation" has been
defined as any adverse employment action. See id. § 95-240 (1993). North Carolina has
also enacted legislation to prohibit discrimination against the handicapped. See id.
§ 168A-5 (1995).
9. See Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 331 N.C. 348, 353-54, 416 S.E.2d 166, 169-70
(1992) (allowing a cause of action for employees fired for refusing to work below the
minimum wage because public policy is violated when an employee is fired in
contravention of the express policy declarations of the North Carolina General Statutes);
Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172, 175, 381 S.E.2d 445, 447 (1989) (allowing a
cause of action for wrongful discharge because public policy is offended when employee
fired for refusing to violate federal trucking regulations but affirming summary judgment
for the employer due to lack of evidence); Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d at 826
(holding that the employee may bring cause of action when fired in retaliation for
refusing to commit perjury because of public policy interest in proper administration of
justice).
10. See, e.g., Salt, 104 N.C. App. at 664, 412 S.E.2d at 104 (holding that plaintiff
employee who relocated to accept job could not sue for wrongful discharge solely on
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the conviction of the North Carolina Supreme Court that no
employee should be forced to choose between upholding the law or
losing her job. What constitutes upholding the law, however, has
been defined narrowly by the North Carolina courts.
12
The doctrine of employment-at-will, while somewhat limited by
statutory and case law exceptions, remains firmly rooted in North
Carolina law.13 Before Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries,
Inc.,4 an employee suing for wrongful discharge or breach of contract
without a contract for a specific term already faced a formidable
amount of case law favorable to the employer. 5 After Kurtzman,
allegations of bad faith discharge without a public policy exception); Walker v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253, 263, 335 S.E.2d 79, 86 (1985) (affirming
summary judgment for the employer when the employee was fired for raising workplace
safety concerns). See generally J. Michael McGuiness, The Doctrine of Wrongfid
Discharge in North Carolina: The Confusing Path from Sides to Guy and the Need for
Reform, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 217, 229-34 (1988) (describing ways that the public policy
exception has been applied in North Carolina and other jurisdictions); Duncan Alford,
Note, Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co.: Recognizing a Public Policy Exception to the
At-Will Employment Doctrine, 68 N.C. L. REV. 1178, 1188-89 (1990) (arguing that the
supreme court did not define the contours of the public policy exception very clearly);
Kimberly Anne Huffman, Note, Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.: Clarifying the Confusion
in North Carolina's Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 70 N.C. L. REV. 2087, 2092-99 (1992)
(analyzing state and federal cases in North Carolina where the public policy exception to
employment-at-will was at issue).
11. See, e.g., Coman, 325 N.C. at 175, 381 S.E.2d at 447 (1989) (" '[W]hile there may
be a right to terminate a contract at will for no reason, or for an arbitrary or irrational
reason, there can be no right to terminate such a contract for an unlawful reason or
purpose that contravenes public policy.'" (quoting Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 342, 328 S.E.2d
at 826 (1985))).
12. See, e.g., Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club, 79 N.C. App. 483, 500, 340 S.E.2d 116,
126-27 (1986) (affirming summary judgment for the employer when the employee claimed
she was fired for complaining about sexual harassment by another employee); Walker, 77
N.C. App. at 263-64, 335 S.E.2d at 86 (hesitating to establish a public policy exception for
raising safety concerns and affirming summary judgment for the employer for lack of
evidence showing that the employee was discharged for raising workplace safety
concerns). Further discussion of the public policy exception is beyond the scope of this
Note.
13. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422 ("North Carolina is an
employment-at-will state.").
14. 347 N.C. 329,493 S.E.2d 420 (1997).
15. See, e.g., Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 632-33, 356 S.E.2d 357, 361
(1987) (holding that employment handbooks are not binding on the employer); Still v.
Lance, 279 N.C. 254, 259, 182 S.E.2d 403, 406 (1971) (holding that a contract for a
"permanent" job does not remove presumption of employment-at-will); Malever v. Kay
Jewelry Co., 223 N.C. 148, 149, 25 S.E.2d 436, 437 (1943) (holding that employer's
assurances that job would be permanent did not remove the presumption of employment-
at-will); Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 696, 366 S.E.2d 918, 920
(1988) (holding that policy in employee manual to fire employees only for cause did not
remove the presumption of employment-at-will, because "employment manuals or
policies do not become part of the employment contract unless expressly included in it").
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new employees whose contracts do not specify a term of employment
probably have no claim in North Carolina courts when they move to
North Carolina and are fired without cause shortly thereafter.
1 6
This Note discusses the facts of Kurtzman, its history in the
lower courts, and the North Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of
the case.17 Next, the Note surveys the history of the employment-at-
will doctrine in North Carolina state and federal courts, comparing it
with the holding in Kurtzman.8 The Note then examines the
alternatives open to the court in reaching its decision and considers
the practical consequences of the holding.19 The Note concludes that
the court-faced with a variety of interests to balance-reached the
fairest result possible without more guidance from the General
Assembly.20
Lewis Kurtzman had a secure position as a national sales
manager for a Rhode Island company when representatives of
Applied Analytical Industries ("AAI"), a pharmaceutical testing
company in Wilmington, North Carolina, approached him to discuss
the possibility of employment with AAI.2' After several months of
communications, AAI offered Kurtzman a position as the Vice-
President of Sales and Marketing,' which he accepted in March of
1992. Throughout the negotiations, Kurtzman expressed concern
about the security of the proposed position with AAI, but was
assured that his position was secure.24 At the end of March 1992,
16. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 423 ("To remove an employment
relationship from the at-will presumption upon an employee's change of residence,
coupled with vague assurances of continued employment, would substantially erode the
rule and bring considerable instability to an otherwise largely clear area of the law.").
But see id. at 423 (stating that earlier cases had neither "approved nor disapproved" the
"moving residence" exception).
17. See infra notes 21-54 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 54-113 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 114-137 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
21. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 330,493 S.E.2d at 421.
2Z See Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 2, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97).
23. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 330,493 S.E.2d at 421.
24. See id. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421. At trial, evidence showed that AAI assuaged
Kurtzman's concerns during their negotiations with statements like: " 'If you do your job,
you'll have a job,' 'This is a long-term growth opportunity for you,' 'This is a secure
position,' and 'We're offering you a career position.'" Id. (quoting statements made by
AAI to Kurtzman). The plaintiff's brief noted several more assurances AAI made to
Kurtzman: "'[W]e look forward to the valuable contribution to our mutual future
growth;' " "' After you have sold your house in Massachusetts, ... we will pay one-eighth
of [your closing costs and real estate commission] quarterly .... Thus, you will be
reimbursed over a two year period.' " Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 6, Kurtzman (No.
103PA7) (quoting AAI's assurances to Kurtzman). The defendant's brief, however, notes
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Kurtzman moved from Massachusetts and began working for AAI.
Kurtzman's wife and daughter remained in Massachusetts until their
house was sold, then joined him in Wilmington.26 Eight days into his
employment, Kurtzman signed an employment application which
stated that" 'employment can be terminated for any reason deemed
sufficient by AAI.' "27 Evidence at trial showed that this application
was used for personnel records only, however, and was not part of
any contract between Kurtzman and AAI. Having worked at AAI
less than eight months, AAI terminated Kurtzman's employment on
November 2, 1992.9
Kurtzman sued, alleging breach of contract, tortious interference
with contractual relations, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and negligent misrepresentation.3 0 Three of Kurtzman's claims were
dismissed voluntarily or by summary judgment, leaving only the
breach of contract action to proceed to a jury trial.31 The jury found
that evidence at trial also showed that when Kurtzman asked about securing an
employment contract, AAI specifically told him that no such contract would be available.
See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 4, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97).
25. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421. AAI agreed to pay Kurtzman
at least $125,000 per year, almost $30,000 more than he had been making at his previous
position. See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 4, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97).
26. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421. The North Carolina Court of
Appeals decision also noted that AAI told Kurtzman that they would pay for any
temporary housing costs and that the company contributed to the costs of selling his
residence. See Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 125 N.C. App. 261, 266, 480
S.E.2d 425, 428, rev'd, 347 N.C. 329, 335, 493 S.E.2d 420, 424 (1997).
27. Kurtzman, 125 N.C. App. at 266, 480 S.E.2d at 428 (quoting Kurtzman's
employment application). The North Carolina Supreme Court did not mention this job
application in its opinion, probably because under North Carolina law an employment
application that an employee is shown after that employee has begun working has no
legal effect. See Rucker v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 98 N.C. App. 100, 102,389 S.E.2d 622,
624 (1990); Griffin v. Housing Auth., 62 N.C. App. 556, 557, 303 S.E.2d 200, 201 (1983);
Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 35, Kurtzman (No. 103PA7).
28. See Kurtzman, 125 N.C. App. at 266,480 S.E.2d at 428.
29. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 421. Lewis Kurtzman was not
"down-sized," but the issue of why he was terminated was sharply contested at the trial
court level. See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 5 n.3, Kurtzman (No. 103PA7).
Although AAI claimed that Kurtzman's job performance had been unsatisfactory, the
trial court found that Kurtzman was terminated without cause. See Plaintiff-Appellee's
Brief at 11, Kurtzman (No. 103PA7). When he could not find a new job, Kurtzman
started his own consulting business, but his salary decreased dramatically. See Kurtzman,
125 N.C. App. at 263, 480 S.E.2d at 426.
30. See Kurtzman, 125 N.C. App. at 263,480 S.E.2d at 426.
31. See id. In Alliance Company v. State Hospital at Butner, 241 N.C. 329, 85 S.E.2d
386, the court stated that "[t]he relation of employer and employee is essentially
contractual in nature, and is to be determined by the rules governing the establishment of
contracts." Id. at 332-33, 85 S.E.2d at 389. Thus, Kurtzman's theory at trial was that AAI
specifically promised him that he would only be discharged for deficient performance, i.e.
"for cause," and that AAI in fact discharged him without cause. See Plaintiff-Appellee's
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for Kurtzman, awarding him $350,000 in damages.
32
By unanimous vote, the North Carolina Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court, holding that Kurtzman's change in residence,
coupled with assurances from AAI about job security, were sufficient
to remove the presumption of employment-at-will. 33 The court of
appeals based its decision on the "additional consideration"
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.' This exception,
recognized by North Carolina courts on occasion, applies when the
employee provides additional consideration beyond his obligation of
services and the employer makes assurances of a permanent
position. The court of appeals noted that the "additional
consideration" exception does not "convert every employment-at-
will agreement into an enforceable contract. ' 36  Instead, additional
consideration means that if the employment agreement expressly or
impliedly provides that the employment is for life or terminable only
for cause, then the employment may be terminated without cause
only after a reasonable time.
37
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, stating unequivocally that "North Carolina is an
Brief at 9-10, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97).
32. See Kurtzman, 125 N.C. App. at 263, 480 S.E.2d at 426, rev'd, 347 N.C. 329, 493
S.E.2d 320 (1990). AAI's motions to set aside the verdict or grant a new trial were both
denied. See id. at 264, 480 S.E.2d at 426. The court of appeals also allowed the trial
court's $350,000 damage award to stand, stating that Kurtzman had provided solid
evidence of the damages he suffered as a result of the breach of contract. See id. at 266-
67,480 S.E.2d at 428.
33. See id. at 266,480 S.E.2d at 428.
34. In determining that an "additional consideration" exception applied in certain
circumstances, the court of appeals relied on both North Carolina precedent and various
treatises. See id. at 264-65, 480 S.E.2d at 427-28; see also Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C.
App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818, 828 (1985) (" 'Where the employee gives some special
consideration in addition to his services, such as relinquishing a claim for personal injuries
against the employer, removing his residence from one place to another in order to accept
employment, or assisting in breaking of a strike, such a contract may be enforced.'"
(quoting Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450,454,250 S.E.2d 678,682 (1979))).
35. See Sides, 74 N.C. App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828 (citing Tuttle v. Kernersville
Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216,219, 139 S.E.2d 249,251 (1964)). In its brief, AAI argued that
the additional consideration language in Sides was "dictum" derived from two older cases,
Tuttle and Burkheimer. See Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 27, Kurtzman (No.
103PA97); infra note 44 and accompanying text. In its brief, AAI implied that older
decisions like Tuttle and Burkheimer relied too heavily on a passage from CORPus JURIS
SECUNDUM which recognized that additional consideration may be sufficient to remove
the presumption of employment-at-will. See Defendant Appellant's New Brief at 28,
Kurtzman (No. 103PA97); see also 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 31 (1948).
36. Kurtzman, 125 N.C. App. at 265,480 S.E.2d at 427.
37. See id.
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employment-at-will state. ' 3' According to the court, employees can
remove the presumption of employment-at-will by proving the
existence of a contract with terms of employment or by showing their
termination to be prohibited by statutory exception.39 The supreme
court noted that North Carolina courts have also recognized a public
policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.40
Turning to the facts of Kurtzman's case, the court noted that
Kurtzman did not rely on any of the statutory or public policy
exceptions, but instead relied on the "moving residence '41 exception
as recited by the court of appeals in Burkhimer v. Gealy.4 Finding
little merit in "this asserted 'moving residence'" exception, the court
also determined that AAI's somewhat vague assurances of a
permanent position were insufficient to create a contract for a
specific term.43 The court announced that although previous cases
had cited the "moving residence" exception, it had never ruled on
that specific issue.4' Next, the court distinguished previous cases
38. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331,493 S.E.2d at 422.
39. See id. Statutory exceptions to the doctrine of employment-at-will are discussed
supra note 9 and accompanying text.
40. See Kurtzman, 347 at 331-32, 493 S.E.2d at 422. The public policy exception to
employment-at-will is discussed supra notes 9 and 12 and accompanying text.
41. The "moving residence" exception is just one of several "additional
consideration" exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine that North Carolina courts
have recognized over the years. See, e.g., Sides v. Duke Univ., 74 N.C. App. 331,345, 328
S.E.2d 818, 828 (1985) (recognizing the "moving residence" exception). Other examples
of additional consideration provided by employees include relinquishing a claim against
the employer for personal injuries or breaking a strike. See id. Although the "moving
residence" exception that Kurtzman relied on has been cited by various North Carolina
courts, the North Carolina Supreme Court refers to his justification several times as an
"asserted exception," as if the exception never existed. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331-32,
493 S.E.2d at 422. Nonetheless, supreme court itself has even alluded to this exception.
See Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987) (explaining
that the employment-at-will doctrine is subject to some well-defined exceptions, including
the "moving residence" exception). Without overruling Harris, the supreme court in
Kurtzman specifically disapproved of the "moving residence" language in Harris and
similar language in decisions by the court of appeals. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493
S.E.2d at 423.
42. 39 N.C. App. 450,250 S.E.2d 678 (1979).
43. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 332-33, 493 S.E.2d at 422 (emphasis added) (citing Still v.
Lance, 279 N.C. 254,259, 182 S.E.2d 403,406 (1971)).
44. See id. ("Plaintiff's contention that this exception is well established in our
jurisprudence is incorrect."). Indeed, AAI's brief argued vigorously that the "moving
residence" exception developed out of dictum and was cited in cases where the employees
did not actually move. For example, in Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216,
139 S.E.2d 249 (1964), the court never mentions relocation. The Tuttle court, however,
did recognize the additional consideration exception. See id. at 219, 139 S.E.2d at 251
(citing 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 31 (1948)). In Tuttle, the court determined that when
an employment contract "is based upon the services being satisfactory," the employee is
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citing the exception and disapproved of language in earlier cases that
could be construed as support for the "moving residence"
exception.45  The court then considered whether a "moving
residence" exception fit within the limited public policy exceptions to
employment-at-will and decided that it did not.46 Because the other
public policy exceptions were intended to prevent status-based
discrimination or violations of the law, and since relocation for a job
is commonplace, the court concluded that to recognize a "moving
residence" exception would bring too much uncertainty into an area
of law that had been clear.
47
Notably, the Court stated that the employment-at-will doctrine
had "'greatly facilitated the development of the American economy
at the end of the nineteenth century.' "48 Moreover, the court
explained that the employment-at-will doctrine remains an incentive
to economic development, and warned that erosion of the doctrine
could lead to instability in the law. 9 Setting a high bar for future
exceptions, the court then announced that any new exceptions to
employment at-will should only be adopted with "substantial
justification grounded in compelling considerations of public
policy. '50 The "moving residence" exception, the court decided, did
not meet this standard.5 1
still terminable at will. Id. at 219, 139 S.E.2d at 251 (citation omitted). Likewise, in
Burkheimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 250 S.E.2d 678 (1979), the employee did not
move to accept a new job, but instead sent his prospective employer a letter proposing
that his employment continue for the rest of his life. See id. at 453, 250 S.E.2d at 681. The
employer responded that the employment agreement would last for a minimum of one
year. See id. at 454,250 S.E.2d at 681. The court in Burkheimer ruled that this response
and the employee's subsequent acceptance of employment constituted an indefinite
hiring, terminable at-will. See id. at 454,250 S.E.2d at 682. In passing, however, the court
noted that if an employee gave additional consideration to his services, then the contract
is not terminable at-will. See id. Finally, in Sides, the employee did change residences,
and the court of appeals applied the "moving residence" exception. See Sides, 74 N.C.
App. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828. The court's language in Sides does not appear to be
binding precedent, however, because it is dictum: the actual holding of Sides is that an.
employer may be liable for wrongful discharge when they discharge an employee who
refuses to perjure themselves in defense of their employer. See id. at 343, 328 S.E.2d at
826-27. Tuttle, Burkheimer, and Sides are discussed in greater detail infra notes 63-68, 69-
72, and 73-78, and accompanying text.
45. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333,493 S.E.2d at 423.
46. See id. at 333-34, 493 S.E.2d at 423.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 334, 493 S.E.2d at 423 (quoting Coman v. Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172,
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Justice Frye, the sole dissenter, admitted that the court had
never addressed the precise issue in this case, but took a different
view of the issue, framing it as purely contractual." In Frye's view,
the critical question was whether the necessary elements of an
enforceable contract were present.5 3 For Frye, when an employer
induces an employee to move based on specific assurances that he
will not be discharged except for deficient performance, an
agreement and consideration are in place, and the employee should
not be terminable at-will.
5 4
Although a majority of the supreme court claimed that this area
of law is "largely clear," there have been shades of disagreement on
the "moving residence" exception in the North Carolina courts. In
Malever v. Kay Jewelry Co.5 6 one of the first North Carolina cases to
address the issue of a "moving residence" exception to employment-
at-will, the supreme court declined to apply the exception. In
Malever, the plaintiff had been working for the defendant in a
seasonal position in Fayetteville, North Carolina, when the defendant
offered him a "regular permanent job" in Charlotte. 8 Since he was
giving up a higher wage, Malever indicated that he wanted
employment beyond the holiday season, and the defendant assured
him that he had a "'permanent, steady place'" with his company. 9
Eight weeks later, Malever's employer discharged him without cause,
and Malever sued for the weeks he was out of work .6  Ruling in favor
of the employer, the supreme court distinguished Malever's situation
from other "additional consideration" cases where plaintiffs had
52. See id. at 335,493 S.E.2d at 424 (Frye, J., dissenting).
53. See id. at 336, 493 S.E.2d at 425 (Frye, J., dissenting).
54. See id. at 336-37, 493 S.E.2d at 425 (Frye, J., dissenting).
55. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423 (disapproving language in
earlier cases regarding the "moving residence" exception); Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319
N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987) (listing the "moving residence" exception
among a group of well-defined exceptions to employment-at-will). But see Kurtzman v.
Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 125 N.C. App. 261,265,480 S.E.2d 425,427 ("This Court
has recognized that additional consideration can include the removal of an employee's
residence from one location to another in order to accept employment."), rev'd, 347 N.C.
329, 335, 493 S.E.2d 420, 424 (1997); Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652,
658-59, 412 S.E.2d 97, 101 (1991) (recognizing the "moving residence" exception, but
declining to apply it to the particular facts).
56. 223 N.C. 148,25 S.E.2d 436 (1943).
57. See id. at 149, 25 S.E.2d at 437.
58. See id. The plaintiff agreed to this arrangement, even though his salary would be
less, because he would be closer to his family. See id.
59. Id. (quoting the defendant's communications with the plaintiff).
60. See id.
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agreed to life employment in settlement of personal injury claims,61
and concluded that Malever had not given any additional
consideration by moving to Charlotte.62
After Malever, the courts in Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co.63
and Burkheimer v. Gealy,6 recognized the existence of the "moving
residence" exception, but neither case involved an employee who
actually moved to accept employment. In Tuttle, the employee
claimed that his contract entitled him to permanent employment if
his work was satisfactory. 65 The supreme court disagreed, however,
concluding that Tuttle's employer had complied fully with the terms
of the contract; the court held that Tuttle was terminable at-will.66
After stating its holding, however, the court stated further that when
an employee provides additional consideration in addition to his
services, then the contract may not be terminable at-will.67 The court
did not mention the "moving residence" exception explicitly, but did
say that additional consideration could be "some other thing of
value" besides the employee's services.68
The Burkheimer court likewise recognized the "moving
residence" exception even though it did not apply the exception to
the facts presented. In Burkheimer, the plaintiff sued for breach of
his employment contract after he was discharged from his job of eight
years. 9 The terms and conditions of the employment contract were
at the center of the dispute, with the plaintiff claiming to have made a
contract for life, and the defendant claiming that the contract was for
an indefinite term.7' The court of appeals affirmed a directed verdict
for the defendant, determining that the contract between the parties
was a contract for an indefinite term, and, therefore, terminable at-
61. See, e.g., Dotson v. F.S. Royster Guano Co., 207 N.C. 635, 178 S.E. 100 (1935);
Stevens v. Southern Ry. Co., 187 N.C. 528, 122 S.E. 295 (1924). See Parker, supra note 7,
at 186-95, for a more thorough discussion of employment-at-will cases in North Carolina
at the turn of the century.
62. See Malever, 223 N.C. at 149,25 S.E.2d at 437.
63. 263 N.C. 216, 139 S.E.2d 249 (1964).
64. 39 N.C. App. 450,250 S.E.2d 678 (1979).
65. See Tuttle, 263 N.C. at 218, 139 S.E.2d at 251.
66. See id. at 216, 139 S.E.2d at 249.
67. See id.
68. Id. (quoting 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 31 (1948)).
69. See Burkheimer, 39 N.C. App. at 451,250 S.E.2d at 680.
70. See id. at 452-54, 250 S.E.2d at 681-82. The contract in question consisted of two
letters: the first, from the plaintiff to the defendant, stated that the employment was to be
for life, and the second, from the defendant to the plaintiff, stated that employment would
last at least a year and then would continue unless changed by mutual agreement. See id.
at 453, 250 S.E.2d at 681.
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will. 71 In dicta, however, the court recognized that when an employee
gives special consideration, such as moving to accept a job, the
presumption of employment-at-will may not apply.72
Relying on language in Tuttle and Burkhimer, the court of
appeals applied the "moving residence" exception in Sides v. Duke
University.73 Unlike all of the other North Carolina cases recognizing
the exception, Sides is the only case that actually involved an
employee who moved to accept her position.74 The plaintiff was a
nurse anesthetist who left her previous job in Michigan to work for
Duke University Medical Center in Durham, North Carolina.75
Before leaving Michigan, the plaintiff received assurances that nurse
anesthetists at Duke could be terminated only for incompetence.76 In
the course of the plaintiff's tenure, a physician asked her to
administer an anesthetic to a patient, but she refused because she
believed the anesthetic would harm the patient.77 In fact, the patient
suffered severe brain damage after the physician administered the
anesthetics, and his family brought suit against Duke University
Medical Center, two physicians, and others.7"
Before giving any testimony, the plaintiff nurse in Sides was
advised by physicians and attorneys at Duke not to tell everything
she had seen regarding the patient.79 The plaintiff did testify against
the physician in deposition and at trial, and when she returned to
work, many of the physicians began to treat her poorly.s0 Eventually,
the plaintiff was discharged, and she filed a complaint alleging
wrongful discharge and breach of contract." The court of appeals
first recognized the public policy exception to employment-at-will in
this case, holding that no employer can discharge an employee for
refusing to testify untruthfully in a court case without civil liability.
82
71. See id. at 454, 280 S.E.2d at 682.
72. See id.
73. 74 N.C. App. 331,328 S.E.2d 818 (1985).
74. See id. at 332-33, 328 S.E.2d at 820-21.
75. See id. at 332, 328 S.E.2d at 820-21.
76. See id. at 332-33, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
77. See id. at 333, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
78. See id.
79. See id. Some of the doctors warned that if she did testify to everything she had
seen, she" 'would be in trouble.' "Id. (quoting statements made to the plaintiff).
80. See id. at 333-34, 328 S.E.2d at 821. The hostilities at work made the plaintiffs
job, which entailed working closely with physicians, very difficult, but when she asked for
help from a supervisor, she was rebuffed. See id. Later, when plaintiff was advised that
her job performance was poor and that she had an abusive attitude, the plaintiff asked for
specific examples but was given none. See id. at 334, 328 S.E.2d at 821.
81. See id. at 334-35,328 S.E.2d at 822.
82. See id. at 342,328 S.E.2d at 826.
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Turning to the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the court then held
that the presumption of employment-at-will was overcome when the
plaintiff moved from Michigan to North Carolina and relied on
assurances from the defendants that she could not be discharged but
for incompetence.
8 3
After Sides, the court of appeals began limiting the "moving
residence" exception; two subsequent cases examined the issue in
further detail. In Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank," the plaintiff
moved from Charlotte to Lumberton to accept a promotion, relying
on an employment manual which stated that he could be discharged
only for illegal, immoral, or unethical conduct. When the plaintiff
was discharged for personnel problems, he sued for wrongful
discharge.86 Affirming a grant of summary judgment for the
defendant, the court recognized the "moving residence" exception
but held that it did not apply in this case because the plaintiff moved
in order to get a promotion and not a new job.87
Three years later, the court limited the "moving residence"
exception again. In Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc.,8s the plaintiff
relocated from a job where she had eleven and a half years of
seniority and many company benefits to accept a position with the
defendant where she earned less money and had to change
residences. 9 Because she did not have a degree in chemistry and
would not be able to return to her former job, the plaintiff was
anxious about job securityf0 After working for the defendant for
83. See id. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828 ("Where the employee gives some special
consideration in addition to his services, such as relinquishing a claim for personal injuries
against the employer, removing his residence from one place to another in order to accept
employment... such a contract may be enforced.").
84. 89 N.C. App. 693,366 S.E.2d 918 (1988).
85. See id. at 696, 366 S.E.2d at 920. However, North Carolina does not incorporate
employment handbooks into employee contracts unless they are expressly included in the
contracts. See, e.g., Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 356 S.E.2d 357 (1987);
Walker v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 77 N.C. App. 253,335 S.E.2d 79 (1985).
86. See Buffaloe, 89 N.C. App. at 694,366 S.E.2d at 919.
87. See id. at 696-97,366 S.E.2d at 921.
88. 104 N.C. App. 652, 412 S.E.2d 97 (1991). Salt v. Applied Analytical, Inc. and
Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Industries, Inc. involve the same pharmaceutical
company, though the two employees involved in these cases were hired at different times
and for different positions.
89. See id. at 654,412 S.E.2d at 98.
90. See id. The defendant discussed career growth with the plaintiff and talked about
plaintiff's future with the company in general terms. In a letter offering the plaintiff
employment, the defendant said, "'I believe the position which we are offering you will
allow opportunities for your continued career growth in new areas .... Id. (quoting a
letter from the defendant to the plaintiff).
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fourteen months, receiving a raise, positive evaluations, and a bonus,
the plaintiff was discharged for low productivity.91 She then sued for
breach of contract.92  Affirming summary judgment for the
defendants, the court of appeals determined that the plaintiff's
change of residence did not constitute additional consideration
sufficient to remove the presumption of employment-at-will. 93 The
court distinguished Sides on the grounds that the plaintiff in Sides
was specifically assured that she could only be discharged for
incompetence.94
In Harris v. Duke Power Co.,95 the supreme court recognized the
existence of the "moving residence" exception to employment-at-
will.96  Although the "moving residence" exception was not
specifically at issue in this case,97 the court did state that "'the
employee-at-will' rule is subject to some well-defined exceptions.
9 8
The Harris court determined that the plaintiff did not fall into any of
the "well-recognized exceptions" to the general rule, including:
retaliatory discharge for filing worker's compensation claims,
retaliatory discharge for engaging in union activities, and additional
consideration exceptions such as the "moving residence" exception to
employment-at-will. 99
Several federal courts have examined the "moving residence"
exception, but have also construed it narrowly.' In House v.
Cannon Mills Co., '1 the plaintiff sued in federal court, alleging
violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 1 2 and
bringing a pendent state law claim for breach of contract. 1 3
Examining the plaintiff's breach of contract claim, the district court
91. See id. at 654-55, 412 S.E.2d at 98. The plaintiff denied the charges but left her
job anyway. See id.
92. See id. at 655, 412 S.E.2d at 98.
93. See id. at 658-60, 412 S.E.2d at 100-01.
94. See id. at 659, 412 S.E.2d at 101.
95. 319 N.C. 627,356 S.E.2d 357 (1987).
96. See id. at 629, 356 S.E.2d at 359.
97. In Harris, the employee sued his employer for discharge without cause, arguing
that the employer's termination policy as stated in a manual distributed to management
was incorporated into his contract. See id. at 628, 356 S.E.2d at 358.
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. See id. at 629, 356 S.E.2d at 359.
100. See, e.g., House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 163 (M.D.N.C. 1988)
("This court does not read the North Carolina case law as establishing a general
exception to the terminable-at-will rule in all cases which involve a relocation, however,
not even when coupled with a job change.").
101. 713 F. Supp 159 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
102. 29 U.S.C.A. § 623 (West Supp. 1998).
103. See House, 713 F. Supp. at 162.
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held that although the plaintiff relocated to accept a position with the
defendants, the defendant's assurances of a " 'long and prosperous
career with Cannon Mills'" were not sufficient to remove the
presumption of employment at-will.1 4 Likewise, in Iturbe v. Wandel
& Goltermann Technologies, Inc.,105 the court recognized the
exception, but held that Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank'0 6 was
controlling, because the plaintiff had accepted a promotion instead of
accepting a new job.' 7
Thus, although North Carolina courts have recognized the
"moving residence" exception, usually courts only refer to it in
dicta."0" To date, no supreme court decision has applied the
exception to a case before it.109 Instead, the supreme court has simply
listed the exception as one that was "well-recognized,"" 0 a statement
they have since renounced."' The court of appeals has been more
receptive than the supreme court to the exception," but both courts
104. Id. (quoting the defendant's statements to the plaintiff).
105. 774 F. Supp. 959 (M.D.N.C. 1991).
106. 89 N.C. App. 693,366 S.E.2d 918 (1988); see supra notes 84-87 and accompanying
text (discussing Buffaloe).
107. See Iturbe, 774 F. Supp. at 961. The Fourth Circuit has not published an opinion
concerning a change of residence exception, but two unpublished dispositions have
addressed the matter. See Walsh v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., No. 96-1528, 1997 WL 538006,
at *1 (4th Cir. Sept. 2, 1997) (per curiam); Smith v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., No. 89-2382,
1990 WL 27352, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1990). In Smith, the plaintiff argued that his
relocation from Myrtle Beach, South Carolina to Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and his
employer's failure to follow the procedures for discharge in an employment handbook
removed the presumption of employment-at-will. See Smith, 1990 WL 27352, at *2. The
Fourth Circuit noted the exception but concluded that it did not apply because the
plaintiff resigned and changed residences before receiving his employee manual; thus the
"additional consideration" of changing residences could not be supported by a contract
that was not yet in existence. See id. Likewise, in Walsh, the Fourth Circuit declined to
apply the exception when defendant was promised employment until age 65, holding that
in North Carolina, the "moving residence" exception does not apply when the employee
moves to accept a job within the same company. See Walsh, 1997 WL 538006, at *3
(citing Buffaloe v. United Carolina Bank, 89 N.C. App. 693, 696-97, 366 S.E.2d 918, 921
(1988)). The court rejected plaintiff's characterization that the promise of employment
until age 65 was a contract of definite duration. See Walsh, 1997 WL 538006, at *3.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 98-99 (stating that the "moving residence"
exception was not at issue in the Harris case).
109. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423 (stating that the supreme court
"has not heretofore expressly passed upon [the 'moving residence' exception]").
110. See Harris, 319 N.C. at 629,356 S.E.2d at 359.
111. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423 (disapproving of language in
Harris that might be construed as approving of the "moving residence" exception).
112. See, e.g., Kurtzman v. Applied Analytical Indus., Inc., 125 N.C. App. 261,265,480
S.E.2d 425, 427, ("This court has recognized that additional consideration can include the
removal of an employee's residence from one location to another in order to accept
employment." (citation omitted)), overruled by Kurtzman, 347 N.C. 329, 493 S.E.2d 420
(1997).
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have relied primarily on reasoning from Corpus Juris Secundum
when recognizing or applying the exception.1 3
After Kurtzman, the employment-at-will debate is probably over
in North Carolina: the continued validity of any change of residence
exception to employment-at-will is highly doubtful at best.114 The
court hinted at flexibility when it claimed that any "moving
residence" exception to employment-at-will had been neither
approved nor "disapproved,""' 5 however, after the Kurtzman decision
it is unlikely that a plaintiff would succeed on a "moving residence"
exception to employment-at-will. 16  As the dissent noted, the
majority chose to make a general rule about employee relocation,
113. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Kernersville Lumber Co., 263 N.C. 216, 219, 139 S.E.2d 249,
251 (1964) (" 'Where, however, the employee gives consideration in addition to his
services, as where he relinquishes a claim for personal injuries or gives some other thing
of value ... [it] is not such an indefinite contract as to come within the rule' [of
employment-at-will]." (quoting 56 C.J.S. Master & Servant § 31 (1948))); Burkheimer v.
Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1979) ("Where the employee gives
some special consideration in addition to his services, such as relinquishing a claim for
personal injuries against the employer, removing his residence from one place to another
in order to accept employment, or assisting in breaking a strike, such a contract may be
enforced." (emphasis added) (citing Tuttle, 263 N.C. at 219, 139 S.E.2d at 251)). In its
brief, AAI argued that the Burkheimer court "embellished" the statement of the
exception by the Tuttle court by adding language about a change of residence. See
Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 28, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97).
114. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at 423 ("We neither specifically
approved or disapproved such an exception, however, and any language in Harris that
may be viewed as suggesting the contrary is disapproved."). The attorney for Lewis
Kurtzman felt that the decision would have broad implications for employees moving to
North Carolina:
"No employee living outside of North Carolina should ever consider living in
this state after reading that opinion .... The court has, in essence, granted
employers in this state a credit card to lure employees here, make promises to
them and then walk away from those promises with the knowledge that the
Supreme Court will say it's OK in the name of economic development."
Scott Smith, Employment Ruling Nixed by High Court, TRIANGLE BUS. J., Dec. 12, 1997,
at 9 (quoting an interview with Lewis Kurtzman's attorney). Needless to say, AAI's
counsel saw the matter differently. The defendant's attorney hypothesized that if
Kurtzman's verdict had been allowed to stand, then "'[i]mmediately, every employment
relationship that began with someone moving would be open to the threat of a lawsuit and
jury trial for any relationship that ended on other than satisfactory terms.'" Id. (quoting
an interview with AAI's attorney). Indeed, the threat mentioned by AAI's attorney is a
real one: the North Carolina Department of Commerce reported that more than 1.4
million people and 1,100 companies moved to North Carolina in 1996. See id.
115. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333,493 S.E.2d at 423 (emphasis added).
116. At least one North Carolina attorney felt that the decision by the court of appeals
to affirm Kurtzman's trial court verdict was already creating momentum for challenges to
employment-at-will. See Smith, supra note 114, at 9. According to that attorney, the
supreme court's reversal of Kurtzman's trial court verdict" 'should halt that trend.'" Id,
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rather than consider the case in purely contractual terms. 17
Consequently, the court made a bid for certainty and a bright-line
rule in this area, but in the process it may have disregarded more
flexible possibilities.1 8
For instance, courts in other jurisdictions have applied
promissory estoppel as a remedy when an employee makes
preparations to relocate and then is discharged without cause."9 To
state a claim for promissory estoppel, the plaintiff traditionally must
establish: (1) that there was an unambiguous promise, (2) which was
intended to be relied upon, (3) that was in fact relied upon, (4) the
reliance was to the promisee's detriment, and (5) injustice will result
if the promise is not enforced.20 One problem with promissory
estoppel, however, is that it only applies in cases where the employee
has not yet begun working.'2' Because the promises exchanged are
fulfilled once the employee relocates and the employer gives the
employee work, promissory estoppel does not provide a satisfactory
remedy in most cases. Moreover, recovery under a promissory
estoppel theory creates the anomaly that those who have merely
made preparations to move may recover while those who have
actually moved may not recover once they have started working.
Instead of relying on promissory estoppel to remedy damages
suffered by relocating employees, Connecticut courts base their
analysis on the reasonable expectations of the parties.' Under
Connecticut law, if the employer makes a statement assuring the
employee of job security, and the plaintiff relies on that statement
and relocates, then relocation is evidence of the employee's
reasonable expectations of job security." Under this doctrine, some
117. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 337, 493 S.E.2d at 425 (Frye, J., dissenting) ("[A
contractual] approach, which relies on contract principles, does not establish a 'general
exception' to employment-at-will in all cases involving a relocation.").
118. See infra notes 119-37 (discussing the policy options open to the courts in
employment-at-will cases).
119. See, e.g., Gould v. Artisoft, Inc., 1 F.3d 544, 549-50 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that
when an employee had made a promise to relocate, an employer could not revoke the
promise to employ); Sheppard v. Morgan, Keegan & Co., 266 Cal. Rptr. 784, 787 (Ct.
App. 1990) (holding that promissory estoppel applied where employee was terminated
before relocating but after making preparations to move).
120. See, e.g., 3 ERIc MILLS HOLMES, CORBIN ON CONTRACrS § 8.9 (Joseph M.
Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1996).
121. See, e.g., Smith v. Beloit Corp., 162 N.W.2d 585, 587-88 (Wis. 1968) (finding that
the employer's promise of employment is fulfilled where employee has begun work).
122. See Rath, supra note 4, at 826-27.
123. See id.; cf. Coelho v. Posi-Seal Int'l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170 (Conn. 1988) (affirming
the trial court verdict in favor of the employee for breach of an implied contract when his
employer promised to support him on specific issues and failed to do so, firing him
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plaintiffs in North Carolina might have succeeded in their claims
against employers."2 4 The problems with this doctrine, however, stem
from the impracticality of proving exactly what the parties' intentions
were, because promises were made were orally and, by the time of
trial, may have occurred several years earlier."z
Rather than create a blanket rule that relocation would not
constitute additional consideration to support a promise of
"permanent" employment, the North Carolina Supreme Court could
have interpreted its precedent and that of the court of appeals to hold
that such an exception to employment-at-will does exist.126  If the
court had agreed with the plaintiff in Kurtzman that relocation and
assurances of job security remove the presumption of employment-
at-will, it would have needed to create standards to clarify what kinds
of assurances from employers are necessary and what constituted a
reasonable length of employment under the circumstances; otherwise
the confusing disagreements between the supreme court and the
instead).
124. See, e.g., Salt v. Applied Analytical Inc., 104 N.C. App. 652, 659-60, 412 S.E.2d 97,
101 (1991) (holding that the employee could not recover because the employer's
assurances of a promising future were too vague to remove the presumption of
employment-at-will). But cf. Sides v. Duke Univ., 74. N.C. App. 331, 345, 328 S.E.2d 818,
828 (1985) (holding that the employer's assurances of no discharge without incompetence
were sufficient to remove the presumption of employment-at-will).
125. See Frank Victory, The Erosion of the Employment-At-Will Doctrine and the
Statute of Frauds: Time to Amend the Statute, 30 AM. Bus. L.J. 97, 118 (1992) ("An
employer cannot, however, know when a terminated employee might allege that a
statement was made years earlier during an interview with a personnel officer, who has
long since died, left the company, or retired, and which created a subjective expectation
of termination only for cause."). Professor Victory argues that the numerous exceptions
applied to the employment-at-will doctrine, coupled with the allowance of permanent
employment contracts under the Statute of Frauds, has brought about a substantial
erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, with negative consequences for employers.
See Victory, supra, at 121-22. See also Alford, supra, note 10, at 1191 (claiming that the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Coman v. Thomas Manufacturing Co., 325
N.C. 172, 381 S.E.2d 445 (1989), placed too high a burden on employers to justify reasons
for discharge).
126. See, e.g., Harris v. Duke Power Co., 319 N.C. 627, 629, 356 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1987)
(listing "well-defined" exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, including the "moving
residence" exception as stated by Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 345, 328
S.E.2d 818, 828 (1985)). Other jurisdictions have allowed employees to recover based on
the additional consideration exception. See, e.g., Ohanian v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc.,
779 F.2d 101, 109 (2d Cir. 1985) (determining that the employee's move from San
Francisco to New York and the employer's oral assurances about job security were
sufficient consideration to support a promise of lifetime employment); Murphree v.
Alabama Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 449 So. 2d 1218, 1221 (Ala. 1984) (reversing summary




court of appeals could continue indefinitely.127
Other states have taken varying approaches, but states allowing
plaintiffs to recover in this situation often do so on an implied
contract theory."2 In Pennsylvania, for example, to prevail on a
"moving residence" exception to employment-at-will, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that the employer made a statement assuring the employee
of job security, and (2) that the employee underwent a substantial
hardship by way of relocating. 29 If the court finds that the "moving
residence" exception applies, then it must then discern how long the
employee should be protected under the exception to the rule, and
whether the hardship suffered by the employee is commensurate with
the amount of time employed. 30 As one author, Manesh Rath, has
noted, the "additional consideration" exception as applied by
Pennsylvania is problematic because it compares the employee's
relocation with the employer's promises, instead of comparing the
exchange of promises between employer and employee. 3' Likewise,
the "substantial hardship" test creates practical problems by
discouraging employers from hiring employees who reside farther
away.'32 As Rath imagines, this could lead to unfavorable questions
in job interviews regarding the location of the candidate's residence,
the candidate's familial status, possibly leading to favoritism towards
single candidates in the hiring process.
33
While not a possibility examined thus far by any North Carolina
court, one student commentator has suggested that the fairest
127. See supra notes 56-113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
contradictory holdings of the supreme court and court of appeals.
128. See Rath, supra note 4, at 827 ("The question ... that binds all of these
approaches and that all of the courts are asking, is: does the parties' behavior-the
employer's vague assurances of job security plus the employee's relocating to accept that
position-amount to an implied contract or not?").
129. The "substantial hardship" test is important because it distinguishes employees
who move across regions of the country to accept employment as opposed to those
employees who relocate closer to a job purely for their own convenience. See id. at 825
(comparing relative hardships on an employee who moved from Maine to Pennsylvania to
accept an offer, but who was single with an employee who was married and left a job of
eighteen years and a home of forty years).
130. See, e.g., Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (citing Veno v.
Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 580 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)); Rath, supra note 4, at 823-25.
131. See Rath, supra note 4, at 833-34. Moreover, Rath argues, the employee's
relocation is best viewed as evidence of the employee's expectations, not the employer's
promises. See id. at 834 ("The result is that the court gains a more fair solution, but
trades away certainty of the law.").
132. See id. at 834-35 ("[T]he farther an employee must move to accept the position,
the longer he is protected by a just cause contract.").
133. See id. at 835.
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approach would be to reverse the presumption of employment-at-
will.l" Under such an approach, the commentator suggested that
employers could give employees a choice between employment-at-
will and just-cause dismissal standards, perhaps providing incentives
like increased pay for the employee to choose the employment-at-
will option.35 Because some believe that a just-cause dismissal
standard could result in market inefficiency, 136 the best way to
balance the respective interests of employers and employees might
be to shift the burden to employers to prove that their employment
practices would inform a reasonable person about the consequences
of at-will employment. 37
In resolving the issue of relocation and employment-at-will in
Kurtzman, the North Carolina Supreme Court had to balance the
interests of employers hoping to attract the best candidates, the
interests of employees who moved their homes and families only to
be terminated a short time later, and the public interest in clear
employment laws. The Kurtzman court chose clarity of the law over
fairness to employees who may lack the bargaining power to
negotiate for clear terms of employment.3 8 Moreover, the court
chose a decidedly status-quo approach, in line with its consistent
protection of the employment-at-will doctrine. 13 9 Although few
would argue for the enforcement of lifetime employment contracts
where the employer's promises were ambiguous, it is difficult to see
any practical difference between contracts that previously have been
134:. See Peter Stone Partee, Note, Reversing the Presumption of Employment-at-will,
44 VAND. L. REV. 689, 691 (1991) ("[E]stablishing a rebuttable presumption that an
employer can be discharged only for just cause would preserve employment-at-will's
economic benefits, while fully protecting those employees most likely to be devastated by
an arbitrary discharge.").
135. See iL at 709.
136. See id. at 701. The argument goes that properly functioning markets will allocate
resources to those who value them most, and, therefore, employers must value
employment-at-will more than employees value job security. See id. See generally Mayer
G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency,
38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1144 (1989) (concluding that government review of employment
dismissal decisions would be more costly for both employers and employees).
137. See Partee, supra note 134, at 709.
138. Some have argued that employees lack bargaining power against their employers
only in the rarest of instances. See, e.g., Freed & Polsby, supra note 136, at 1099-1101.
On the other hand, a practitioner has suggested that very few employees have the
bargaining power necessary to obtain an employment for a definite duration. See Martha
A. Geer, Exceptions to the Employment-at-will Doctrine, FUNDAMENTALS OF
EMPLOYMENT LAW (North Carolina Bar Foundation Continuing Legal Education, Cary,
N.C.), May 5, 1995, at IV-1.
139. See supra notes 9, 95-99 and accompanying text (discussing Coman v. Thomas
Manufacturing and Harris v. Duke Power Co.).
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upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court, like that in Sides, and
the contract in Kurtzman.1
40
The majority in Kurtzman expressly stated that they did not
hold, as the dissent suggested, that the establishment of a definite
term of service is the sole means of removing the presumption of
employment-at-will. 141 Following the holding in Kurtzman, however,
it is difficult to see how anything short of a contract or a public policy
exception would remove the presumption of employment at-will. 42
While the rule seems harsh, it is important to remember that
employment-at-will works both ways: employers don't have to keep
bad employees and employees don't have to keep bad jobs. As the
supreme court has said in a different context, "[t]he free enterprise
system demands that competing employers be allowed to vie for the
services of the 'best and brightest' employees without fear of
subsequent litigation."'4 3
In preserving a strict employment-at-will doctrine in North
Carolina, the supreme court stuck to its guns as well as its precedent,
but precedent does not necessarily make for the best policy.'" On
one hand, the court no doubt was concerned about burden on the
court system, costs to the taxpayers of numerous "moving residence"
claims, and economic costs of allowing employees to sue their
140. In Kurtzman, the employee was promised that he would have a job so long as he
did his job, and the supreme court concluded that this promise was insufficient to remove
the presumption of employment-at-will. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 333, 493 S.E.2d at
423. In Sides v. Duke University, 74 N.C. App. 331, 328 S.E.2d 818 (1985), however, the
employee was promised that she could only be removed for incompetence, and the court
of appeals held that this same promise was sufficient to remove the presumption, and the
supreme court affirmed. See id. at 345, 328 S.E.2d at 828.
141. See Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 334,493 S.E.2d at 424.
142. See supra note 116 (describing the view of one attorney about the likelihood of
success on a "moving residence" claim after Kurtzman).
143. Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Hooks, 322 N.C. 216,222,367 S.E.2d 647,651 (1988).
144. The harshness of employment-at-will is best illustrated by more examples from
downsized corporate America:
At Tenneco, where 1,200 employees were laid off over a six-week period, many
learned of their fates when confronted by armed guards carrying boxes to use in
clearing out their desks. At Allied Bank of Texas, department heads called
meetings and then read the names of those to be laid off in front of their
coworkers.
Marks, supra note 2, at 79. Such stories are likely to abound as companies cut costs to
remain competitive, but one might wonder why more protections for employees are not in
place given the disruptive effect massive layoffs can have on communities. One author
has proposed a Model Termination Act, requiring employers to terminate employees only
for cause, and requiring employees to give up their right to sue in lieu of mandatory
arbitration. See JOHN JUDE MORAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: NEW CHALLENGES IN THE
BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT 143 (1997).
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employers more often.145 On the other hand, the court might have
given more consideration to what kinds of tactics employers ought to
be allowed to use in recruiting and terminating employees, because
the quality of employers North Carolina can attract ought to be just
as important as the quantity of employers.46 Moreover, the court did
not address one issue that commentators have pointed out
repeatedly: if employers wish to avoid lawsuits for breaching an
implied contract, they may simply stop making promises they do not
intend to keep. 47 Ultimately, however, the policy aspects of the
Kurtzman decision are more or less appealing depending on which
side of the debate one sympathizes with: employers or employees. 14
In Kurtzman, the court clearly sided with employers, claiming that
the employment-at-will doctrine "remains an incentive to economic
145. See Smith, supra note 114, at 9. According to a San Francisco public policy firm
Smith cites, one in five California businesses have now restricted their hiring and 11% of
California businesses have not increased their hiring because of the increase in cost of
providing jobs. See id.; cf. House v. Cannon Mills Co., 713 F. Supp. 159, 164 (M.D.N.C.
1988) ("Recognition of a general exception [to employment-at-will] whenever relocation
or job change is involved would emasculate the terminable-at-will rule, because many if
not most hirings involve either a job change or a change of residence or both.").
146. Employers who use tactics like those used by AAI in this case may reap the
consequences of their actions in low employee morale. As one commentator has
observed, "'Employee morale is intangible, but it does affect your productivity level.'"
Tim Gray, Ruling Replenishes Ammo to Continue Firing at Will, BUSINESS N.C., May
1998, at 18, 20 (quoting an interview with employment law Professor Marion Crain).
Gray's article included an interview with AAI's counsel, who stated that the lawsuit might
never have been brought in the first place if his client had included a statement of
employment-at-will status in the letter offering Kurtzman his position. See id.
147. See Brief of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Plaintiff Lewis Kurtzman, at 8, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97); see also id. at 17
(noting that if an employee or candidate made false statements about a resume to an
employer, that employer could be expected to take action against the candidate); cf.
Sandra J. Mullings, Truth-In-Hiring Claims and the At-Will Rule: Should an Employer
Have a License to Lie?, 1997 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 105, 111-12 (distinguishing a suit for
wrongful termination from a suit for misrepresentation because in suits for
misrepresentation the employer's right to terminate the employee is preserved).
148. The North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers were not subtle about who they
sided with:
Each time this court considers requiring greater accountability of corporations in
connection with their dealing with employees, corporations transform
themselves into Chicken Little. According to the companies, while the sky may
not be falling, the end of North Carolina's economy, as we know it, is near. Yet,
neither North Carolina's ability to attract businesses nor the courts' work load
appear to have suffered a substantial blow from landmark decisions [by the
supreme court] in Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co. and Coman v. Thomas
Manufacturing Co., which expanded the rights of employees by permitting them
to bring claims of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.
Brief of the North Carolina Academy of Trial Lawyers as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Plaintiff Lewis Kurtzman, at 17, Kurtzman (No. 103PA97) (citations omitted).
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development, and any significant erosion of it could serves as a
disincentive. 1
49
In Kurtzman, by refusing to recognize any "moving residence"
exception, the court saved itself from creating a new set of standards,
including how far an employee would have to move to state a claim,
what damages would result, and what sort of assurances would have
to be made to the employee in order to qualify for the exception. °
Indeed, there is a good argument that if such an exception is to exist,
the General Assembly should be body to make such decisions.'
Until the General Assembly elaborates on North Carolina
employment law, 52 however, employees will be dependent on the
courts for a remedy. In the meantime, let them heed Justice




149. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 334,493 S.E.2d at 423.
150. See supra notes 121, 125, 131-33 & 136 and accompanying text (discussing
problems with the approaches taken in other states recognizing the exception).
151. See supra note 8 (discussing the only statutory protections currently afforded to
employees in North Carolina).
152. Cf. supra notes 122-25, 129-33 (describing novel approaches in Connecticut and
Pennsylvania).
153. Kurtzman, 347 N.C. at 331, 493 S.E.2d at 422. See generally Pauline T. Kim,
Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal
Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CoRNELL L. REv. 105 (1997) (describing the lack of
knowledge or misunderstanding prevalent among most employees about the legal
doctrine of employment-at-will).
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Lankford v. Wright: Recognizing Equitable Adoption in North
Carolina
In 1873, North Carolina codified its first laws relating to the
adoption of minor children.' For 125 years, this statutory route has
been the only means available for adoption in North Carolina.2
Every state in the nation has a similar statute for legal adoption.3
Filled with time consuming procedures, costly filings, and confusing
paperwork, the statutory route to adoption has been criticized for
being too harsh on potential adoptive parents.4 In response to these
criticisms, many states have recognized another form of adoption-
equitable adoption'-which permits a child who was not adopted in
1. See Act of March 3, 1873, ch. 155, § 1, 1872-73 N.C. Pub. Laws 254, 255 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-100 to -10-105 (1995 & Supp. 1997)). For an in-
depth tracking of the progression of adoption statutes in North Carolina, see Francis H.
Fairley, Inheritance Rights Consequent to Adoptions, 29 N.C. L. REV. 227,229-37 (1951).
2. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-100 to -10-105.
3. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 453.005-.503 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 7501-1.1 to -1.5 (West 1998); TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 162.001-.507 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1998).
4. See Devjani Mishra, The Road to Concord: Resolving the Conflict of Law over
Adoption by Gays and Lesbians, 30 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 103 (1996). But see
Elizabeth Bartholet, Private Race Preferences in Family Formation, 107 Yale L.J. 2351,
2352 (1998) (noting that "our society discourages adoption through restrictive regulation,
making adoption expensive while failing to provide the financial subsidies that we accord
procreation").
5. Other jurisdictions refer to equitable adoption as "virtual adoption" or "adoption
by estoppel." This Note uses the term equitable adoption throughout. The majority of
states presently recognize equitable adoption. See, e.g., Benefield v. Faulkner, 29 So. 2d
1, 4 (Ala. 1947) (enforcing a contract to adopt child even though the contract was not
acknowledged or recorded as required by statute); In re Estate of Lamfrom, 368 P.2d 318,
321 (Ariz. 1962) (detailing the contractual elements required for relief under specific
performance for equitable adoption); In re Estate of Rivolo, 15 Cal. Rptr. 268, 271 (Ct.
App. 1961) (recognizing equitable adoption); Barlow v. Barlow, 463 P.2d 305, 308-09
(Colo. 1969) (en banc) (recognizing the doctrine of equitable adoption for intestate
succession); Sheffield v. Barry, 14 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 1943) (en banc) (utilizing specific
performance to enforce a contract to adopt); Williams v. Murray, 236 S.E.2d 624, 625
(Ga. 1977) (recognizing virtual adoption as a means to avoid the unfair result of intestate
succession laws); Weiss v. Beck, 115 N.E.2d 768, 772 (Ill. 1953) (requiring an adoptee to
establish a contract to adopt by clear and conclusive evidence); In re Estate of Painter, 67
N.W.2d 617, 618 (Iowa 1954) (stating that Iowa recognized adoption by estoppel);
McGarvey v. State, 533 A.2d 690, 691-93 (Md. 1987) (discussing equitable adoption in
Maryland); Roberts v. Sutton, 27 N.W.2d 54, 57 (Mich. 1947) (inferring a contract to
adopt in equity to save the right of the equitably adopted child to inherit); In re Estate of
Berge, 47 N.W.2d 428, 430 (Minn. 1951) (stating the requirement of clear and convincing
evidence to establish a contract to adopt); Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964, 968
(Mo. 1947) (holding that an adoptee must establish equitable adoption by showing a
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accordance with state adoption statutes to inherit from the intestate
estate of a decedent.6
The fact patterns involved in equitable adoption cases are similar
in many situations. Birth parents place their child in a foster home,
or the home of a neighbor, agreeing to relinquish their parental rights
to the foster parents who raise the child. The foster parents clothe,
feed, and educate the child, as well as rear the child following their
morals and ideals. In return, the child benefits the foster parents by
giving them the affection and obedience expected of a natural child.
The only thing missing is the paperwork involved in a legal adoption
procedure. Therefore, when a foster parent of the child dies without
a will, or without including the child in an executed will, the child has
no statutory right to claim any of the foster parent's estate. To
resolve this injustice, courts may use their equity power to enforce
the doctrine of equitable adoption.
7
For almost 100 years a majority of states have recognized
equitable adoption as a solution to the injustice of declaring the
seemingly adopted, yet not statutorily adopted, child a stranger to the
foster parent's estate.' North Carolina courts, however, had not
followed this trend,9 but in Lankford v. Wright,10 the Supreme Court
of North Carolina became the twenty-ninth state court to recognize
contract to adopt by clear and convincing evidence and leaving no reasonable doubt in the
mind of the chancellor); Frye v. Frye, 738 P.2d 505, 506 (Nev. 1987) (holding that
equitable adoption could be used to impose a duty to pay child support); Ashman v.
Madigan, 122 A.2d 382, 383 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1956) (stating that direct evidence
of an agreement to adopt is not necessary); Lankford v. Wright, 347 N.C. 115, 121, 489
S.E.2d 604, 608 (1997) (recognizing equitable adoption); Eggstaff v. Phelps, 226 P. 82, 85-
86 (Okla. 1924) (allowing a claim under equitable adoption); Johnson v. Olson, 26 N.W.2d
132, 133-34 (S.D. 1947) (requiring clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to prove an
enforceable agreement to adopt); Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. 1940)
(permitting an estoppel theory to prove equitable adoption); In re Estates of Williams,
348 P.2d 683, 684-85 (Utah 1960) (requiring clear and convincing evidence to prove
equitable adoption); Wheeling Dollar Say. & Trust Co. v. Singer, 250 S.E.2d 369, 372 (W.
Va. 1978) (recognizing equitable adoption).
6. See Estate of Wilson v. Van Dett, 168 Cal. Rptr. 533, 535 (Ct. App. 1980) ("It
may properly be emphasized that [certain authorities] concern only the right of an
equitably adopted child to inherit by virtue of contract; they do not otherwise, nor do we,
equate the rights of such an equitably adopted child with those of a legally, or statutorily,
adopted child."); see also Elizabeth A. Gaudio, Recent Decisions, Limiting the Scope of
Equitable Adoption, 54 MD. L. REV. 822, 825-26 (1995) (noting that the claim of the
equitably adopted child to inherit is a claim made in equity to avoid the unfair results of
intestacy laws).
7. See supra note 5 (listing cases discussing equitable adoption).
8. See supra note 5 (listing the states that recognize equitable adoption).
9. See infra notes 104-29 and accompanying text (discussing the brief history of the
North Carolina courts' refusal to recognize equitable adoption).
10. 347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604 (1997).
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equitable adoption."
This Note first addresses the facts in Lankford, the decisions of
the lower courts, and the opinion of the North Carolina Supreme
Court. 2 Next, the Note traces the origins of the doctrine of equitable
adoption in the United States, including the scant history of the
doctrine in North Carolina. 3 The Note then analyzes the modern-
day doctrine of equitable adoption and focuses on the changes that
have taken place over the years.14 Because the dissent in Lankford
expressed concern with the majority's use of equity power in
establishing equitable adoption, the Note also discusses equity
jurisprudence and how it was used specifically in Lankford.15 Finally,
the Note addresses some of the issues that may arise as a result of the
decision.'
6
On January 15, 1944, Mary M. Winebarger gave birth to Barbara
Ann Newton Lankford. 7 When Barbara was still a child, her natural
mother, Mary, entered into an agreement with her neighbors,
Clarence and Lula Newton, in which the Newtons consented to adopt
and to raise Barbara as their child.' In accordance with the
agreement, Barbara moved in with the Newtons and took the
surname of her new family, becoming known as Barbara Ann
Newton. 9
The Newtons treated Barbara as their own child, and they
publicly recognized her as their daughter at all times.20 For example,
records and other documentation listed the foster child as Barbara
Ann Newton and recognized her as the daughter of Clarence and
Lula Newton 2 1 and upon Clarence Newton's death in 1960, the local
newspaper obituary listed Barbara as his surviving daughter. While
Barbara was away in the Navy, she and Lula frequently wrote letters
11. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 607.
12. See infra notes 17-72 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 73-134 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 135-62 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 210-39 and accompanying text.
17. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 117, 489 S.E.2d at 605.
18. See id.
19. See id. The court's opinion failed to reveal whether or not the Newtons ever
legally changed Barbara's name.
20. See id.
21. See id. Examples of such records recognizing Barbara as Barbara Ann Newton
included her school records and high school diploma. See id. The record also stated that
Lula and Barbara obtained a Social Security card for Barbara under the name Barbara




in which they referred to each other as mother and daughter, Lula
continually deposited money, sent to her by Barbara, into joint bank
accounts that were set up for Lula and Barbara.24
Lula Newton prepared a will in 1975 designating Barbara as co-
executrix and granting specific bequests to her.' After Lula died in
1994, Barbara attempted to probate the will, but the probate court
rejected the will because an unknown person had defaced it.
26
Consequently, Lula Newton died intestate.2 7 Upon the ruling of
intestacy, Barbara filed for a declaratory judgment seeking a
declaration of her rights and status as an heir for purposes of
inheritance.28 Barbara claimed that despite not fulfilling the legal
procedures necessary for a formal adoption, Clarence and Lula
Newton had always held her out as their daughter, 29 and she urged
the court to recognize her as the adopted daughter of Lula Newton.3
The administrators and named heirs of Lula Newton, the defendants
in this action, responded by filing a motion for summary judgment.3'
When the trial court granted the defendants' motion for
summary judgment, Barbara Newton appealed,32 but the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling.33 Writing for the court of
appeals,' Judge Greene narrowed the decision to one crucial issue-
whether North Carolina recognized equitable adoption.3" Relying on
North Carolina Supreme Court precedent that North Carolina did
not recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption,36 and determining
23. See id. While serving in the Navy, Barbara returned to her home several times to






29. See Lankford v. Wright, 122 N.C. App. 746, 747, 472 S.E.2d 31, 32 (1996), rev'd,
347 N.C. 115, 489 S.E.2d 604 (1997).
30. See id.
31. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 117, 489 S.E.2d at 605.
32. See Lankford, 122 N.C. App. at 746,472 S.E.2d at 32.
33. See id. at 746, 472 S.E.2d at 31.
34. Judge Greene wrote the majority opinion in which Judge Martin and Judge
Walker concurred. See id. at 747, 472 S.E.2d at 32. Judge Walker wrote a separate
opinion. See id. at 748, 472 S.E.2d at 32-33 (Walker, J., concurring); see also infra notes
38-40 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Walker's concurrence).
35. See Lankford, 122 N.C. App. at 747,472 S.E.2d at 32.
36. See id. Judge Greene relied on Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 64 N.C. App. 471,
307 S.E.2d 850 (1983), aff'd on other grounds, 314 N.C. 477, 334 S.E.2d 751 (1985), in
which the supreme court stated that North Carolina had not yet recognized the doctrine
of equitable adoption. See Ladd, 314 N.C. at 480-81, 334 S.E.2d at 754. For a discussion
of Ladd and how Lankford affected it, see infra notes 114-29 and accompanying text. The
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that Barbara Newton was not adopted in accordance with the North
Carolina statutes, Judge Greene upheld the granting of defendants'
motion for summary judgment.37
Concurring in the opinion of the appellate court, Judge Walker
urged the legislature to work towards recognizing the doctrine of
equitable adoption. Judge Walker felt that Barbara Newton's
struggle clearly demonstrated the need for recognition of the
doctrine.39 Noting that similar cases would inevitably arise, Judge
Walker voiced his concern about the harshness of requiring strict
compliance with the adoption statutes.
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and remanded the case to be heard on the merits.41 Justice
Frye, writing for the court, began by declaring that North Carolina
would now recognize the doctrine of equitable adoption.42 To
support this holding, the court first set forth the scope of its equity
power.43 The court stated that the principles of equity form the
doctrine of equitable adoption and that the court has the duty to
court of appeals also relied on Wilson v. Anderson, 232 N.C. 212, 59 S.E.2d 836 (1950), in
which the supreme court held that adoption occurs only after the adoptive parents satisfy
all the statutory provisions of Chapter 48. See id. at 221, 59 S.E.2d at 843; see also N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-100 to -10-105 (1995 & Supp. 1997) (stating the requirements for
legal adoption).
37. See Lankford, 122 N.C. App. at 747,472 S.E.2d at 32.
38. See id. at 748, 472 S.E.2d at 33 (Walker, J., concurring) ("I... write separately to
urge the legislature to take action in recognizing this doctrine [of equitable adoption].").
39. See id. (Walker, J., concurring).
40. See id. (Walker, J., concurring).
41. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 121,489 S.E.2d at 607.
42. See id. at 116-18, 489 S.E.2d at 605-06.
43. See id. at 118, 489 S.E.2d at 606. The court addressed the issue of equity by
stating, " '[it is a fundamental premise of equitable relief that equity regards as done that
which in fairness and good conscience ought to be done,'" id. (quoting Thompson v.
Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 489, 263 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1980)), and "'[e]quity regards substance,
not form,' " id. (quoting In re Will of Pendergrass, 251 N.C. 737, 743, 112 S.E.2d 562, 566
(1960)). The court seemed to be attempting to refute a major argument of the dissent
that an equitable remedy may not be applied when statutorily defined and established
rights exist. See id.; see also id. at 122, 489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting)
(noting that "no equitable remedy may properly be applied to disturb statutorily defined
and established rights"). The majority noted that "acting in an equitable manner in this
case does not interfere with the legislative scheme for adoption, contrary to the assertions
of the dissent." Id. at 120, 489 S.E.2d at 607; see also id. at 122, 489 S.E.2d at 608
(Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) ("A court's notion of what is good or desirable does not
determine what 'ought to be done' in applying equity."); Douglas Laycock, The Triumph
of Equity, LAWV & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1993, at 53, 54 ("We should invoke equity
just as we invoke law, without explanation or apology and without a preliminary showing
that this is a case for equity."); infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text (discussing
equity in more depth).
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protect and to promote these equitable principles." Thus, the court
determined that it would rely on equitable remedies 5
After establishing that North Carolina would now recognize
equitable adoption, the court undertook the task of explaining the
doctrine.46 Relying on the case law of other jurisdictions, the court
stated that "[e]quitable adoption is a remedy to '"protect the
interest[s] of a person who was supposed to have been adopted as a
child but whose adoptive parents failed to undertake the legal steps
necessary to formally accomplish the adoption." ' "I4 The court noted
that it did not intend for equitable adoption to replace the formal
(and legal) statutory requirements for adoption.48  Rather, courts
should utilize the doctrine only when a foster child is attempting to
establish heirship for intestacy proceedings. 49 The court further
noted that the right of the foster child to inherit arises out of
equitable enforcement of contract principles.5 The court recognized
that the doctrine would work to grant inheritance rights to the child
from the foster parents who had contracted to adopt the child and
who honored that contract in every regard except in failing to follow
formal statutory procedures." Furthermore, the court stated that as
an equitable matter, the child also must honor the contract in all
respects by faithfully performing the duties of a natural child before
the child may benefit from the doctrine.5
44. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 118,489 S.E.2d at 606.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. Id. (quoting Gardner v. Hancock, 924 S.W.2d 857, 859 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)
(quoting 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 53 (1994))).
48. See id. at 118-19, 489 S.E.2d at 606.
49. See id. at 119-20, 489 S.E.2d at 607. The court specifically stated that the
"doctrine acts only to recognize the inheritance rights of a child." Id. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at
607.
50. See id. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at 607; see also Christi Gill Baunach, Note, The Role of
Equitable Adoption in a Mistaken Baby Switch, 31 U. LOUIsVILLE J. FAM. L. 501, 503
(1992-1993) (noting that "[t]he doctrine applies when a legally competent person enters
into a binding legal contract to adopt a child, but the performance falls short of statutory
adoption"); Robert S. Gardner, Comment, Equitable Adoption in Missouri, 20 Mo. L.
REV. 199, 200 (1955) (stating that the enforcement of equitable adoption requires
sufficient evidence that the contract to adopt the child existed and that enforcing the
contract would serve equity and justice).
51. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 119,489 S.E.2d at 606.
52. See id. It is unclear what courts mean by stating that the child must also honor
the contract. One court stated:
"The plaintiff [adoptee] carried out her part of the agreement made in her
behalf by living with the [adoptive parents] as their child ... and performing
such services as a natural child would have performed under the circumstances.
She continued to treat them as her father and mother until their respective
1998] 2451
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Finally, the court's decision provided guidelines to enable
subsequent courts to use the doctrine.53 Specifically, it presented six
elements necessary to establish the existence of equitable adoption
and stated that each element must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence.5 4 Applying the elements to Barbara Newton's claim, the
court held that the record demonstrated that each element could be
satisfied by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence.5 5 In conclusion,
the court again stressed the role that equity played by referring to the
fairness and justice of the decision. 6
This attempt by the majority to "do good" and to be fair inspired
Chief Justice Mitchell to dissent.57 The Chief Justice criticized the
majority for misapplying the maxims of equity.5 8 According to the
dissent, the majority disregarded the maxims of equity and used
equity to "'trump[]' another applicable extensive legislative
scheme. '59 The Chief Justice disapproved of the majority's disregard
for existing statutes that address intestate succession for adoptees6 0
deaths."
Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1061 (Mo. 1931) (quoting Fisher v. Davidson, 195 S.W.
1024, 1026 (Mo. 1917)); see also Laney v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201,203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (exploring what satisfies the "performance" that is required of the alleged
adoptee).
53. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 119,489 S.E.2d at 606-07.
54. See id. at 119-20, 489 S.E.2d at 606-07. The six elements identified by the court
are:
(1) an express or implied agreement to adopt the child,
(2) reliance on that agreement,
(3) performance by the natural parents of the child in giving up custody,
(4) performance by the child in living in the home of the foster parents and
acting as their child,
(5) partial performance by the foster parents in taking the child into their home
and treating the child as their own, and
(6) the intestacy of the foster parents.
Id. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at 606-07.
55. See id. at 120, 489 S.E.2d at 607.
56. See id. at 121,489 S.E.2d at 607.
57. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting). Justice Parker joined in Chief Justice
Mitchell's dissenting opinion. See id. at 126, 489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
58. See id. at 122-23, 489 S.E.2d at 608-09 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting). The dissent
described these maxims as rules or principles created for equity courts to help guide them
in the governing and regulating of matters using equity power. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d
at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and
Principled Discretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 U. DET. MERCY L, REV. 609, 616-17
(1997) ("The maxims of equity are short statements or rules of thumb that guide courts of
equity in the exercise of their sound judicial discretion.").
59. Lankford, 347 N.C. at 123, 489 S.E.2d at 609 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also
infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text (discussing the maxims of equity).
60. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122, 489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
Under the North Carolina General Statutes, "[a] child, adopted in accordance with
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He was sympathetic to Barbara Lankford's circumstances but felt
Chapter 48 of the General Statutes or in accordance with the applicable law of any other
jurisdiction ... [is] entitled by succession to any property by, through and from his
adoptive parents." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17(a) (1984). The dissent argued that because
the legislation is very specific, the procedures of Chapter 48 must be satisfied before a
child is legally adopted and legally allowed to inherit through intestate succession. See
Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122-23, 489 S.E.2d at 608-09 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-100 to -10-105 (1995 & Supp. 1997) (setting forth the statutory
requirements and procedures for formal adoption).
Section 48-2-304 of the North Carolina General Statutes controls one of the most
important procedural aspects of adoption. It states in pertinent part:
(a) The original petition for adoption must be signed and verified by each
petitioner, and the original and two exact or conformed copies shall be filed with
the clerk of court. The petition shall state:
(1) Each petitioner's full name, current address,... and whether each
petitioner has resided or been domiciled in this State for the six months
preceding the filing of the petition;
(2) The marital status and gender of each petitioner;
(3) The sex and, if known, the date and state or country of birth of the
adoptee;
(4) The full name by which the adoptee is to be known...;
(5) That the petitioner desires and agrees to adopt and treat the adoptee as
the petitioner's lawful child; and
(6) A description and estimate of the value of any property of the adoptee.
(b) Any petition to adopt a minor shall also state:
(1) The length of time the adoptee has been in the physical custody of the
petitioner;
(2) If the adoptee is not in the physical custody of the petitioner, the reason
why the petitioner does not have physical custody and the date and
manner in which the petitioner intends to acquire custody;
(3) That the petitioner has the resources ... to provide for the care and
support of the adoptee;
(6) That all necessary consents, relinquishments, or terminations of parental
rights have been obtained ....
Id. § 48-2-304 (1995). Sections 48-2-305 to -603 of the North Carolina General Statutes
also detail further requirements for adoption procedures, such as requirements that
petitioners give notice of pendency of adoption proceedings, that petitioners present a
report to the court concerning petitioners' family life, mental health, income, and
financial obligations, that petitioners file this report with the court, that petitioners
participate in a hearing on the petition to adopt to determine if the adoption is in the best
interest of the child, and that petitioners pay all fees necessary during the adoption
process. See id. §§ 48-2-305 to -603 (1995 & Supp. 1997).
Several times in Lankford, the dissent reinforced that Chapter 48 of the North
Carolina General Statutes must be strictly adhered to before adoption has occurred and
sharply criticized the majority for not reading this language in the clear and unambiguous
manner in which it was written. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122, 489 S.E.2d at 608
(Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also Kennedy, supra note 58, at 617 (explaining the maxim
of "equity follows the law" and stating that in light of that principle, it is "obviously true"
that a court in equity cannot disregard the substantive rules of law); infra notes 163-209
and accompanying text (examining the use of equity in more depth).
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
that the North Carolina General Statutes should bind the court.1
The dissent argued that an equity court, like a court of law, does not
have the right to act according to its own idea of what is right; rather,
established rules and precedents must guide a court of equity, and
when legal rules define and establish rights, a court of equity cannot
change these rights.62 The Chief Justice explained that" '[a] court of
equity is thus bound by any explicit statute or directly applicable rule
of law, regardless of its view[] of the equities.' "63 The dissent
suggested that the proper method for introducing equitable adoption
is through the legislature and the procedures developed under the
state adoption statutes.r4 Additionally, the dissent posited that many
complex questions could arise under equitable adoption and that the
legislature could address these issues in clear laws.65
The Chief Justice also criticized the majority for misapplying the
maxim "equity regards as done that which ought to be done."6 The
dissent argued that the proper application of this maxim required an
equal concern for the innocent third parties to the transaction as well
as the plaintiff.67 In this case, Chief Justice Mitchell defined the
innocent third parties as the defendants, the prospective heirs under
the laws of intestate succession, and stated that they were being
injured unnecessarily by the majority's application of equity.6" He
also argued that according to the court's precedent, "equity regards
as done that which ought to be done ought not to be and 'will not be
61. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122, 125, 489 S.E.2d at 608, 610 (Mitchell, C.J.,
dissenting); see also supra note 60 (quoting the pertinent language of N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 29-17 (1984)).
62. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122,489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 109, at 595
(1996)).
64. See id. at 124, 489 S.E.2d at 609 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
65. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting). For example, the Chief Justice was concerned
about whether the equitably adopted child would inherit from the natural parents or from
a natural sibling who had not been equitably adopted, and whether the court should
recognize for inheritance purposes the relationship between the equitably adopted child's
issue and the equitably adoptive parents. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 125, 489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also Thompson v.
Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 489, 263 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1980) ("It is a fundamental premise of
equitable relief that equity regards as done that which in fairness and good conscience
ought to be done.").
67. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125-26, 489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting);
see also Kennedy, supra note 58, at 618-19 (discussing the maxim "he who seeks equity
must do equity"); infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text (discussing equity in more
depth).
68. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125, 489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see
also infra notes 202-05 and accompanying text (explaining the injury that the defendants
would suffer).
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enforced to the injury of innocent-third parties.' ,69
Finally, the Chief Justice asserted that the plaintiff was also an
innocent party.70 He concluded that because both parties were
innocent, the general principles of equity that concern "what ought to
be done" did not even arise between the parties.7 Therefore, Chief
Justice Mitchell stated that because the application of "what ought to
be done" would injure both parties, equity should not apply in this
case because" 'where equities are equal, "the law must prevail." ' "72
Nearly a decade before the court in Lankford recognized
equitable adoption, courts in some parts of the country welcomed the
doctrine as an equitable alternative to statutory adoption. The
equitable adoption doctrine first appeared in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries in Missouri73 and Wyoming74 when these
two pioneer states held that an agreement to adopt that did not fulfill
the statutory provision of adoption could be enforced under the
principles of equity.75
The origins of equitable adoption coincide with the origins of
adoption legislation generally.76  In the mid-nineteenth century,
widespread social welfare reform brought about adoption
legislation.77 Because the common law never recognized adoption,
69. Id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Hood ex rel. North
Carolina Bank & Trust Co. v. North Carolina Bank & Trust Co., 209 N.C. 367, 381, 184
S.E. 51,59 (1936)).
70. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 125-26,489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 126,489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting 27A AM. JUR. 2D
Equity § 139, at 616 (1996) (quoting Sargent v. Coolidge, 433 A.2d 738, 743 (Me. 1981)));
see also Kennedy, supra note 58, at 620 (explaining, as an example of the maxim "equality
is equity," that when two persons are similarly situated, those two persons should be
treated equally and that none should receive preferential treatment from a court sitting in
equity); infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text (discussing equity in more depth).
73. See Lynn v. Hockaday, 61 S.W. 885, 889 (Mo. 1901).
74. See Nugent v. Powell, 33 P. 23,31 (Wyo. 1893).
75. See Lynn, 61 S.W. at 888-89 (noting that the Statute of Frauds cannot invalidate
an agreement to adopt when the agreement has otherwise been fully performed); Nugent,
33 P. at 25 (noting that the policy behind adoption compels the court to recognize a child
as adopted as long as the court finds "that there was a substantial compliance with the
[adoption] statute").
76. Compare Timothy Hughes, Comment, Intestate Succession and Stepparent
Adoptions: Should Inheritance Rights of an Adopted Child Be Determined by Blood or by
Law?, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 321, 324-28 (tracing the history of adoption), with Edward W.
Bailey, Adoption "By Estoppel," 36 TEx. L. REv. 30, 30-43 (1957-58) (discussing the
history of equitable adoption in Texas), and Christopher J. Petri, Note, What's in a Name?
Not Much for Equitable Adoption in Missouri, 63 MO. L. REV. 195, 198-218 (1998)
(tracing the history of equitable adoption in Missouri).
77. See Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should
Get What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 714-15 (1984). Care for children and other
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courts around the country strictly construed the early statutes that
created adoption.7' One commentator has noted that the policy
behind strict enforcement was to ensure that a child would not be
placed in the hands of an incompetent adult.79 The adoption statutes
mandated judicial approval of those persons wishing to adopt, which
served as a screening mechanism that greatly decreased the
probability that minors would be raised by unfit adoptive parents."
Despite these concerns, courts in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries determined that strict enforcement of adoption
statutes often resulted in grave injustice to the purportedly adopted
child.8 During this time, if courts found any deviation from the
adoption statutes, the controlling statutes forced the courts to declare
the adoption invalid and thus deny any inheritance rights to the
allegedly adopted child." Courts became discouraged with the
dependent people was relegated to almshouses (or orphanages) until the middle of the
nineteenth century. See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American
Law of Adoption, 11 J. FAM. L. 443, 472 (1971). The ineffectiveness of this public child
care system spawned private efforts to care for neglected children. See id. at 473. The
private institutions focused on placing children in acceptable family environments and
succeeded in responding to the changing social and economic conditions of America in
the nineteenth century. See id. at 474. There were three central reasons for the shift to
placing children in families: (1) the emergence of the public school system eliminated the
responsibility of the almshouses to provide the children an education; (2) the
industrialization of America created wage-earning opportunities in factories and made
the apprenticeship obsolete, thus resulting in less children in the workplace and more
children in need of family care; and (3) the influx to America of immigrants made the
number of dependent children unmanageable for the public institutions who sought relief
by placing the children in homes at an early age. See id. at 474-79; see also John Francis
Brosnan, The Law of Adoption, 22 COLUM. L. REV. 332 (1922) (tracing the origins of
adoption); Leo Albert Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743, 743-49 (1956) (providing additional information regarding the history of
adoption).
78. See George C. Sims, Comment, Adoption by Estoppel: History and Effect, 15
BAYLOR L. REv. 162, 164 (1963) (describing the treatment of adoption by the Texas
courts); see also Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 664, 281 S.E.2d 1, 5 (1981)
(construing strictly the North Carolina statutory provisions for formal adoption to provide
that severance from the adoptee's natural family should be construed as complete
severance).
79. See Harvey A. Schneider, Comment, Equitable Adoption: A Necessary Doctrine?,
35 S. CAL. L. REV. 491,497 (1962).
80. See id.
81. See, e.g., Taylor v. Coberly, 38 S.W.2d 1055, 1061 (Mo. 1931); Lynn v. Hockaday,
61 S.W. 885, 888-89 (Mo. 1901); Nugent v. Powell, 33 P. 23, 30-31 (Wyo. 1893); Sims,
supra note 78, at 164.
82. An example of a North Carolina case in which the court declared adoptions
invalid because of deviations from the adoption statutes is In re Shelton, 203 N.C. 75, 164
S.E. 332 (1932). In Shelton, the mother of a young child went to live with a family in
order to earn money and have child care for her newborn. See id. 203 N.C. at 76,164 S.E.
at 332. After the woman and her child lived there for six months, the mother left to go
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frequency of this result and felt that equity and public policy
demanded a more just solution.83 Furthermore, the unfairness
created by these cases caused courts to look for equitable relief to
offer some protection to adopted children." The solution these
courts developed was to allow children to be deemed adopted even
though the adoptive parents did not comply with all, or in some cases
any, of the statutory requirements.8
Although equitable adoption was more lenient than the
statutory provisions for legal adoption, early courts did set guidelines
for subsequent courts to follow.86 The major provision established by
these early courts was the requirement that a "contract to adopt" be
seek work. See id. Although the mother knew of the family's plans to adopt the little girl
when she left, she did not want to be a party to the adoption proceedings because she did
not want her parents to know that she had an illegitimate baby. See id. at 77-78, 164 S.E.
at 333. The family adopted the baby girl, and they lived as a family for almost three
years. See id. The young mother then sought to have the adoption declared void because
she was not a party to the proceedings. See id. at 76, 164 S.E. at 332. Even though the
court of appeals had determined that it was in the best interest of the child to stay with
the family she had been living with for three years, the supreme court reversed, holding
that the best interest of the child was not controlling but that because the statutes clearly
required the mother to be a part of the proceedings, the adoption was invalid. See id. 203
N.C. at 79-80, 164 S.E. at 334; see also Truelove v. Parker, 191 N.C. 430,436, 132 S.E. 295,
298 (1926) (requiring the parents to be parties to the proceedings).
According to one commentator who has addressed the struggle that early courts
faced with strict statutory provisions, some jurisdictions had no alternative to statutory
adoption, and no private agreements were recognized to bring the allegedly adopted child
into the statutes of descent and distribution. See Note, Equitable Adoption: They Took
Him into Their Home and Called Him Fred, 58 VA. L. REv. 727, 727-28 (1972)
[hereinafter "Equitable Adoption"]. The commentator further states, "[o]ne may ask why
any court would consider a claim of equitable adoption in the face of an unambiguous
statutory scheme. The answer lies in the extraordinarily persuasive factual situations
which may arise." Id. at 728; see also John S. Strahorn, Jr., Adoption in Maryland, 7 MD.
L. REV. 275,278 (1943) (providing examples of the Maryland judiciary's strict compliance
with the statutory requirements for adoption).
83. See Sims, supra note 78, at 164 ("The inequity resulting from the many cases
coming before the [Texas] court prompted that tribunal to search for some equitable
grounds, upon which a decision could be based, to afford some degree of protection to the
adopted child."); see also Moore v. Bryant, 31 S.W. 223, 225 (Tex. Civ. App. 1895, no
writ) (holding that even though no records were recovered that showed a contract to
adopt, the manner in which the foster parents treated the adoptee "were proper
circumstances for the consideration of the jury in determining the entire issue of
adoption").
84. See Sims, supra note 78, at 164.
85. See Butler v. Ross, 4 S.E.2d 21,25 (Ga. 1939); Taylor, 38 S.W.2d at 1062; Jones v.
Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. 1940); Nugent, 33 P. at 30-31; see also Rein, supra note 77,
at 767 (noting that early courts developed the doctrine of equitable adoption to "correct
the injustice" that resulted from strictly applying adoption statutes).
86. See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text (explaining the guidelines
established by early equitable adoption cases).
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in existence. 7 The policy behind requiring strict proof of intent to
adopt, as evidenced by an established contract, was to remind the
couples who took a child into their home that such beneficence would
not automatically grant the child adopted status, unless the evidence
was clear and convincing that adoption was intended."8 Judges sitting
in equity felt the contract to adopt was vital because it clarified the
intention of the adoptive parents to make the allegedly adopted child
an heir.89 Furthermore, these judges felt that the existence of a
contract made it more plausible that the parents intimated to the
child the legitimacy of the adoption, thereby providing a stronger
basis to estop others from denying the child's right to take.90
87. See, e.g., Keller v. Lewis County, 134 S.W.2d 48, 51 (Mo. 1939). In Keller, the
Missouri Supreme Court nullified an earlier decision handed down in Holloway v. Jones,
246 S.W. 587 (Mo. 1922), that had affirmed a decision granting an adoptee equitable
adoption without finding a contract for adoption. See Keller, 134 S.W.2d at 51; Holloway,
246 S.W. at 593; see also Equitable Adoption, supra note 82, at 733 (discussing Keller and
Holloway). The facts of Keller are as heartwrenching as most cases of this sort. The
plaintiff was a young woman, Anna Elizabeth Draper (Keller), who had been taken from
an orphans' home in 1872 at the age of seven. See Keller, 134 S.W.2d at 49. Anna
remained at the home of her foster parents for 16 years. See id. She married in 1888, but
returned to the home of her foster parents with her three children after the marriage
failed in 1896. See id. In 1898, Anna remarried her husband and moved out of her foster
parents' home. See id. While relations between Anna and her foster parents were tense
for a while, the record showed a friendly lunch meeting in 1912 with Anna's son at which
the foster father reminisced about getting Anna out of the orphanage. See id. at 50.
After the death of her foster father, Anna sought to be declared an heir. See id. at 48.
The court held that because there was not an express agreement to adopt Anna nor
conduct sufficient to establish her adoption, she could not be recognized as an heir under
the doctrine of equitable adoption. See id. The court stated that "the rule is definite and
strict as to the requirements respecting the character and quantum of proof necessary to
establish an oral contract to adopt .... This rule ... is that such evidence must be clear,
cogent, and convincing and such as to leave no reasonable doubt." Id. at 51.
Texas, another forerunner in the development of equitable adoption, also strictly
required the existence of a contract. See Howell v. Thompson, 190 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1945, no writ). In Howell, the adoptive parents failed to show a contract with
the child, with her natural parent, or with some person representing the child. See id. at
599. Because "[iut is the contract, either oral or written,... which gives rise to the doctrine
of adoption by estoppel," the court refused to recognize the child as equitably adopted.
Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
88. See Benjamin v. Cronan, 93 S.W.2d 975, 981 (Mo. 1936) ("No one, after he or she
has passed on, should be adjudged to have adopted a child unless the evidence is clear,
cogent, and convincing .... ").
89. See House v. House, 222 S.W.2d 337, 338-39 (Tex. 1949). In House, the foster
family had never entered into a contract to adopt, despite holding out the foster child as
their own daughter. See id. at 338. The court held that because a "contract to adopt" did
not exist, the doctrine of equitable adoption could not be enforced to grant the child
inheritance rights. See id. at 339; see also Bailey, supra note 76, at 41-42 (discussing the
importance of the contract in equitable adoption proceedings).
90. See Bailey, supra note 76, at 41-42.
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Early courts also struggled with what evidence would be
required to prove that a contract existed. Courts allowed either oral
or written contracts,91 which made fact-gathering a difficult task.
92
Because the adoptive parents were usually dead when the foster child
was seeking relief, courts required strong evidence to avoid fraud or
deceit when the claimed contract was oral.93 The most common
standard among early courts was one of clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that left no reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge.94 In
these cases, the alleged adoptee carried the burden of proof.95
91. One court has held that the Statute of Frauds does not invalidate an oral contract
to adopt. See Signaigo v. Signaigo, 205 S.W. 23, 29 (Mo. 1918) (en banc). The Statute of
Frauds requires that certain contracts be evidenced by a writing. See 3 SAMUEL
WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 448, at 340-41 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed.
1960). The Statute of Frauds was designed to prevent the enforcement of fraudulent
claims to a contract by requiring a writing to prove the existence of a contract. See id.
The Missouri court in Signaigo held that an equity court could make a decree, based
solely on the proof of the existence of an oral contract, despite the clear violation of the
Statute of Frauds. See Signaigo, 205 S.W. at 29. Courts in Texas have made similar
decrees. See, e.g., Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 910 (Tex. 1940) (holding that the Statute
of Frauds did not preclude the specific performance of an oral contract for adoption). But
see Marietta v. Faulkner, 126 So. 635, 635-36 (Ala. 1930) (recognizing that the Statute of
Frauds should prevent inheritance through the enforcement of an oral contract in
equitable adoption); Wright v. Green, 119 N.E. 379, 380 (Ind. Ct. App. 1918) (stating that
the Statute of Frauds invalidated an oral contract that provided for the sale of land as part
of an equitable adoption).
92- See Bailey, supra note 76, at 39 (noting that absent an express agreement to adopt
the child, the contract can be proven " 'by the acts, conduct, and admissions of the parties
and other relevant facts and circumstances'" (quoting Cavanaugh v. Davis, 235 S.W.2d
972, 974 (Tex. 1951))).
93. See Jess T. Hay & Ronald M. Weiss, Comment, The Doctrine of Equitable
Adoption, 9 SW. L.J. 90, 100 (1955). Hay and Weiss further note that "the courts [were]
very strict in considering the weight to be given circumstantial evidence .... It is well
settled that the mere inter-vivos relationship of the alleged adopting parent and child,
standing alone, is not sufficient to prove the contract." Id. at 101; see also Rein, supra
note 77, at 780 ("Traditionally the courts have viewed these parole contracts with 'grave
suspicion.' "). But see Sims, supra note 78, at 168 ("The courts lay great stress upon the
acts and conduct of both the child and the adoptive parent, which may be indicative of the
relationship enjoyed by a natural parent and child or legally adopted child.").
94. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Benton, 34 F. Supp. 859, 862 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (stating
that the plaintiff needed to show not only that a contract to adopt was made, but also its
terms and conditions); Hogane v. Ottersbach, 269 S.W.2d 9, 11 (Mo. 1954) (noting the
special strictness under which the court will review evidence of a contract to adopt);
Westlake v. Westlake, 201 S.W.2d 964, 969 (Mo. 1947) (stating that an equitable adoption
case required that the evidence be examined with "especial strictness"); Burdick v.
Grimshaw, 168 A. 186, 189 (N.J. Ch. 1933) ("[C]ourts have come to regard ... oral
agreements [to adopt] with grave suspicion, have subjected them to close scrutiny, and
have allowed them to stand only when established by evidence that is clear, cogent, and
convincing.").
95. See Niehaus v. Madden, 155 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. 1941); Lamb v. Feehan, 276
S.W. 71, 79 (Mo. 1925); Sims, supra note 78, at 167; see also Petri, supra note 76, at 203-04
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Furthermore, although the alleged adoptee did not have to prove the
contract by direct evidence, "evidence which merely raise[d] a
surmise or suspicion of adoption [was not] sufficient to support a
verdict. ,
96
After establishing the requirements of a contract to adopt, the
early equitable adoption courts also established contract remedies,
which included specific performance and promissory estoppel.97
Specific performance, or the contract theory, presupposed that the
foster parent had contracted to create a legal adoption and that by
granting relief the court was specifically enforcing the contract.98
Specific performance could only be granted against the foster
parent's estate because the remedy was not enforceable during the
lifetime of the promisors. 99 In order to rely on specific performance,
the child had to show an adoption agreement and valid consideration
for the promise of adoption.10
The second remedy, the estoppel theory, was more informal than
the contract theory and was perceived as a complete break from the
rigors of the elements of specific performance. 101 Estoppel did not
(discussing Niehaus and the burden of proof that the alleged adoptee must carry).
96. Sims, suprd note 78, at 167-68.
97. See Hay & Weiss, supra note 93, at 105-08; see also Gaudio, supra note 6, at 826-
27 (discussing the contract remedies of specific performance and estoppel); Equitable
Adoption, supra note 82, at 730-38 (discussing specific performance and estoppel).
98. See Rein, supra note 77, at 770. In Habecker v. Young, 474 F.2d 1229 (5th Cir.
1973), the court listed elements that would support a finding of equitable adoption under
specific performance: an agreement between the natural and adoptive parents;
performance by the natural parents in relinquishing custodial rights; performance by the
youth by residing with the adoptive parents; part performance by the adoptive parents by
giving the child a home and acting like natural parents; and the intestacy of the adoptive
parents. See id. at 1230. These elements are almost identical to those listed in Lankford,
showing that the North Carolina court was also relying on a theory of specific
performance. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at 606-07; see also In re Estate of
Lamfrom, 368 P.2d 318, 320-21 (Ariz. 1962) (en bane) (detailing the contractual elements
required for relief under specific performance); Williams v. Murray, 236 S.E.2d 624, 625
(Ga. 1977) (same); In re Estates of Williams, 348 P.2d 683, 684 (Utah 1960) (same); supra
note 54 (detailing the elements set out in Lankford).
99. See Equitable Adoption, supra note 82, at 730. The reason specific performance
can only be awarded against the estate of a deceased promisor is equity will not force a
parent to adopt a child during the parent's lifetime. See id. When courts have granted
specific performance against the estate of the foster parent, the courts have not forced an
intimate relationship between a parent and child, but in theory only compelled the estate
to recognize the child as adopted. See Besche v. Murphy, 59 A.2d 499,501-02 (Md. 1948).
100. See Equitable Adoption, supra note 82, at 731.
101. See Sims, supra note 78, at 164. The court in Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365
(Neb. 1898), discussed the essential elements of estoppel as a promise or representation
of fact, an actual and reasonable reliance on that promise, and a resulting detriment
because of reliance. See id. at 367; see also infra notes 153-62 and accompanying text
(discussing the modem applications of the estoppel theory).
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require the existence of a contract, but only a showing that the child
was led to believe that he would inherit from the adoptive parents.102
The courts viewed the child's belief in the adoption as reliance and
determined that the adoptive parents' estate should be estopped from
denying the child the inheritance on which the adoptee had relied 03
While the development of equitable adoption was taking place in
courts around the country, North Carolina avoided addressing the,
issue of equitable adoption on two occasions prior to Lankford. The
first time was in the 1938 case of Chambers v. Byers."° In Chambers,
the supreme court considered the status of Lucy Bowers Knight, a
young woman who claimed that she was entitled to 108 acres of land
from John R. Tucker's estate. 05 Ms. Knight relied on a written
contract between Mr. Tucker and Ms. Knight's father, 06 which stated
that she was Mr. Tucker's adopted daughter, that she would be raised
by him, and that upon his death she would be his only heir.1°" The
court did not specifically address the issue of equitable adoption, 08
but instead held that Ms. Knight sufficiently had proven the contract
which granted her the land and that the contract appeared to be
102. See Hay & Weiss, supra note 93, at 107-08. A Texas court relying on estoppel for
recovery described it as preventing adoptive parents and others from denying the status
of the adopted child when "by performance upon the part of the child, the adoptive parents
have received all the benefits and privileges accruing from such performance, and they ...
induced such performance under the belief of the existence of the status of adopted
child." Jones v. Guy, 143 S.W.2d 906, 908 (Tex. 1940) (emphasis added). But see Hay &
Weiss, supra note 93, at 109 (stating that Texas courts purportedly relied on estoppel, but
required an express contract to adopt or an attempt to comply with statutory provisions).
103. See Rein, supra note 77, at 776.
104. 214 N.C. 373, 199 S.E. 398 (1938).
105. See id. at 374, 199 S.E. at 399.
106. See id. at 375, 199 S.E. at 399-400. In the contract, C.M. Bowers acknowledged
that he was the father of Lucy Bowers, a minor, and gave his full consent to her adoption
by John and Laura Isabelle Tucker, who were to take Lucy "as their own child and sole
and only heir." Id. In return, the Tuckers covenanted and agreed to adopt Lucy as their
own child, to provide for her wants and needs, and "to make said Lucy Bowers ... [their]
sole and only heir to what... [they] may die possessed of." Id. at 375, 199 S.E. at 400.
107. See id. at 374-75, 199 S.E. at 399-400.
108. The facts of Chambers presented a perfect case for the court to address equitable
adoption. All of the necessary elements were present: an existing contract, performance
on the part of the natural parents, the foster parents, and the child to fulfill the contract,
and the intestate death of the foster parents. See id. at 374-77, 199 S.E. at 399-401. These
equitable adoption elements had been established in several jurisdictions by 1938. See,
e.g., Tuttle v. Winchell, 178 N.W. 755, 757 (Neb. 1920); Beach v. Bryan, 133 S.W. 635, 643
(Mo. Ct. App. 1911). Furthermore, the Chambers court used equity jurisprudence, the
same jurisprudence it would have used to decide the case on the basis of equitable
adoption, to grant specific enforcement of the contract. See Chambers, 214 N.C. at 378,
199 S.E.2d at 401. Despite this opportunity, the court failed to address equitable adoption
in Chambers.
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binding on the decedent."a9 The court only addressed the issue of the
adoption in dictum, noting that the agreement did not meet the
statutory requirements for adoption as required under chapter two of
the North Carolina Code."0 Finally, the court dismissed the issue by
comparing the facts of Chambers to the facts of a similar Missouri
case, Sharkey v. McDermott,"' in which the Missouri court held that
the contract to adopt was not enforceable, but that the conveyance of
land designated in the contract was enforceable.' Following the
Missouri court, the court in Chambers also declared that the contract
for adoption was not valid, but the court determined that the
conveyance of land was enforceable because it gave effect to the
promise upon which the parties had agreed. 13
Almost five decades later, the North Carolina Supreme Court
again avoided addressing equitable adoption in Ladd v. Estate of
Kellenberger."4  Unlike the alleged adoptee in Chambers, the
plaintiffs in Ladd affirmatively asked the court to declare them
equitably adopted so that they could take under their foster parent's
will." 5 The plaintiffs were three women, Elizabeth Coffey Ladd,
Margaret Coffey Graddy, and Marion Coffey Hensley,"6 whose
109. See Chambers, 214 N.C. at 378-79, 199 S.E. at 401-02.
110. See id. at 377, 199 S.E. at 401 ("The parties to the agreement in this case did
nothing as required by the Adoption statute."). The major deviations from the statute
were that the Bowers did not have the state investigate their living conditions and they
did not file any of the papers stating the agreement to adopt. See N.C. CODE § 191(3), (9)
(1935); Chambers, 214 N.C. at 376-77, 199 S.E.2d at 401.
111. 4 S.W. 107 (Mo. 1887).
112. See id. at 110. In Sharkey, the plaintiff was a young woman who was given away
at the age of four to a couple. See id. at 107. The couple agreed to raise her and to adopt
her legally, making her their sole heir. See id. The young woman's foster father did name
her as the sole heir in his will, but he had revoked that bequest by codicil and had left
everything to his wife. See id. at 108. After the foster father's death, the young woman
continued to live with her foster mother. See id. The adoptee gave all her earned wages
to the mother, sewed for her, cleaned for her, and "yielded all of the affection and
obedience due from a child to a parent." Id. After her foster mother died intestate, the
adoptee realized she had never been formally adopted and that she was not entitled to
any of her foster parents' property. See id. The court did not recognize her as the
adopted daughter of the deceased because they had not complied with the adoption
statutes. See id. at 110. However, the court held that because the failed adoption was no
fault of the adoptee, she should be entitled to enforce the contract which granted her
property because the "agreement was not merely and solely one to adopt the plaintiff, but
was in part to leave the plaintiff the property at their death." Id. Note, however, that
Missouri actively recognizes the doctrine of equitable adoption and that it was one of the
first states to do so. See Lynn v. Hockaday, 61 S.W. 885, 889 (Mo. 1901).
113. See Chambers, 214 N.C. at 378, 199 S.E. at 402.
114. 314 N.C. 477,334 S.E.2d 751 (1985).
115. See id. at 478,334 S.E.2d at 753.
116. See id. at 479,334 S.E.2d at 753.
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natural father had taken them in 1933 to the home of May Gordon
Latham Kellenberger, a distant relative who was wealthy and
childless." 7 Mr. and Mrs. Kellenberger agreed to take the children
and raise them as their own," 8 and, when the natural father visited
the Kellenbergers some fifteen years later, they repeated their
agreement to adopt his daughters and to continue to support them." 9
During this visit, the Kellenbergers asked the father to cease contact
with the children, and in return, the Kellenbergers agreed to finande
higher education for the young women.
20
In 1978, Mrs. Kellenberger, predeceased by her husband, died
testate.12' Her will provided gifts for many charities, but it contained
only one clause for bequests to family members, stating that forty
percent of her residuary estate should go to her " 'various relatives,
both on my father's and my mother's sides of the family, who would
inherit from me if I died intestate.' " After the distribution of the
proceeds of the estate, the three sisters sought specific performance
of the contract for their adoption."2 The North Carolina Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the case for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted 24 and stated that
equitable adoption was not a recognized doctrine in North Carolina
because it was "contrary to public policy and the prevailing law" of
the state.'2
On appeal, the supreme court was presented with the
opportunity to address the question of equitable adoption, and while
117. See id.
118. See id. at 479, 334 S.E.2d at 753-54. The record indicates that the children did not
stay in the home of the Kellenbergers, but were sent to school at the Barium Springs
Home for Children. See id. at 479, 334 S.E.2d at 754. The Kellenbergers provided the
girls with gifts, clothes, toys, and music lessons throughout childhood, and the couple
made all parental decisions. See id.
119. See id. The record does not indicate how often Mr. Coffey visited the
Kellenbergers, or if he ever visited the girls, but the visit in 1948 was his last visit to the
Kellenberger's home. See id. at 480,334 S.E.2d at 754. However, at the time of the foster
parents' death, Mr. Coffey was still alive. See id.
120. See id. at 479-80,334 S.E.2d at 754.
121. See id. at 480, 334 S.E.2d at 754.
122. Id. (quoting from Mrs. Kellenberger's will).
123. See id. The daughters filed this action against the co-executors and the
distributees who received estate proceeds. See id. The trial court dismissed for lack of
personal jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
See id.
124. See Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 64 N.C. App. 471, 307 S.E.2d 850 (1983),
affd, 314 N.C. 477,334 S.E.2d 751 (1985).
125. Id. at 473-74,307 S.E.2d at 851.
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the court recognized the issue, it did not resolve it.116 Writing for the
court, Justice Exum explicitly stated that it was "unnecessary to
decide whether we shall recognize the equitable adoption doctrine in
this state."'127 The court held that the intent of the testator controlled,
and, relying on the language "'on my father's and my mother's side
of the family,' "the court determined that Mrs. Kellenberger's intent
was to divide her estate among her collateral relatives and not her
lineal relatives." The court thus concluded that this language
necessarily excluded all children. 29
While North Carolina courts declined to recognize equitable
adoption as a means of intestate inheritance, the General Assembly
had included adopted children in the class for intestate succession in
the first adoption statutes. 130 Noting that adoption conferred all the
126. See Ladd, 314 N.C. at 481,334 S.E.2d at 754.
127. Id. at 481, 334 S.E.2d at 755.
128. Id. at 482-83, 334 S.E.2d at 755-56 (quoting from Mrs. Kellenberger's will).
129. See id. It is generally accepted in the United States that testators may exclude
their children from their wills. See generally Russell G. Donaldson, Annotation,
Pretermitted Heir Statutes: What Constitutes Sufficient Testamentary Reference to, or
Evidence of Contemplation of, Heir to Render Statute Inapplicable, 83 A.L.R.4TH 779
(1991) (collecting and analyzing statutes and cases dealing with the exclusion of heirs
from wills). In North Carolina, a testator may exclude a child from his estate. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5 (Supp. 1997). The statute entitles the child to the portion of the
testator's estate that she would have received had the testator died intestate, unless the
testator has either provided for the child in his will in any manner, or in judging from the
language of the will, it is apparent that the testator intentionally omitted the child. See id.
States have passed pretermitted heir statutes to protect children from the testators'
inadvertent exclusion of issue in their wills. See Donaldson, supra, at 790-91. North
Carolina adopted a pretermitted heir statute in 1869. See Act of April 6, 1869, ch. 113,
§ 62, 1868 N.C. Sess. Laws 257, 273 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5.5
(Supp. 1997)). In simple terms, the North Carolina statute states that the child is entitled
to a share of the testator's estate as if the testator had died intestate, unless: (1) the
testator made some provision for the child; or (2) it is apparent from the will that the
testator intentionally meant to leave the child out of the will. See Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. McKee, 260 N.C. 416, 418, 132 S.E.2d 762, 764 (1963). The intent of the
testator to exclude the child must be unmistakable in order for the court to deny the child
the protection of the statutes. See id. The North Carolina Supreme Court has expressed
dismay in having to deny a child his share of an estate, so the burden of proving
"unmistakable" intent is a difficult one. See id. at 418-19, 132 S.E.2d at 764 ("The
members of the Court enter with reluctance a judgment which excludes [a child] from
sharing in her father's estate.").
130. See 1 N.C. REVISAL, ch. 2, § 177 (1905). The original adoption statutes remained
basically unchanged until the Revisal of 1905, which specifically stated that adoption
established a parent-child relationship between a petitioner and a child. See Act of March
3, 1873, ch. 155, § 1, 1872-73 N.C. Pub. Laws 254, 255 (providing the original adoption
statutes) (codified as amended in various sections of N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-100 to -10-
105 (1995 & Supp. 1997)); 1 N.C. REVISAL, ch. 2, § 177. Furthermore, if the petitioner
died intestate, the order for adoption would "enable such child to inherit the real estate
and entitle it to the personal estate of the petitioner in the same manner and to the same
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privileges of a natural child onto the adopted child, the North
Carolina General Assembly determined that the statutes of adoption
and distribution should be read together.13 ' The current statute states
that a child who has been adopted in accordance with Chapter 48 of
the North Carolina General Statutes, or in accordance with the laws
of another jurisdiction, is "entitled by succession to any property by,
through and from his adoptive parents and their heirs the same as if
he were the natural legitimate child of the adoptive parents.' 32 The
statute also states that the adopted child cannot inherit from a
natural parent unless the adopted parent is a step-parent who is
married to a natural parent of the child.' 3 Because equitable
adoption places the adoptee in the same position as a legally adopted
child for intestate purposes, the equitably adopted child in North
extent such child would have been entitled to if such child had been the actual child of the
person adopting it." 1 N.C. REVISAL, ch. 2, § 177, at 42. By recognizing the doctrine of
equitable adoption in North Carolina, Lankford provides the rights of intestate succession
to another group of children. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 607.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-106(b) (1995); 1 N.C. REVISAL, ch. 2, § 177.
132. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17(a) (1984).
133. See id. § 29-17(b), (e); see also Crumpton v. Mitchell, 303 N.C. 657, 664, 281
S.E.2d 1, 5 (1981) (interpreting the statute pertaining to the legal effects of adoption to
provide that the adoptee is completely severed from her natural family for purposes of
intestate taking).
Severing all ties from the adoptee's natural parents for purposes of intestate
succession is termed the "modem" view. See Donald G. Cohen, Adoption Can Have
Unexpected Effects on Inheritance and Overall Estate Plan, 18 EST. PLAN. 8, 8 (1991).
Both the Uniform Adoption Act and the Uniform Probate Code follow the modem
approach. See UNF. ADOPTION AcT § 14, 9 U.L.A. 58-59 & cmt. (1988); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-114(a)-(b) (amended 1993), 8 U.L.A. 91-92 & cmts. (1998). Six
states have enacted the Uniform Adoption Act: Arkansas, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, and Oklahoma. See Cohen, supra, at 8 & n.1.
States that have enacted the Uniform Probate Code include: Alaska, Arizona,
Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota,
and Utah. See Cohen, supra, at 9 & n.2. The most "modern" aspect of these statutes is
that they allow the adopted child to inherit from other members of the adopted parent's
family. See Cohen, supra, at 9. North Carolina did not allow an adopted child to inherit
from the family members of the adoptive parents until 1947, 12 years after it approved
intestate inheritance for a child from the adopted parents. See Act of April 4, 1947, ch.
832, § 1, 1947 N.C. Sess. Laws 1131, 1131 (repealed 1959; current version at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 29-17(a) (1984)).
The other view of intestate succession for adopted children is the "conservative
view," which does not recognize the adoptee's right to inherit from any other members of
the adoptive parent's family. See Cohen, supra, at 9. Furthermore, some states-
Alabama, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, Vermont, and Wyoming-allow the adoptee to
inherit from both the biological and adoptive families. See id. & n.3. A popular trend in
adoption statutes is to sever all ties with the natural parents and the natural parents'
families. See Hughes, supra note 76, at 321. However, some concerns are expressed that
this objective neutralizes strong traditional notions that rely upon blood relations for
intestate succession. See id.
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Carolina will also inherit pursuant to state statutes.'4
By the time the court in Lankford recognized equitable
adoption, the doctrine had been examined and reexamined by other
courts. Although many of the same principles from the late
nineteenth to early twentieth centuries still form the basis of
equitable adoption, those early courts left many questions
unanswered.35 One of the first dilemmas facing courts that sought to
recognize equitable adoption was whether to recognize the doctrine
as based on contract theory or estoppel theory. 136 Courts electing to
rely on the contract theory of specific performance encountered
problems when attempting to incorporate contract principles into an
equitable remedy, 37 especially with the concept of consideration.138
The accepted assumption that developed concerning the
consideration for the foster parents was twofold: "(a) the promisee
parents must turn the child over to the promisor, and (b) the child
must give filial affection, devotion, association and obedience to the
promisor during the latter's lifetime.' 1 39 This rule meant that courts
assumed the contract was between the natural parents and the foster
parents, which relegated the child to the role of third party
134. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 29-15, -17 (1984); Lankford, 347 N.C. at 121,489 S.E.2d
at 607.
135. See Rein, supra note 77, at 768. Some questions left unanswered concerned
inheritance from other members of the adoptive parents' family, child support, wrongful
death actions, and inheritance tax issues. See id. at 768-69. Because of lingering
questions such as these, Professor Rein comments that "[like most doctrines designed to
provide relief in an appealing case, the equitable adoption doctrine has become a
Pandora's Box, emitting... [a] host of perplexing questions." Id. at 768.
136. See id. at 770-80.
137. See id. at 771-72.
138. See Jones v. O'Neal, 20 S.E.2d 585, 586-87 (Ga. 1942); Taylor v. Boles, 13 S.E.2d
352, 352-57 (Ga. 1941). The court in Taylor attempted to clarify the concept of
consideration, stating:
The problem of want of a present, moving consideration between the parties,
ordinarily required in matters of contract [has been disposed of], as indeed in all
other cases of virtual adoption, by reliance upon allegations and proof that there
had been performance by the parties to such an extent that an equitable status
had been acquired by the child. That has been the test on the question of
consideration.... Requirements as to consideration have usually been met by
facts showing surrender of the child by the natural parent to the adopting parent
and performance on the part of the child by taking the new domestic status thus
created by his surrender and his being taken into a new home, by services
rendered to the adopting parent by the child in the changed status, by the filial
love and affection bestowed on the adopting parent in the new relation.
Taylor, 13 S.E.2d at 353-54.
139. In re Estate of Lamfrom, 368 P.2d 318, 321 (Ariz. 1962) (en banc); see also Laney
v. Roberts, 409 So. 2d 201, 203 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (discussing performance as
consideration in equitable adoption).
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beneficiary. 140  Treating the child as an integral part of the
consideration and then relegating the child to the role of third party
beneficiary was a very "peculiar feature[]" that was contrary to
established contract principles that recognized the child's services as
performance for which the adoptive parents bargained.' 4
Another issue courts encountered in using the contract theory
was finding a means to enforce specific performance. 42 Because
,courts can only grant relief against the estate of a dead foster parent,
and because true specific performance of the contract would require
the adoptee to be adopted by the promisors, 43 there is never really
an order of specific performance. 44 The problem is obvious: "A
corpse cannot adopt anyone." 4 One commentator has argued that
the real remedy involved is "quasi-specific performance" because
equitable adoption contracts involve a personal matter and equity
avoids granting specific performance for personal contracts. 46
California addressed the issue of quasi-specific performance in
the context of wills' 47 in which the testator and the petitioner
contracted with each other regarding bequests they vow to make in
140. See Hilt v. Hooper, 203 S.W.2d 334, 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947, no writ); see also
Rein, supra note 77, at 772 (discussing the role of the child as a third party beneficiary).
141. Bailey, supra note 76, at 35 n.19.
142. See Rein, supra note 77, at 774; Hay & Weiss, supra note 93, at 105-07; Equitable
Adoption, supra note 82, at 731.
143. See Laney, 409 So. 2d at 202 ("Such an action seeks the specific performance of
an agreement to adopt after the death, intestate, of the last surviving putative foster
parent, when, paradoxically, the agreement can no longer be specifically enforced."). The
New Mexico Supreme Court addressed the problem of specific performance by stating
that granting specific performance of a contract to adopt is impossible if the parties who
made the promise have died. See Wooley v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 45 P.2d 927, 931
(N.M. 1935). Furthermore, the court noted that "[e]quity was driven to the fiction that
there had been an adoption. That fiction being indulged, the case was not one of specific
performance. It remained merely to apply the statutes of descent and to decree the
succession." Id. at 931-32.
144. See Equitable Adoption, supra note 82, at 731.
145. Rein, supra note 77, at 774.
146. See Schneider, supra note 79, at 495-96. Schneider states that courts in equity
from time immemorial have refused specific enforcement of agreements that result in the
parties taking on personal or intimate relations with each other. See id. at 496 n.21; see
also infra notes 163-209 and accompanying text (discussing equity in more depth).
147. See, e.g., Ludwicki v. Guerin, 367 P.2d 415, 417-18 (Cal. 1961) (en banc)
(addressing the statute of limitations for a cause of action for quasi-specific performance
of a contract to make a will); Bank of Cal. Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 106 P.2d 879,
884 (Cal. 1940) (utilizing equity to impose a constructive trust for the enforcement of a
contract to make a will); Notten v. Mensing, 45 P.2d 198, 200 (Cal. 1935) (stating that if
two parties agree to execute reciprocal wills and one party dies before the wills are
revoked, and the surviving party benefits from the decedent's will but then revokes the
bequests that would pass to the decedent's heirs, equity permits the court to hold that the
survivor is estopped from revoking the benefits to the decedent's heirs).
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their wills, a situation very similar to equitable adoption. In the wills
situation, the petitioner performs her part of the contract, but when
the testator's will is probated, the petitioner's bequests do not
materialize.'48 The California Supreme Court stated that because a
person cannot be forced to make a will, a court will not be able to
grant specific performance in the strictest sense of the remedy.1
49
However, recognizing the inequity of the circumstance, the California
court said that "under certain circumstances equity will give relief
equivalent to specific performance by impressing a constructive trust
upon the property which decedent had promised to leave to
plaintiff.' '15  Equitable adoption provides a very similar set of
circumstances for two reasons: (1) the adoption of a child cannot be
compelled; 5' and (2) specific performance is being requested after
the promisor has died. Taking these similarities into account, quasi-
specific performance appears to be the proper contract remedy. 52
Courts choosing the estoppel theory also faced dilemmas. The
principle underlying the estoppel theory is that because the child has
relied to her detriment on the belief that she is adopted, the adoptive
parents and her privies should be estopped from asserting the
invalidity of the relationship.153 The major difficulty with this theory
has been how to prove actual reliance on the part of a child.154 Courts
148. See Ludwicki, 367 P.2d at 417.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. See Merrick v. Merrick, 639 N.Y.S.2d 818,818 (App. Div.) (mem.) (holding that a
party who decided not to go through with the adoption of two minor children could not be
forced to proceed with the adoption), leave to appeal dismissed, 672 N.E.2d 609 (N.Y.
1996).
152 See Schneider, supra note 79, at 495-96.
153. See Cubley v. Barbee, 73 S.W.2d 72,79-80 (Tex. 1934) (noting that foster parents
are precluded from asserting the invalidity of an alleged adoption when the child has
performed and the adoptive parents have received all of the benefits and privileges
accruing from the child's performance).
154. See Rein, supra note 77, at 776. Courts also had a problem determining what the
resulting detriment was to the child. See id. Detriment may be defined generally in an
economic sense, but the equitably adopted child receives a home, an education, and
support-a far cry from an economic detriment. See id. Additionally, in many
circumstances the adoptive parents assure that the child does not grow up in an
orphanage or in a home where the parents do not want or cannot afford the child, and
therefore it is hard to see how any real harm to the child could exist. See Equitable
Adoption, supra note 82, at 732. At one point, a Texas court dispensed with the detriment
element altogether. See Treme v. Thomas, 161 S.W.2d 124,133 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942, writ
ref'd w.o.m.) ("Where an abandoned child has been taken from an orphan's home and
given a good home, raised in love and tenderly nurtured,.., a jury could not find that he
had suffered detriment by reason of the performance of his duties to those who had
[raised him] in their keeping."). However, a later Texas court regarded the lack of
evidence showing a detriment as one factor in dismissing a claim. See Price v. Price, 217
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struggled to determine whether the child must have relied on the
contract per se or on the perceived status of being adopted.155
Recognizing that the children were usually very young when the
agreements were made, many courts have held that reliance on the
actual agreement (or contract) was not plausible. 56 Courts also have
determined, however, that reliance on status was not plausible.'57 If
courts chose strictly to require children to prove reliance on the
belief that they were adopted, children who discovered they were not
adopted yet continued to live in the foster home would be denied
relief.158  One commentator has summarized the absurdity of this
reasoning by stating that "[ilt seems safe to assume that most
children, even if they knew of their lack of status, would remain in
the foster home and continue to act as dutiful children simply
because they would have no other viable option."'5 9
Concerned that a strict requirement for showing reliance would
defeat many worthy claims, modern courts have relaxed the
requirement of reliance. 6 One court explicitly pointed out the
S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949, writ refd n.r.e.) (stating that the alleged adoptee
never presented evidence that he relied to his detriment upon the agreement to adopt).
155. See Sims, supra note 78, at 169. Sims comments that "[iun either case, it would
seem that the reliance element is fictitious." Id. at 169-70.
156. See id. at 169-70 & n.39; see also Rein, supra note 77, at 776 ("Reliance on the
agreement itself is usually impossible because a young child cannot comprehend the
import of a contract.").
157. See Luna v. Estate of Rodriguez, 906 S.W.2d 576, 580-81 (Tex. App. 1995, no
writ). In Luna, the petitioner, Christopher Luna, sought to be declared the heir of his
stepfather. See id. at 577-78. Christopher knew that his stepfather had never formally
adopted him. See id. at 578. Therefore, there was no reliance on a contract or on the
status of being actually adopted. See id. Nevertheless, the court ruled that Christopher
was equitably adopted because "[a] child subject to an equitable adoption acts in reliance
on its belief in its 'status' as a child, not necessarily in reliance on an agreement to adopt
or on representations about adoptive status." Id. at 581. The court also determined that
reliance on the agreement or on the adoptive status was not essential. See id.
158. A claim of estoppel fails if a party cannot prove reliance. See E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACrS § 2.9, at 134 (1990). An example of a case
in which a court did require strict proof of reliance on an agreement to adopt is Garcia v.
Saenz, 242 S.W.2d 230,230-31 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951, no writ). In Garcia, a boy was taken
in by his aunt and uncle when he was five years old. See id. at 230. When he was 10 years
old, he found out that he had not been legally adopted by his foster parents. See id.
Despite this knowledge, the young boy continued to be the dutiful son of the couple, and
upon their death, he sought declaration as an heir to their estate. See id. at 230-31. The
Texas court, which relied only on estoppel for a theory of recovery, denied him relief
because "[t]here was no evidence presented which would show that [he] had performed
his tasks by reason of any reliance upon representations made to him which induced such
performance under the belief that he was an adopted child." Id.
159. Rein, supra note 77, at 776.
160. See id. at 777. Two landmark cases on the issue of reliance are Laney v. Roberts,
409 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982), and Ramsay v. Lane, 507 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ.
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unfairness in requiring a child cared for and nurtured by the foster
family to prove reliance on something as material as a contract or the
right to inherit.' Moreover, another court has eliminated the
requirement of reliance after becoming frustrated with evidentiary
difficulties. 6
Besides concerns with the contract and estoppel theories, courts
also are concerned with the use of equity power more generally. 163
Equity is "the power to do justice in a particular case by exercising
discretion to mitigate the rigidity of strict legal rules."'" Although
equity began as its own separate court system,165 over time the two
systems were merged.166 The limited equitable remedies available to
App. 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Laney, the child admitted that she knew that she was not
adopted, but nevertheless, the court held that "there is absolutely no evidentiary value in
the fact that Irene knew she was not formally adopted." Laney, 409 So. 2d at 203. In
Ramsay, the claimant testified that she discussed the financial constraints that her
adoption would have on her foster parents and agreed with their decision not to adopt her
legally because of the cost. See Ramsay, 507 S.W.2d at 906. Even so, the court in Ramsay
held that there was sufficient evidence of reliance based on the manner in which the
claimant was regarded by the family and the community. See id. at 907. The court stated
that the foster family "represented that Jo Ann was their child by their words and actions.
An inference can be drawn that by such conduct Jo Ann was led to believe that she had
been adopted, and that she continued the family relationship in reliance on the
agreement." Id.; see also Luna, 906 SW.2d at 581 (noting that proof of an agreement to
adopt may be enough to establish the element of reliance); supra note 157 (discussing
Luna).
161. See Mize v. Sims, 516 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974) ("We do not cast a
burden upon a child of tender age to remember events beyond his little
comprehension.").
162. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 62 & n.22 (Alaska 1977) (stating that
because there were too many evidentiary problems with proving reliance, the element is
no longer mandatory in a proceeding for equitable adoption). It could be argued that
Texas has eliminated the requirement for reliance, based on the decision in Luna, but
because the court in Luna determined that the child had relied on his belief in his "status"
as a child, it does not directly follow that the court altogether abandoned the reliance
requirement. See Luna, 906 S.W.2d at 581.
163. See Rich v. Baer, 238 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1951). The court in Baer stated:
Equitable adoption is a principle and rule of equity only.... If the rule is so
relaxed as to become one of law (instead of equity) childless couples will be
more than ever reluctant to take into their homes orphan or other unfortunate
children, as is so often done, purely for the welfare of such children, and not for
the purpose of adoption.
Id.
164. Kennedy, supra note 58, at 609.
165. See id. at 609-10.
166. The federal courts merged law and equity in 1938. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT,
LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS § 62, at 427-28 (5th ed. 1994); see also id. § 67, at 465-66
(discussing the merger of law and equity by the federal courts). New York paved the way
for procedural reform when it merged law and equity in 1848. See id. § 67, at 465.
Delaware is the only state that still has separate courts of law and equity. See Laycock,
supra note 43, at 53.
1998] EQUITABLE ADOPTION 2471
courts include: an injunction, an order reforming a contract, an order
of specific performance of a contract, or a cancellation of a
contract.167 Whatever the remedy chosen, however, judges sitting in
equity adhere to their principled discretion.68
In Lankford, Chief Justice Mitchell argued in dissent that the
majority did not use equity properly to decide the case, and his
criticism of the majority focused on several maxims of equity that he
believed the majority misapplied. 69  The first maxim the Chief
Justice addressed was "equity regards as done that which in fairness
and good conscience ought to be done."'7" The goal of this maxim is
to prevent the unjust enrichment of one party at the expense of
another.171 Courts rely on this maxim to treat actions that "were
promised, intended, or agreed upon between parties as done, if in
good conscience the actions should have been done and there was a
duty to perform the actions.' ' 7  The majority in Lankford regarded
this maxim as the cornerstone of its decision, treating the agreement
to adopt between the Newtons (the adoptive parents) and Mary
Winebarger (the adoptee's natural mother) as done.73
The problem, according to Chief Justice Mitchell, was that the
maxim of "equity follows the law" trumps the maxim that "equity
regards as done that which ought to be done."'74 Equity was not
created to undermine the law,175 and one commentator has noted that
167. See Laycock, supra note 43, at 53,54-64.
168. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 614-15.
169. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 121-26,489 S.E.2d at 607-10 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 122,489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
171. See Kent v. Klein, 91 N.W.2d 11, 13-14 (Mich. 1958) ("[C]hancery will not permit
one to enrich himself at the expense of another by closing his eyes to what is clear to the
rest of mankind. Equity, to paraphrase, regards that as seen which ought to be seen, and,
having so seen, as done that which ought to be done.").
172. Howard W. Brill, The Maxims of Equity, 1993 ARK. L. NoTES 29, 33 (emphasis
added).
173. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 118,489 S.E.2d at 606 (noting that this maxim "form[s]
the essence of the doctrine of equitable adoption, and it is the duty of this Court to
protect and promote [this maxim]").
174. See id. at 122, 489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (asserting that "no
equitable remedy may properly be applied to disturb statutorily defined and established
rights"). Chief Justice Mitchell also stated that equity was created to soften some of the
inflexible rules of the common law but that it was not meant to be a "means of avoiding
legislation that courts deemed unwise or inadequate." Id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 608
(Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
175. See Brill, supra note 172, at 32; see also Miles v. Andress, 493 S.E.2d 233,235 (Ga.
App. 1997) ("[T]he trial court had no jurisdiction to invoke 'equity' in this case, but rather
was being called on to apply the law as written."); In re Estate of Voeller, 534 N.W.2d 24,
26 (N.D. 1995) ("[The petitioner] asks for an equitable remedy to aid approval of the
1988 codicil, since the principal purpose of the statute is to establish the intent of the
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"equity follows the law" is the most important maxim because "it
expresses a significant barrier to the grant of equitable relief: Equity
cannot be used to deprive a person of a legal right.' 7 6 Even though
the facts of cases in which a party seeks equitable relief are often
heartwrenching, courts have had to abide by the maxim that law
controls. 77 Furthermore, commentators have warned of the dangers
of falling into the trap of equitable remedies when clear and
dispositive law exists. 1
78
In interpreting the maxim "equity follows the law," Chief Justice
Mitchell argued that § 29-17(a), combined with Chapter 48 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, should have controlled the decision
in Lankford.179 The Chief Justice bolstered his argument by asserting
that the intent of the legislature in passing the adoption statutes was
to establish " 'clear judicial process for adoptions, [and] to promote
the integrity and finality of adoptions ..... "I Therefore, the Chief
Justice argued, the majority was wrong in putting aside the formalism
of the law and allowing equity to control.'
decedent.... But an equitable remedy cannot avoid the meaning of an unambiguous
statute.").
176. Kennedy, supra note 58, at 622.
177. For example, in Ramirez v. Bureau of State Lottery, 463 N.W.2d 245 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990), the plaintiff sought equitable relief after he lost his winning lottery ticket by
asking the court to invoke equity power and establish the ticket by judicial declaration.
See id. at 249-50. Clear and dispositive lottery statutes stated that payment of prizes
would only be awarded to "holders" of winning tickets. See id. at 248. Additionally,
terms on the back of the lottery tickets stated that the ticket must be presented to collect
the prize. See id. The court expressly stated that it felt discomfort about denying the
long-time lotto player his winnings, commenting that "[w]hile plaintiff's predicament in
the instant case is heartbreaking, we are unable to afford him the [equitable] relief he
requests because the law is clear." Id. at 250. The court concluded by quoting Judge
Robert M. Toms, who stated: "'The court fervently hopes the petitioner in this case will
appeal his decision and that it will be promptly and definitely reversed by the Supreme
Court in which event the court will join a host of others in dancing in the streets.'" Id.
(quoting In re Detroit Edison Co., 87 N.W.2d 126, 130 (Mich. 1957)).
178. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 617.
179. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 122-24,489 S.E.2d at 608-09 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting);
see also supra note 60 (detailing some of the procedural aspects of Chapter 48).
180. Lankford, 347 N.C. at 124,489 S.E.2d at 609 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 48-1-100(a) (1995)).
181. See id. at 125, 489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) ("[I] am persuaded
that the majority improperly 'trumps' clear legislative intent in the name of equity.").
Douglas Laycock, a strict defender of the power of equity, concedes that equity should
not override established constitutions. See Douglas Laycock, Taking Constitutions
Seriously: A Theory of Judicial Review, 59 TEX. L. REV. 343, 352 (1981) (book review).
Laycock also asserts that judges should not have unlimited discretion in deciding what,
and whose, rights they will enforce. See Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial
Review, the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99
YALE L.J. 1711, 1745 (1990) (book review). See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, SOME
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Chief Justice Mitchell provided further support that the majority
was using equity in spite of the law by noting that because common
law did not recognize adoption, it can be accomplished only through
statutory means. 182 He first cited Wilson v. Anderson,' stating that
adoption "'can be accomplished only in accordance with provisions
of statutes enacted by the legislative branch of the State
government.' "11 Next, the Chief Justice noted that in Ladd v. Estate
of Kellenberger,'" the court concluded that "'[a] mere contract to
adopt a child ... is not a contract to devise or bequeath property to
that child.' "I86 According to the dissent, because these two cases
along with the statutory provisions provided ample guidance for the
court to decide the issue in Lankford, granting an equitable remedy
was improperY.
Despite the maxim "equity follows the law," the majority
bypassed statutory authority and controlling precedent, thus
bolstering the already existing exceptions to the maxim that are both
powerful and numerous. 8 A number of courts have recognized that
the maxim exists, yet denied its application due to the weight of
equity in light of the facts and the unjust enrichment of a legal
remedy. 9 Equity grants a court the power to remedy highly unjust
PROBLEMS OF EQurrY (1950) (addressing many dilemmas within equity that have arisen
as courts have used their equity jurisprudence). Chafee focuses on the problems of
strictly applying the maxim "equity follows the law," but he admits that there may be a
generally positive effect of uniformity to be achieved by following statutes if applicable.
See id. at 108-09.
182. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 123,489 S.E.2d at 609 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
183. 232 N.C. 212,59 S.E.2d 836 (1950).
184. Lankford, 347 N.C. at 123, 489 S.E.2d at 609 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
Wilson, 232 N.C. at 215,59 S.E.2d at 839).
185. 314 N.C. 477,334 S.E.2d 751 (1985).
186. Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125,489 S.E.2d at 610 (quoting Ladd, 314 N.C. at 486, 334
S.E.2d at 758).
187. See id. at 123, 125-26,489 S.E.2d at 609-10 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
188. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 607; CHAFEE, supra note 181, at 103-48 (noting many
situations where equity does not follow the law); see also 55 N.Y. JUR. 2D Equity § 95, at
525 (1986) ("While equity follows the law, it does not do so at all times or in a craven
dependence upon the law.").
189. See, e.g., Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 489, 263 S.E.2d 599, 603 (1980)
(recognizing the maxim that equity regards as done that which in fairness ought to be
done). In Thompson, the plaintiffs were four sisters seeking an adjudication that the
defendant, their brother, had received his share of their father's estate when he accepted
an advancement of one tract of land. See id. at 485, 263 S.E.2d at 601. The defendant
claimed that the paper failed for want of a signature and therefore was not an
advancement. See id. at 490, 263 S.E.2d at 603-04. The court held that the substance of
the transaction should control and not the form, thereby disregarding the statutory
authority and allowing equity to grant a remedy. See id. at 489,263 S.E.2d at 603.
Chafee argues that of all equity maxims, equity follows the law "is least entitled to be
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situations, and in some cases, to disregard the law so that justice may
prevail. 90 Illustrating that certain circumstances require the maxim
to be cast aside for a more equitable solution, Justice Cardozo wrote
that "[e]quity follows the law, but not slavishly nor always." 191 The
stark fact is that a judge may often set aside the law for equity when
the judge feels that equity should control."9
The majority in Lankford stated that recognizing the doctrine of
equitable adoption did not disregard the maxim "equity follows the
law" because the new doctrine did not disrupt or impair the statutory
procedures that the legislature has created for adoption.193 The court
proclaimed that its "unique role" was to grant equitable remedies
which protect and advance equitable issues such as the ones involved
in Lankford.94 Furthermore, the majority declared that it did not
disregard existing precedent because the prior North Carolina
Supreme Court cases, Chambers and Ladd, did not foreclose the
possibility of North Carolina adopting the equitable alternative to
statutory adoption. 95 The majority asserted that the decision in Ladd
clearly stated that there was no occasion to address the issue of
transformed from a concise expression of a tendency of judicial thought into a hard and
fast rule. Exceptions to it are so numerous and well known that judges and text writers
state it with great qualifications." CHAFEE, supra note 181, at 103 (footnote omitted).
190. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court permitted equity to trump the law in In re
Marriage of Harvey, 523 N.W.2d 755, 757 (Iowa 1994). In that case the petitioner was
seeking back payment for child support owed by respondent, her ex-husband. See id. at
756. Upon the divorce of the parties, the petitioner retained primary custody of the child
and received monthly child support. See id. at 755-56. Sometime later the child asked if
he could go and live with the respondent. See id. at 756. Petitioner and respondent
agreed that the child support payments would stop while the child lived with his father.
See id. However, the divorce decree was not modified, and the petitioner brought a
garnishment action for the alleged delinquent child support that she did not receive while
the child was living with respondent. See id. Iowa law states: "A modification of a
support order entered ... between parties to the order is void unless the modification is
approved by the court ... and entered as an order of the court." IOVA CODE ANN.
§ 598.21(8) (West 1996). Because there was no court-authorized modification, petitioner
argued that the agreement was void and thus that the support was delinquent. See
Harvey, 523 N.W.2d at 756. The court recognized, however, that the equities of the case
strongly favored respondent and that despite the clear law on the matter, it would not let
the equities be ignored. See id. at 756-57.
191. Graf v. Hope Bldg. Corp., 171 N.E. 884, 887 (N.Y. 1930) (Cardozo, C.J.,
dissenting).
192. See CHAFEE, supra note 181, at 107-08 ("With respect to equitable rights,
then,... ['equity follows the law'] is only a brief and inaccurate description of what
sometimes happens and oftener does not.").
193. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 120,489 S.E.2d at 607; see also supra note 60 (detailing
the statutory adoption procedures).
194. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 120,489 S.E.2d at 607.




equitable adoption, and the Chambers decision was limited to
whether there was an enforceable contract to make a will. 96 Thus, by
distinguishing Chambers and Ladd, the majority weakened one of the
dissent's major arguments.197
Chief Justice Mitchell further criticized the Lankford majority's
interpretation of "equity regards as done that which ought to be
done" by arguing that the majority misapplied this maxim because it
allowed an equitable remedy to injure innocents. 98 The dissent
stated that the object of equity is to do what is just, and harming
innocent parties is not the proper application of equity.9 9 In essence,
the Chief Justice referred to the maxim "he who seeks equity must do
equity," which means that one who seeks equitable relief may receive
that relief only if the remedy is able to return the other party to the
status quo. °0 Practically speaking, the maxim requires that the party
seeking relief must allow the other party "all the equitable rights,
claims, and demands growing out of the subject matter of the
controversy to which the opposing party is entitled."201
The dissent asserted that the majority's decision injured the
defendants, thus violating the maxim "he who seeks equity must do
equity."2 2  The Chief Justice felt that the injury inflicted on the
defendants was the decrease in the share of the estate that the
defendants could receive if Barbara Lankford were declared an
heir.0 3 By declaring Barbara the equitably adopted child of the
196. See Lank'ford, 347 N.C. at 120,489 S.E.2d at 607.
197. See supra notes 57-72 and accompanying text (discussing the dissent's major
arguments).
198. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125,489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
199. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting). The dissent cited several cases in which courts
have refused to apply equity because of the injury to an innocent party that would result.
See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also Riganti v. McElhinney, 56 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199-
200 (Ct. App. 1967) (granting the plaintiffs quasi-specific performance to prevent the
unjust enrichment of the defendants and noting that "equitable relief should not be
granted where it would work a gross injustice upon innocent third parties"); Bedal v.
Johnson, 218 P. 641, 649 (Idaho 1923) (concluding that the contract to make the alleged
adoptee the sole heir could not be enforced in equity because to do so would be "harsh,
offensive, and unjust" to the innocent person to the transaction); Crahane v. Swan, 318
P.2d 942, 945 (Or. 1957) (en bane) ("It is an almost universal rule of equity not to grant
relief by way of reformation to the injury of innocent third persons ... [including those]
who without notice have acquired intervening or vested rights and who cannot be placed
in statu quo.").
200. See Kennedy, supra note 58, at 618 (stating that the maxim was "designed to
prevent the unjust enrichment of the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant").
201. Brill, supra note 172, at 38.
202 See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125,489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 123, 489 S.E.2d at 608 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he application of
the doctrine of equitable adoption denies other rightful heirs their statutory intestate
1998] 2475
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Newtons for intestate purposes, the court may have taken away the
defendants' award completely."°  Therefore, by awarding an
equitable remedy to Barbara Lankford, the court permitted her
unjust enrichment at the cost of harming the innocent defendants,
and thus disregarded the maxim that "he who seeks equity must do
equity."
205
While the dissent viewed the defendants as the innocent
victims,20 6 the majority sided with the plaintiff.207  The majority's
response to the dissent's argument was that the defendants, those
claiming under and through the deceased, should be estopped from
asserting that the equitably adopted child was not legally adopted or
that she did not deserve the same protections as a legally adopted
child.08 Thus, the majority felt that the defendants were the ones
unjustly enriched by the original grant and that it was acting to
ensure that the defendants did not harm the innocent equitably
adopted child.2 9
In spite of the concerns of the Chief Justice, the majority
welcomed equitable adoption to North Carolina.210  The majority
went to great lengths to state that equitable adoption would apply
only to cases of intestate succession in North Carolina,21 but it is
likely that in the wake of Lankford, many new issues will arise in
which parties will seek coverage under the new equitable remedy.
For instance, many questions remain regarding whether an equitably
adopted child should be granted the full status of an adopted child or
shares .... ).
204. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 607; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-17(a) (1984)
(stating that an adopted child shall be entitled to any property from the adoptive parents
the same as if the adopted child were a natural child). Likewise, the equitably adopted
child shall take the same as the adopted child. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 118, 489 S.E.2d
at 606 (stating that equitable adoption "is predicated upon ... 'securing the benefits of
adoption that would otherwise flow from the adoptive parent under the laws of
intestacy'" (quoting 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 53, at 930 (1994))). Therefore, because
the court treated the equitably adopted child as the natural child for intestate purposes,
North Carolina General Statutes § 29-15(1) controlled because Lula Newton was not
survived by a spouse or by any natural or other adopted children. See Lankford, 347 N.C.
at 117-18, 489 S.E.2d at 605-06; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-15 (1984) (stating that
when one child, but no spouse, survives the intestate, the child receives the entire estate).
205. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 125-26,489 S.E.2d at 610 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
206. See id. (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 121, 489 S.E.2d at 607.
208. See id. at 118,489 S.E.2d at 606.
209. See id.
210. See id at 121,489 S.E.2d at 607.
211. See id. at 119, 489 S.E.2d at 606-07.
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be limited to intestate situations 1  Additional issues that have arisen
in other jurisdictions and that may arise also in North Carolina
include: whether the equitably adopted child can inherit from other
members of the foster family;213 whether child support is available;
214
whether the equitably adopted child has standing in wrongful death
actions;211 whether equitably adopted children may reap the benefits
of favorable state inheritance tax statutes;2 6 whether foster parents
can recover worker's compensation death benefits for the death of an
equitably adopted child;217 whether Social Security benefits can be
dispersed to equitably adopted children;2 8 and even whether an
212. See Rein, supra note 77, at 787-806 (discussing the consequences of equitable
adoption and what rights should flow from declaring a child equitably adopted).
213. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, 344 S.E.2d 201, 205 (W. Va. 1985) (allowing
an equitably adopted child to inherit from the other child of the foster parents). But see
In re Estate of Jenkins, 904 P.2d 1316, 1320 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (holding that equitable
adoption claims are limited to those made by an equitably adopted child against the estate
of an adoptive parent and not allowing the alleged adoptee to inherit through the
adoptive parents' estate from a remote ancestor).
214. See, e.g., Geramifar v. Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475, 479 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997)
(compelling a foster father to provide child support to an equitably adopted child). But
see Ellison v. Thompson, 242 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga. 1978) (holding that the theory of virtual
adoption did not make a foster parent responsible for support).
215. See, e.g., Bower v. Landa, 371 P.2d 657, 661 (Nev. 1962) (allowing an equitably
adopted child to maintain an action for the wrongful death of his foster father). But see In
re Estate of Edwards, 435 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (1982) (stating that a foster parent does not
fit within the term "next of kin" as required by the wrongful death statute when the
contract to adopt has not been performed).
216. See, e.g., Estate of Radovich, 308 P.2d 14, 26-27 (Cal. 1957) (en banc) (holding
that an equitably adopted child was not subject to inheritance tax at the rate of a stranger
but was a Class D transferee within inheritance tax law). But see McGarvey v. State, 533
A.2d 690, 695 (Md. 1987) (holding that only formally adopted children and natural
children could benefit from favorable inheritance tax statutes).
217. See, e.g., Tarver v. Evergreen Sod Farms, Inc., 533 So. 2d 765, 767 (Fla. 1988)
(denying a foster parent's claim for worker's compensation after the accidental death of
his equitably adopted son); Consolidated Underwriters v. Ward, 57 S.W.2d 964, 966 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1933, writ ref d) (same). But see Jones v. Loving, 363 P.2d 512, 514-15 (Okla.
1961) (allowing a natural parent to obtain death benefits of an equitably adopted child
under the worker's compensation statutes).
218. See, e.g., Davis v. Celebrezze, 239 F. Supp. 608, 610-11 (S.D. W. Va. 1965)
(holding that the term "legally adopted" within the meaning of a provision in the Social
Security Act included an equitable adoption that complied with state law). But see Craig
v. Finch, 425 F.2d 1005, 1010 (5th Cir. 1970) (stating that equitable adoption was not
within the definition of the Social Security Act because the statute specifically required a
formal "legal" adoption). See generally David A. Johns, Annotation, Construction and
Application of §202(d)(8)(D) and 202(d)(9)(B) of Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
§ 402(d)(8)(D) and 402(d)(9)(B)) Respecting Award of Child Benefits to Child Legally
Adopted by Individual Within 24 Months After Individual Has Become Entitled to
Disability or Old Age Insurance Benefits, 10 A.L.R. FED. 903 (1972) (collecting federal
cases that have construed "legally adopted" and the problems that accompany trying to
decide what constitutes "legal adoption" within the Social Security Act).
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equitably adopted child can qualify for benefits under social welfare
legislation.219
Although many of these issues are likely to arise in North
Carolina, the issue of child support in particular has been widely
litigated in other jurisdictions220 Because North Carolina's child-
support statute specifies that support is available only for formally
adopted or biological children,z21 a problem arises when two parents
divorce after having equitably adopted a child and one parent seeks
support for the child from the other parent. z2 Some courts have
readily granted child support for the equitably adopted child,
focusing on the harm that would result if the support was not
granted.' Recently, the Court of Appeals of Maryland allowed a
219. See, e.g., Blair ex rel. Brown v. Califano, 650 F.2d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1981)
(allowing welfare benefits). But see King v. Schweiker, 647 F.2d 541, 547 (5th Cir. 1981)
(refusing to permit an allegedly equitably adopted child to collect welfare benefits
because Louisiana did not recognize equitable adoption).
220. See infra notes 223-29 and accompanying text (detailing cases involving the issue
of child support).
221. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(b) (1995 & Supp. 1997). The North Carolina
General Statutes state that in a child support action a judge may not require child support
to be paid "by a person who is not the child's parent or an agency, organization or
institution standing in loco parentis." See id. The only exception is if the person or
agency has agreed in writing to support the minor child. See id.
222 See Stuart A. Markus & Michael Metta, Virtual Adoption: Contractual Estoppel
of Parental Rights and Responsibilities, FLA. B.J., May 1997, at 90, 91-93 (1997).
223. See In re Marriage of Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. 38, 41 (Ct. App. 1975) (awarding
support for an equitably adopted child); Clevenger v. Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Ct.
App. 1961). In Clevenger, Mrs. Clevenger became pregnant while her husband was away
in the military service, making it impossible for the son to be the natural child of Mr.
Clevenger. See Clevenger, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 709. Nevertheless, when Mr. Clevenger
returned, he accepted the boy and raised him as his own son. See id. The child was never
legally adopted by Mr. Clevenger, and he never agreed to adopt the boy. See id. at 714.
Eleven years after Mr. Clevenger's return, Mrs. Clevenger filed for divorce and sought
child support from her ex-husband. See id. at 709-10. Mr. Clevenger asserted that he had
no duty to support the child because the boy was not his legal or natural son. See id. at
710 & n.1. The California Court of Appeals stated there is an "innate immorality" when
an adult cares for and loves a child while the family is intact, but then as soon as the
family separates, the same adult declares the child a bastard in an effort to relieve himself
of the obligation to support the child. See id. at 710. The court further noted that
declaring an equitably adopted child a bastard is "a cruel weapon, which works a lasting
injury to the child and ... should garner no profit to the wielder; the putative father
should earn no premium by the assertion of the illegitimacy of the child. If any legal
hypothesis can prevent such an inducement... we should adopt that theory." Id. at 710.
Unfortunately, the evidence in Clevenger did not show an agreement to adopt the child,
so the court refused to order the husband to pay child support. See id. at 717. However,
the court's decision established the right to child support claims for equitably adopted
children in California. See id.; see also Valle, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (relying on Clevenger to
award support for an equitably adopted child).
New York also has recognized the claim for child support in equitable adoption. See
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claim for child support based on the child's best interestY4
Conversely, another court has determined that a claim for child
support has no place in an equitable adoption situation. 22 One court
concluded that the foster parents have no parental rights or parental
obligations to the equitably adopted child after divorce, 6 and
another court stated that equitable adoption does not apply to a
dispute over who is responsible for the support of a minor child.227
Inevitably, the issue of child support, and many others, will appear
before the North Carolina courts seeking clarification under the new
doctrine of equitable adoption.' The question that remains is
whether the Supreme Court of North Carolina will continue to limit
the doctrine to cases of intestate inheritance, or whether it will begin
Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d 815, 818 (App. Div. 1970). In Wener, Mrs. Wener
obtained a young child, and when the Weners later divorced, Ms. Wener sought child
support. See id. at 816-17. The court granted child support and stated that "[h]aving
agreed to adopt the child and support her; and having treated her as his own prior to the
parties' separation, the plaintiff [father] may not now disavow all obligation and shift the
entire burden onto the defendant." Id at 818.
224. See Geramifar v. Geramifar, 688 A.2d 475, 479 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997). The
Geramifars, an Iranian couple living in Maryland, were unable to have children so they
went to the Republic of Iran and brought back a child of Iranian heritage. See id. at 476.
One year after they returned with the infant boy, the couple separated and a vigorous
custody battle ensued. See id. On the eve of the custody hearing, Mr. Geramifar
abandoned his quest for custody. See id. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals granted
child support, disregarding an agreement in which the parties declared the adoptive father
not liable for the child's support. See id. at 479. The court expressed a strong public
policy concern to protect the best interest of the child and stated that the best interest of
the child was "to be supported by those who were permitted to bring him to the United
States," and therefore, "having equitably adopted [the child], appellee [the father] has a
duty to contribute to his support. This duty could neither be bargained away, nor.
abrogated." Id.
225. See In re Marriage of Fenn, 847 P.2d 129, 133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993). In Fenn, the
husband and wife went through all of the preliminary proceedings in an adoption agency
in an effort to adopt a little girl. See id. at 131. Approximately six months after the
couple assumed responsibility but not legal custody of the child, they separated. See id.
After the separation, the parties agreed that the wife would rear the child, and the wife
kept the child because the agency did not want to disrupt the baby's home life. See id.
The wife sought support from the husband, and the husband asserted that he had no legal
obligation to support the baby. See id. On the issue of equitable adoption, the court held
that equitable adoption in Arizona is limited to cases of inheritance, and the court did not
deem it appropriate to extend that doctrine on the facts in Fenn. See id. at 133-35.
226. See In re Marriage of Pierce, 645 P.2d 1353, 1357 (Mont. 1982). In Pierce, the
Montana Supreme Court stated that the stepfather who had equitably adopted a young
boy had no duty to continue to pay support after the stepfather and his wife divorced. See
id. at 1357. The court also stated that the stepfather had no parental rights. See id. at
1356-57.
227. See Ellison v. Thompson, 242 S.E.2d 95, 97 (Ga. 1978).
228. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text (noting some of the other issues
that may arise).
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to grant equitably adopted children some of the rights that North
Carolina courts and legislatures have afforded legally adopted
children. 9
Although equitable adoption seems to be a favorable doctrine to
the thousands of parents seeking children and to children seeking
stable homes, there are some concerns that circumventing statutory
adoption procedures will do more harm than goody 0  Adoption
regulations are in place to ensure that children are placed in a
suitable environment.231 If the public becomes aware that they can
achieve the equivalent of legal adoption without following the time-
consuming and expensive legislative mandates, then the statutes, and
the safeguards the statutes were designed to promote, will falter. 2
Equitable adoption has been praised for being a fair and
understanding alternative to statutory adoption. 3  Before the
decision in Lankford, North Carolina required strict adherence to the
adoption statues in order for children to claim a right of inheritance
in the intestate estate of their foster parents. 4 With the decision in
Lankford, North Carolina has joined a majority of states that seek to
prevent the injustice that would result if laws were always "woodenly
applied." 5 If the North Carolina Supreme Court expands equitable
adoption beyond the parameters of Lankford, it will undoubtedly be
breaking out of the mold it created with this precedential decisionY6
However, if the court does allow children to benefit from equitable
adoption beyond intestate taking, it is very likely that Chief Justice
229. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-1-106, -107 (1995) (detailing the legal effects that
result from an order of adoption).
230. See Rein, supra note 77, at 803-04.
231. See id. at 803.
232- See id. at 803-04. Professor Rein explores the typical procedtires involved in
securing a child through an adoption agency and through independent adoption. See id. at
801-03. She also chronicles some of the dangerous alternatives to going through those
regulated procedures, such as the black market where desperate couples can buy a child.
See id. at 804. Professor Rein concludes: "Why should prospective adoptors endure the
investigations, trial periods, red-tape, reporting requirements, and expenses involved in
formal adoption when they can achieve all the consequences of formal adoption by
informal means?" Id. at 803.
233. See Calista Corp. v. Mann, 564 P.2d 53, 61 (Alaska 1977) ("After examining
extensively the doctrine of equitable adoption, we conclude that it is a sound, equitable
tool which, when utilized properly, allows courts to avoid unjust and often intolerable
results."); see also Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 692 (Vt. 1997) (Morse, J.,
dissenting) (stating that applying equitable adoption would have achieved a more just
result in the case).
234. See Ladd v. Estate of Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477,481,334 S.E.2d 751,754 (1985);
see also supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text (discussing Ladd).
235. Rein, supra, note 77, at 767.
236. See Lankford, 347 N.C. at 119,489 S.E.2d at 606-07.
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Mitchell's vociferous concerns will materialize' 37  But the most
terrifying concern of expanding equitable adoption beyond intestate
taking is one that the Chief Justice did not address-the concern that
equitable adoption may replace statutory adoption and throw out all
of the protections that statutory adoption provides.3 s  One
commentator offers a piece of wisdom for courts to consider when
thinking about expanding equitable adoption beyond intestate taking
by noting that the "sympathies for the equitably adopted child cannot
be indulged without risking erosion of formal adoption procedures
and thus sacrificing the larger good of ensuring suitable placement
for all children to the exigencies of the individual case."239
BETH ANN YOUNT
237. See i&d at 124-26, 489 S.E.2d at 609-10 (Mitchell, C.J., dissenting); see also supra
note 65 and accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Mitchell's concerns).
238. See Rein, supra note 77, at 803-04. Professor Rein explains that in most equitable
adoption cases the placement of the child does not come to the attention of any official
until after the child has reached adulthood and the foster parents have died. See id. at
803. Without official intervention, natural parents could agree to give their child to
anyone willing to take a child because the process would be completely unregulated. See
id. Unfortunately, in today's world, people desire children for less than pure reasons,
making an unregulated process of allowing parents to give their children away replete
with dangerous consequences.
239. Id. at 805.
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North Carolina Farm Bureau v. Bost: Does a Covenant Not to
Enforce Judgment Compromise a Claim for Underinsured
Motorists Benefits?
In 1953, the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the
Motor Vehicle Safety and Financial Responsibility Act1 ("the Act")
to protect innocent victims injured by financially irresponsible
motorists.' While the original Act included uninsured motorist
("UM") coverage to protect persons injured by a tortfeasor who had
no liability insurance,3  the General Assembly later added
underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage to the Act to protect
against tortfeasors with inadequate insurance,4 perhaps because of
the high number of accidents in which serious injuries were left
uncompensated as a result of negligent motorists who lacked
sufficient insurance coverage.
5
1. Act of Apr. 30, 1953, ch. 1300, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1262 (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -279.39 (1993 & Supp. 1997)).
2. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Becks, 123 N.C. App. 489, 492, 473 S.E.2d
427,429 (1996); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baer, 113 N.C. App. 517,522,439 S.E.2d 202,
205 (1994); South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Smith, 67 N.C. App. 632, 636, 313 S.E.2d 856, 860
(1984); see also infra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the remedial purpose of the
Act and citing additional cases).
3. See Act of Apr. 30, 1953, ch. 1300, § 21, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1262, 1271-72
(codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (Supp. 1997)).
4. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 675, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 720, 720-21 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)); see also infra notes 69-80
and accompanying text (discussing statutory provisions).
5. See GEORGE L. SIMPSON, III, NORTH CAROLINA UNINSURED AND
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 3:2, at 74 (1996) (explaining that the "basic
purpose of UIM coverage is to provide the insured with an additional source of
compensation when the liability insurance coverage available to the tortfeasor is
insufficient to compensate the insured fully"); 3 ALAN I. WIDISS, UNINSURED AND
UNDERINSURED MOTORIST INSURANCE § 31.4, at 7 (2d ed. 1995) (noting that UIM
statutes arose in response to "accidents involving insured motorists with liability
coverages that were not sufficient to provide complete compensation for claimants who
were entitled to recover"). See generally 3 WIDISS, supra, §§ 31.1-31.6, at 3-13 (discussing
the origins and development of UIM coverage). Uninsured motorist coverage
"compensates the insured when the tortfeasor has no insurance or when the tortfeasor's
insurance company is bankrupt." John F. Buckley, Note, Underinsured Motorist
Coverage: Legislative Solutions to Settlement Difficulties, 64 N.C. L. REV. 1408, 1409
(1986). In contrast, UIM coverage "only becomes significant when the victim's damages
exceed the tortfeasor's liability coverage," thus making the tortfeasor an underinsured
motorist. Id. at 1408 n.4; see also infra note 29 (discussing UIM insurance). Although
UM and UIM coverage may involve similar issues, this Note focuses primarily on UIM
insurance.
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The General Assembly amended the Act in 1997 to allow an
injured party to execute a covenant not to enforce judgment against
the tortfeasor in exchange for a settlement agreement and to
preserve the injured party's claim for UIM recovery unless the
agreement expressly states otherwise.6  Prior to the 1997
amendments, however, the North Carolina Court of Appeals, in
accordance with previous North Carolina cases involving UIM
claims,7 had held in North Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance
Co. v. Bost' that a settlement agreement and release signed by the
injured motorist did not constitute a general release of all claims and
therefore did not preclude her claim for TIM benefits.9 Although the
court of appeals decided Bost without the assistance of a specific
statutory provision to guide its interpretation on the settlement
issue," the General Assembly's latest amendment to the Act codifies
the court's holding, thereby substantiating the court's decision in Bost
that a covenant not to enforce judgment does not preclude a claim
for UIM recovery."
The litigation concerning UIM coverage has produced differing
results over the years, 2 perhaps due to the complexity that numerous
6. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, § 2, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 52-55
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)). The General Assembly
also added a new section making the same provisions applicable in situations involving
UM coverage. See id. § 3, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 55 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21() (Supp. 1997)).
7. See, e.g., Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 296, 378 S.E.2d 21, 26
(1989) (holding that the insured plaintiff who had entered into a consent judgment with
the tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's liability insurance company could receive the benefits
of UIM coverage); Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163, 168, 423
S.E.2d 317, 320 (1992) (holding that the plaintiffs could proceed with their UIM claim
after dismissing the underlying claim against the primary tortfeasor); North Carolina
Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. 507, 511,369 S.E.2d 386, 389 (1988)
(holding that when insurance policies contained identical "excess" clauses in the UIM
provisions, the clauses were mutually repugnant and unenforceable); infra notes 81-113,
121-53 and accompanying text (discussing cases involving UIM claims).
8. 126 N.C. App. 42, 483 S.E.2d 452, disc. rev. denied, 347 N.C. 138, 492 S.E.2d 25
(1997).
9. See id. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456.
10. The statute was amended in August 1997. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, § 3,
1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52,56 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21()). Bost was
decided in April 1997. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 42,483 S.E.2d at 452.
11. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (providing that "[a] covenant not to
enforce judgment shall not preclude the injured party from pursuing available
underinsured motorist benefits, unless the terms of the covenant expressly provide
otherwise").
12. Compare Spivey v. Lowery, 116 N.C. App. 124, 126, 446 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1994)
(holding that an injured party who executed a general release cannot subsequently assert
claims.arising out of the same accident), and Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. 428,
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amendments have added to the Act.13 On a couple of occasions, after
the court of appeals had interpreted the most recent amendment in
one case, the General Assembly either superseded or codified that
interpretation by making further amendments to the Act.14  Bost
provides an example of a case in which the General Assembly further
amended the Act shortly following, and perhaps in response to, the
court's decision.15 The court in Bost both allowed the claim for UIM
benefits, even though the claimant had settled with the tortfeasor's
insurance company, 6 and permitted interpolicy stacking of UIM
430, 350 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986) (holding that a plaintiff cannot pursue UM benefits after
signing a general release), with Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 26 (holding that a
plaintiff who had entered into a consent judgment releasing the tortfeasors and their
insurance company could pursue UIM benefits), and Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 168,
423 S.E.2d at 320 (holding that a plaintiff can proceed with a UIM claim after dismissing
the underlying claim against the tortfeasor).
13. The General Assembly passed the Act in 1953. See Act of Apr. 30, 1953, ch.
1300, 1953 N.C. Sess. Laws 1262 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 20-279.1 to -
279.39 (1993 & Supp. 1997)). Throughout the past two decades, the General Assembly
frequently has amended the UIM provisions of the Act. See Act of July 18, 1983, ch. 777,
§ 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 958 (clarifying the law concerning UIM coverage) (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)); Act of July 10, 1985, ch.
666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 851, 862 (providing that when more than one policy
applies, the owner receives "the benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured motorist
coverage under all such policies") (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4)); Act of July 12, 1991, ch. 646, § 2, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550, 1556
(prohibiting the intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage) (codified as amended at N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4)); Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, §§ 2, 3, 1997 N.C. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 52, 54-55 (allowing an injured person to execute a covenant not to enforce
judgment as consideration for payment of the applicable limits of liability by a tortfeasor's
liability carrier and still pursue UIM or UM benefits) (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4), (/)).
14. See, e.g., Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458 (noting that the 1991
amendment prohibited stacking of UIM claims within a policy and thus overturned Harris
v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 195, 420 S.E.2d 124, 130 (1992), superseded by
statute as stated in Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458, which had permitted
intrapolicy stacking of UIM claims); Mitchell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 335 N.C. 433,
435, 439 S.E.2d 110, 111 (1994) (permitting both intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking of
UIM coverage for a case involving an automobile accident that occurred prior to the 1991
amendment to the Act that prevents intrapolicy stacking); Onley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins.
Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 689, 456 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1995) (same). Following the court's
decision in Bost in April 1997, the General Assembly added another section to the Act in
August 1997 that essentially codified the court's holding in Bost that a covenant not to
enforce judgment does not preclude a UIM claim. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, § 2,
1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 54-55 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4));
Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47,483 S.E.2d at 456.
15. See supra note 10 (noting that the court decided Bost in April 1997 and that the
legislature amended the Act in August 1997).
16. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also infra notes 37-44 and
accompanying text (discussing the issue of settlement in Bost).
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coverage, 7 results seemingly consistent with the cases leading up to
Bost that had interpreted the UIM statutory provisions.'8
After summarizing the facts of Bost and the court's opinion,
this Note explores the relevant cases leading up to the court's
decision,20 including a review of cases that interpreted the effect of
settlement2' and cases that addressed the issue of interpolicy stacking
of UIM coverage.2 The Note also points out the inconsistencies
among these cases and the effect of the amendments to the Financial
Responsibility Act on the issue of a settlement agreement with a
tortfeasor in UIM claims.2' The Note then compares Bost to its
precedent24 and concludes that the court appropriately interpreted
the then-current version of the Act and correctly decided the case.l
On June 24, 1994, Carrie Bost sustained personal injuries when a
car negligently driven by William Earl Ezzelle struck the car owned
and operated by her son, Larry Bost, in which she was a passenger.26
Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") had insured Ezzelle's
vehicle under a liability policy with a limit of $100,000, while North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company ("Farm Bureau")
had insured Mr. Bost's vehicle and provided UIM coverage in the
amount of $100,000 per person, with a $300,000 limit for each
accident.27 Because Ms. Bost was a family member and a resident in
both her son's and her daughter's households at the time of the
accident,' she sought UIM recovery under her son's policy with
Farm Bureau as well as under her daughter's policy with Allstate,
17. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458. "Stacking" is a method of
combining coverages to obtain more compensation. See infra note 54 (describing
stacking); infra notes 55-61 and accompanying text (discussing the issue of interpolicy
stacking in Bost).
18. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21; infra notes 81-153 and accompanying text
(examining cases interpreting North Carolina's UIM statute).
19. See infra notes 26-68 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 69-153 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 114-53 and accompanying text.
22- See infra notes 69-113 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 114-53 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 154-83 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 184-96 and accompanying text.
26. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 44,483 S.E.2d at 454.
27. See id. The parties stipulated that Ms. Bost's damages were equal to or in excess
of $200,000. See id.
28. Family members of a named insured may qualify for coverage if the family
member is a resident of the same household as the named insured. See N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1997) (describing "persons insured"); 3 WIDISS, supra note 5,
§ 33.2, at 63 (noting that coverage may extend to family members); id. § 33.4, at 71
(same); see also infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text (explaining the importance of
"persons insured").
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which also provided UIM coverage in the amount of $100,000 per
person, with a $300,000 limit per accident.29 After having notified
both Farm Bureau and Allstate of an offer received for the limits of
Ezzelle's liability policy with Allstate, Ms. Bost subsequently
accepted payment and executed a limited release and settlement
agreement with Ezzelle.3 0 The document she signed released Ezzelle
from further personal liability, and it specifically preserved her right
to pursue compensation under the UIM provisions of her children's
insurance policies.31
Farm Bureau subsequently filed an action for declaratory
judgment in order to determine its obligations to Ms. Bost under the
UIM policy it had issued in the name of her son.32 The trial court
granted Bost's motion for summary judgment and denied Farm
Bureau's summary judgment motion, concluding that the document
signed by Bost did not bar her claim for UIM recovery against either
Allstate or Farm Bureau.33 According to the trial court, the vehicle
operated by Ezzelle was underinsured because the total coverage
available to Bost under the UIM provisions of her children's policies
($200,000) exceeded the limit of Ezzelle's liability coverage
($100,000). 3' Furthermore, the trial court found that the amount of
UIM coverage available from each insurance company was $100,000,
for a total of $200,000, and that each company was entitled to receive
credit for a pro-rata share of the $100,000 paid by Allstate under
Ezzelle's liability policy.35  Therefore, after subtracting the
29. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 44, 483 S.E.2d at 454. Under the Act, UIM coverage
protects a person injured by a tortfeasor whose liability insurance fails to afford adequate
compensation for the injured person's damages by compensating an injured person for the
difference between the injured person's UIM coverage and the total amount of the
tortfeasor's liability coverage awarded to the injured person. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4); see also 12A MARK S. RHODES, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
§ 45:649, at 202 (2d ed. rev. vol. 1981) (noting that UIM coverage protects an insured
motorist injured by an underinsured motorist).
30. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 44, 483 S.E.2d at 454. Ms. Bost was required by
statute to notify in writing the UIM carriers of the settlement agreement and limited
release and of her intent to pursue UIM benefits. See id. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (detailing the notice requirements).
31. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 44,483 S.E.2d at 454.
32. See id. at 43-44, 483 S.E.2d at 454.
33. See id. at 44,483 S.E.2d at 454.
34. See id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (describing how to determine
if an automobile is an "underinsured highway vehicle"); infra note 55 (discussing the
meaning of an "underinsured highway vehicle"). The trial court thus "stacked," or
combined, the policies of Bost's children. See infra notes 54-60 and accompanying text
(discussing stacking).
35. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 45, 483 S.E.2d at 454-55. Because Ms. Bost received
$100,000 from Ezzelle's liability carrier and because all of the UIM coverage available to
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appropriate credits of $50,000 for each company, each company had
coverage remaining in the amount of $50,000, which was available on
a pro-rata basis to satisfy Bost's claim.36
On appeal, the North Carolina Court of Appeals first addressed
whether the settlement agreement and limited release signed by Bost
precluded any recovery by her under the UIM provisions of her son's
policy with Farm Bureau.37 Farm Bureau asserted that because UIM
coverage derives from the liability of the tortfeasor,5 Bost's
settlement with Ezzelle and his insurance company prevented her
claim for UIM recovery.39 The court disagreed, determining that the
language in the agreement expressly reserved Bost's right to pursue
recovery both against Farm Bureau and Allstate.0 The document
signed by Bost4' stated that she relieved Ezzelle from any further
liability arising out of the accident and that she would enforce all
other judgments against Allstate or Farm Bureau as the UIM carriers
for her children.4  Furthermore, the agreement expressly certified
that she was not releasing or discharging Allstate or Farm Bureau
from any duty arising out of UIM coverage applicable to claims
arising out of the accident on June 24, 1994, and it also stated that
Bost "specifically preserve[d] her underinsured motorist claims
against Allstate Insurance Company and North Carolina Farm
Bureau Insurance Company."'43 Therefore, the court concluded that
because the document signed by Bost constituted a "covenant not to
enforce judgment and not a general release," it did not preclude as a
her was $200,000, the remaining amount owed to her as a result of the UIM coverage was
$100,000. See id.
36. See id. at 45, 483 S.E.2d at 455; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4)
(providing that in a UIM claim, "payment upon the judgment.., shall be applied pro-rata
to the claimant's claim beyond payment by the insurer of the owner ... of the
underinsured highway vehicle and the claim of the underinsured motorist insurer"
(emphasis added)).
37. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 45,483 S.E.2d at 455.
38. See id.; infra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining the derivative nature of
UIM claims).
39. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 45, 483 S.E.2d at 455. In its argument concerning the
effect of the document, Farm Bureau relied on Spivey v. Lowery, 116 N.C. App. 124, 446
S.E.2d 835 (1994), in which the court held that a general release precludes any further
claims arising out of the accident, including a claim for UIM benefits. See Bost, 126 N.C.
App. at 46, 483 S.E.2d at 455; Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837; see also
infra notes 144-53 and accompanying text (discussing Spivey).
40. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455.
41. The document was entitled "Settlement Agreement and Limited Release." See
id. at 46, 483 S.E.2d at 455.
42. See id. at 45-46, 483 S.E.2d at 455.
43. Id. at 46, 483 S.E.2d at 455.
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matter of law her UIM claim against Farm Bureau.44 The court next
considered Farm Bureau's argument that Bost's acceptance and
endorsement of the check from Allstate as Ezzelle's liability carrier
established a final settlement of all claims she may have had as a
result of the automobile accident, including her UIM claim against
Farm Bureau.45 While the court agreed with Farm Bureau that Bost's
conduct established an accord and satisfaction,46 it held that the
accord and satisfaction did not terminate her claim against Farm
Bureau for UIM recovery.47
The court pointed out an ambiguity shared by the UIM
provisions of the Act and the insurance policy, both of which seemed
to demand that the insured preserve her claim against the tortfeasor
but resolve the claim prior to pursuing UIM coverage." The court
noted that while UIM coverage derives from a tortfeasor's liability,
49
the internally conflicting provisions in the statute and the policy
should be resolved in favor of Bost.1 Moreover, Bost properly
notified Farm Bureau according to the provisions of its policy
concerning the settlement agreement and her intent to seek UIM
44. Id. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456. A general release usually extinguishes all claims
between the parties to the release. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837.
In contrast, a "covenant not to enforce judgment" is a more limited agreement in which
the claimant agrees that if he receives a judgment against the tortfeasor for an amount
that exceeds the limits of the tortfeasor's liability insurance, the claimant will not try to
enforce the judgment against the tortfeasor's personal assets. See SIMPSON, supra note 5,
§ 4:3, at 171; see also infra text accompanying note 113 (quoting Simpson's definition of a
covenant not to enforce judgment).
45. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47,483 S.E.2d at 456.
46. See id. According to the court, an "accord" is an agreement in which one party
agrees to give or to perform and the other party agrees to accept " 'in satisfaction of a
claim ... something other than or different from what he is, or considered himself[,]
entitled to; and a "satisfaction" is the execution or performance of such agreement.' " Id.
(quoting Sharpe v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 62 N.C. App. 564, 565, 302 S.E.2d 893,
894 (1983)).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 47-48, 483 S.E.2d at 456. Farm Bureau's insurance policy stated that it
would pay UIM coverage "'only after the limits of liability under any applicable liability
bonds or policies have ben [sic] exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements.' "
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Farm Bureau's policy). According to the Act,
"[u]nderinsured motorist coverage is deemed to apply when, by reason of payment of
judgment or settlement, all liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for
bodily injury caused by the ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway
vehicle have been exhausted." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997).
49. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also Silvers v. Horace Mann
Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 294, 378 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989) (stating that UIM liability is
derivative); infra note 107 and accompanying text (explaining the meaning of
"derivative"); cf. Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. 428, 429-30, 350 S.E.2d 175, 176-
77 (1986) (noting the "derivative nature" of UM coverage).
50. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47,483 S.E.2d at 456.
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coverage.5 1  Because Farm Bureau failed to preserve its statutory
right to approve Bost's settlement,52 and because Bost exhausted the
tortfeasor's available liability coverage, she had the right to pursue
her UIM claim against Farm Bureau. 3
The court of appeals also resolved whether the 1991 amendment
to the Act precluded the interpolicy stacking 4 of applicable UIM
limits in order to determine if a tortfeasor's automobile was an
"underinsured highway vehicle. ' 55 The court noted that although the
51. See id. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4)
(requiring a claimant to give the insurance company written notice of the settlement
offer).
52. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4); Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at
456-57.
53. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 456-57. The court again noted that in
the settlement agreement and covenant not to enforce judgment, Bost had expressly
preserved her right to pursue her UIM claim against Farm Bureau. See id. at 48, 483
S.E.2d at 457.
54. One commentator describes stacking as a case in which an injured insured may
claim coverage under more than one insurance policy, even if the claimant is not the
owner of the policy under which he seeks recovery. See PAUL W. PRETZEL, UNINSURED
MOTORISTS § 25.5(B), at 87-88 (1972). Another commentator defines stacking as "a
situation where all available policies are added together to create a larger pool from
which the injured party may draw in order to compensate him for his actual loss where a
single policy is not sufficient to make him whole." 12A RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:628,
at 77; see also Douglas R. Richmond, Issues and Problems in "Other Insurance," Multiple
Insurance, and Self-Insurance, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1373, 1418 (1995) (defining stacking as
"the recovery of damages by an insured under multiple policies in succession until all
damages have been satisfied, or until the total limits of all policies are exhausted"); cf.
JAMES E. SNYDER, JR., NORTH CAROLINA AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE LAW § 33-1, at
256 (2d ed. 1994) (declaring "stacking" to be one of the most important features of UM
coverage and describing it as a tool through which insurance companies try to preclude
the aggregation of UM coverage). The Act does not use the term "stacking," but instead
refers to the "combining" of UIM limits available under different policies. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) ("[Tihe total limits of the claimant's underinsured motorist
coverages [are] determined by combining the highest limit available under each policy."
(emphasis added)); id. ("The underinsured motorist limits applicable to any one motor
vehicle under a policy shall not be combined with or added to the limits applicable to any
other motor vehicle under that policy." (emphasis added)). However, courts, as do
commentators, usually use the term "stacking." See, e.g., Bass v. North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 109, 113 n.2, 418 S.E.2d 221, 223 n.2 (1992) (noting that
intrapolicy stacking is not permissible under the Act); Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49-51, 483
S.E.2d at 457-58 (discussing the issue of stacking); Honeycutt v. Walker, 119 N.C. App.
220, 224, 458 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1995) (same).
55. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49, 483 S.E.2d at 457. The Act defines an
"underinsured motorist vehicle" as a "highway vehicle" in which the total of the liability
limits "under all bodily injury liability bonds and insurance policies applicable at the time
of the accident is less than the applicable limits of underinsured motorist coverage for the
vehicle involved in the accident and insured under the owner's policy." N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.21(b)(4); see also Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49-50, 483 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting the
statutory definition of an "underinsured highway vehicle"). Stacking affects the
determination of an underinsured highway vehicle by allowing multiple policies with UIM
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statute prior to the 1991 amendment had been interpreted to permit
both intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking of UIM coverage to decide
if a tortfeasor's vehicle was underinsured, 6 the statute as amended in
199157 prevented intrapolicy stacking to determine whether a vehicle
was underinsured.58 In its holding, however, the court emphasized
that the 1991 amendment did not preclude interpolicy stacking.5 9
Thus, the court permitted Bost to stack the UIM coverage under
both her son's Farm Bureau policy and her daughter's Allstate policy
to determine if Ezzelle's vehicle was an "underinsured highway
vehicle."60
After determining that interpolicy stacking was appropriate for
purposes of defining an "underinsured highway vehicle," the court
addressed Farm Bureau's contention that it provided the primary
provisions to be combined in the determination of the maximum amount of underinsured
motorist benefits available to the injured claimant. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4).
56. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49, 483 S.E.2d at 457; see also Harris v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 192, 420 S.E.2d 124, 129 (1992) (interpreting the language in
the pre-1991 statute to permit intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage), superseded by
statute as stated in Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458; Onley v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 689, 456 S.E.2d 882, 884 (1995) (interpreting the language in
the pre-1991 statute to permit interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage).
57. See Act of July 12, 1991, ch. 646, § 2, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550, 1556 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21 (b)(4)).
58. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 50, 483 S.E.2d at 458; see also Bass, 332 N.C. at 113
n.2, 418 S.E.2d at 223 n.2 (noting that the 1991 amendment seems to prevent intrapolicy
stacking); Honeycutt, 119 N.C. App. at 224, 458 S.E.2d at 26 (stating that "the main
purpose of the 1991 amendment to G.S. 20-279.21(b)(4) appears to be the prohibition of
intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage"); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 593,
597, 452 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1995) (concluding that the 1991 amendment permits stacking of
UIM coverage "only between policies"). "Intrapolicy" stacking occurs when a single
policy provides UIM coverage for multiple vehicles and the claimant under the policy
attempts to "multiply the policy's stated UIM limits by the number of insured vehicles ...
to determine the UIM insurer's limit of liability." SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:13, at 123.
59. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458. The court further supported its
reasoning by indicating that the Act, provisions of which are incorporated as a matter of
law into all automobile liability policies, requires a liberal construction in order to
effectuate the primary purpose of " 'compensat[ing] innocent victims who have been
injured by financially irresponsible motorists.'" Id. at 50-51, 483 S.E.2d at 458 (quoting
South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Smith, 67 N.C. App. 632, 636, 313 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1984)); see
also infra note 72 and accompanying text (noting that the provisions of the Act are
incorporated as a matter of law into automobile insurance policies); infra notes 77-78 and
accompanying text (noting the liberal construction of the Act afforded by its broadly
compensatory purpose).
60. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458. If the court had held that Bost
was not allowed to stack, Ezzelle's vehicle would not have been "underinsured," as his
liability limit was the same as each child's UIM limit. See id. at 44, 483 S.E.2d at 454. In
that event, Bost would have received only the limits of Ezzelle's liability insurance
($100,000). See id. -
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UIM coverage because it insured the vehicle owned by Bost's son.61
Both Farm Bureau's and Allstate's insurance policies included
identical provisions pertaining to "other insurance," 62 which stated
that if similar insurance applied, they would only pay their
61. See id. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458. A problem that arises in connection with "other
insurance" provisions is the necessity of determining which insurance coverage is
"primary" and which insurance coverage is "excess." See PRETZEL, supra note 54,
§ 25.5(A), at 87. "Primary" liability often falls on the insurer of the vehicle involved in
the accident, while "excess" liability falls on the insurer of the injured claimant. See id.
§ 25.5, at 82; SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:15, at 141; see also SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-1,
at 256 (noting that "the primary insurance coverage is always provided by the owner's
policy, and any insurance provided with respect to a vehicle not owned is excess over any
other collectible insurance"). The Act fails to address either the issue of which insurance
carrier has primary or excess coverage or the issue of pro-rata allocation. See SIMPSON,
supra note 5, § 3:16, at 145 (noting that the statute does not state "whether one insurer
will be required to exhaust its policy limit before any other insurance will be required to
pay, or what part of the claim each insurer will be required to pay if all the policies have
the same relative status"). In at least some situations involving primary and excess
coverage, however, the primary insurer pays first, up to the limits of its policy, and then
the insurer providing excess coverage pays any remainder of the loss. See id. § 3:16, at
1146. If neither insurance carrier is primary, then the court will give the carriers the same
status and prorate the loss. See id. While the court's opinion did not expressly state why
Farm Bureau wanted to be the primary UIM carrier, Farm Bureau probably sought the
designation of primary insurer in order to take full advantage of the total credit created
by the $100,000 payment from Ezzelle's liability insurance policy. See generally id. § 3:16,
at 145-47 (discussing the issues of prorating and primary/excess coverage).
Because the owner of an underinsured highway vehicle presumably has liability
insurance that will pay for some but not all of an injured person's damages, a UIM carrier
does not have to pay all of the damages sustained by a UIM claimant; rather, the UIM
carrier will pay the difference between the insufficient liability coverage and the available
amount of UIM coverage, thus bridging the gap for the injured claimant. See id. § 3:15, at
140. The amount the claimant receives from the tortfeasor's liability insurer serves as a
credit and will reduce only once the amount that the claimant can recover from all UIM
carriers, see id. at 142, because the statute states that UIM coverage applies "'to the first
dollar of an underinsured motorist coverage claim beyond amounts paid to the claimant
pursuant to the exhausted liability policy,'" id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added)). Thus, when an insured engages in interpolicy
stacking of UIM policies, a question arises about the allocation between UIM insurers of
the credit for the tortfeasor's liability coverage. See id.
62. Insurance companies attempt to limit their liability by using "other insurance"
provisions. See 3 WIDISS, supra note 5, § 40.2, at 239. For example, "other insurance"
provi'sions usually contain an "excess" clause, stating, for example, that "any insurance we
provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible
insurance." INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, INC., UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
COVERAGE FORM PP 03 11 (Ed. 6-80), reprinted in 3 WIDISS, supra note 5, app. H, at 5.
By using an "excess" clause, insurance companies try to make the coverage of the policy
in which the clause appears "excess coverage over any other 'collectible insurance'-
including liability insurance." 3 WIDISS, supra note 5, § 40.5, at 265. While courts usually
follow other insurance provisions in determining primary and secondary coverage, courts
may refuse to enforce the provisions when they create conflicts. See 3 id. § 40.5, at 265-
66; infra notes 88-105 and accompanying text (explaining "other insurance" provisions
and also discussing cases that involved such provisions).
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proportionate share of the loss and that any insurance they provided
with respect .to a vehicle not owned by the claimant would be
" 'excess over any other collectible insurance.' "63 In determining
Bost's right to receive UIM benefits, the court first characterized her
as a "person insured" under the Act' because she was a resident of
the same household as her son, the named insured. 5 Then, the court
noted that when two policies contain identical "excess" provisions,
the clauses are mutually repugnant and have no effect.66 Instead, the
insured's claim is pro rated between the separate policies in
accordance with the policies' respective limits. 67 The court thus
concluded that Farm Bureau and Allstate had to share the settlement
on a pro-rata basis.
6 8
To understand the significance of Bost, a brief overview of the
statutory and common law development of UIM law in North
Carolina provides a useful framework. In 1979, the North Carolina
General Assembly extended the UM provisions of the Act to
encompass UIM coverage69 because of accidents involving motorists
63. Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458 (quoting the insurance contract).
64. The importance of the court's recognition of Bost as a person insured lies in the
fact that once a person qualifies as a "person insured," the person has the right to stack
UIM coverage. See SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-4, at 270. Under § 20-279.21(b)(3) of
the North Carolina General Statutes, uninsurance and underinsurance coverage creates
two distinct classes of insureds. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1997);
North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. 507, 509, 369 S.E.2d
386,388 (1988); Crowder v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 79 N.C. App. 551,
554, 340 S.E.2d 127, 129-30 (1986). The first class of "persons insured" includes "the
named insured and, while resident of the same household, the spouse of any named
insured and relatives of either, while in a motor vehicle or otherwise," while the second
class includes any person who uses or is a guest in the motor vehicle to which the policy
applies. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3); see also Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. at 510, 369
S.E.2d at 388 (quoting the statutory definition of "persons insured"); SIMPSON, supra note
5, § 3:7, at 96-106 (discussing the meaning and different classes of "persons insured").
65. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3); Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 52, 483 S.E.2d at
458-59.
66. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 52,483 S.E.2d at 458-59.
67. See id. at 52,483 S.E.2d at 459.
68. See id.; see also supra notes 61-62 (discussing the concepts of primary and excess
coverage).
69. See Act of May 29, 1979, ch. 675, § 1, 1979 N.C. Sess. Laws 720, 720-21 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)). By carrying
"uninsured" motorist coverage, an injured person stands in the place she would have been
if the tortfeasor, whose negligent operation of an uninsured motor vehicle caused an
accident, had liability insurance with limits that satisfied the statutory minimum
requirements. See 3 WIDISS, supra note 5, § 31.1, at 3. A policy that provides
"underinsured" motorist insurance offers remuneration to an injured insured if a
tortfeasor's liability insurance does not pay for all of the damages sustained by an injured
person. See 3 id. § 31.4, at 7. See generally Paul J. Osowski, Note, Underinsured Motorist
Coverage: North Carolina's Multiple Claimant Wrinkle-Ray v. Atlantic Casualty
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with liability insurance that failed to provide adequate compensation
for claimants entitled to recover.70 A person insured under an
insurance policy that provides for UIM coverage qualifies for an
"extra layer of insurance protection designed to kick in after the
insured has recovered from the liability insurer."71  In North
Carolina, the statute is written into every liability policy as a matter
of law72 and requires insurers to offer UIM coverage.73 If the insured
does not reject or alter the UIM coverage,74 the amount of UIM
coverage is "equal to the highest limit of bodily injury liability
coverage for any one vehicle in the policy," 75 but the liability
coverage in the policy containing UIM coverage has to be more than
the amount of minimum compulsory coverage in order for UIM
coverage to be included.
76
Insurance Co., 17 CAMPBELL L. REv. 147, 152-54 (1995) (describing the statutory
development of UIM law in North Carolina).
70. See 3 WIDISS, supra note 5, § 31.4, at 7.
71. SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:2, at 74.
72- See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(d) (Supp. 1997) (describing the requirements
for a motor vehicle liability policy and stating that such a policy "is subject to all the
provisions of this Article"); id. § 20-279.21(f) (stating that "[e]very motor vehicle liability
policy shall be subject to [specified provisions] which need not be contained therein");
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Chantos, 293 N.C. 431, 441, 238 S.E.2d 597, 604 (1977)
(noting that the Act is written into insurance policies as a matter of law); Bowser v.
Williams, 108 N.C. App. 8, 12, 422 S.E.2d 355, 358 (1992) (same); North Carolina Farm
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. 507, 509, 369 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1988)
(same); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 59 N.C. App. 621, 622, 298 S.E.2d 56, 57 (1982)
(same); SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-4, at 269 (same). Furthermore, when a policy
provision conflicts with the statute, the statute will prevail despite the fact that the
insured technically agreed in the insurance contract to the language of the policy. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(f)(4) (stating that the insurance policy is the entire contract
between the insured and the insurance company to the extent that the policy "does not
conflict with the provisions of the Article"); Baxley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.
App. 718,721,446 S.E.2d 597,598 (1994); Bray v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co., 115 N.C. App. 438, 442-44, 445 S.E.2d 79, 81 (1994), cert. improvidently granted in
part, affd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 341 N.C. 678,462 S.E.2d 650 (1995).
73. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4). However, the Act also permits the
insured to reject or to change the UIM coverage. See id.
74. Purchasers of UIM coverage usually have latitude in choosing the coverage limits,
especially in a state that does not have a statute requiring UIM coverage. See 3 WIDISS,
supra note 5, § 31.6, at 8-10. Because North Carolina requires a statutory minimum of
automobile insurance, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4), any amount in addition to
the minimum requirement is voluntary and thus not subject to the provisions of the Act,
see Brown v. Truck Ins. Exch., 103 N.C. App. 59, 64,404 S.E.2d 172, 175 (1991).
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
76. See id. The minimum amount of basic liability coverage required by statute is
$25,000 for bodily injury to or death of one person in one accident and $50,000 for bodily
injury to or death of two or more persons in one accident. See id. § 20-279.5(c) (Supp.
1997); see also Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259, 264, 382 S.E.2d 759, 762
(1989) (noting the statutory requirement that UIM coverage has to be equal to the policy
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The primary purpose of the statutory requirement for motor
vehicle liability insurance under the Act is " 'to compensate innocent
victims who have been injured by financially irresponsible
motorists.' ",77 To effectuate this compensatory goal, the North
Carolina courts have interpreted the Act to call for liberal
construction,78 and perhaps due to the wide latitude afforded to the
courts through these broad principles, the General Assembly
amended the statute in 1985.79  While the 1985 amendment
specifically permitted interpolicy stacking, however, it failed to clarify
whether intrapolicy stacking was also acceptable."
In Sutton v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,81 the North Carolina
Supreme Court held that the Act as amended in 1985 allowed both
intrapolicy and interpolicy stacking.82 In Sutton, the injured insured
owned two insurance policies, each of which covered two vehicles
and under which the insured paid four separate premiums for UIM
liability limits), superseded by statute as stated in North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Stamper, 122 N.C. App. 254,257,468 S.E.2d 584,585-86, disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C.
513,472 S.E.2d 17 (1996).
77. Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 50-51, 483 S.E.2d at 458 (quoting South Carolina Ins. Co.
v. Smith, 67 N.C. App. 632, 636, 313 S.E.2d 856, 860 (1984)); see also Hartford
Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Becks, 123 N.C. App. 489, 492, 473 S.E.2d 427, 429 (1996)
(stating that the central purpose of the Financial Responsibility Act is protection of
innocent victims from financially irresponsible motorists); Bray, 115 N.C. App. at 443, 445
S.E.2d at 82 (same); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baer, 113 N.C. App. 517,522,439 S.E.2d
202,205 (1994) (same).
78. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458; see also Moore v. Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. Group, -270 N.C. 532, 535, 155 S.E.2d 128, 130-31 (1967) (noting that liberal
construction of the Act is necessary to achieve its remedial purpose); Gurganious v.
Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163, 168, 423 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1992) (same);
Smith, 67 N.C. App. at 636,313 S.E.2d at 860 (same).
79. See Act of July 10, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 851, 862-64 (codified
as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4)). See generally John F. Buckley, Note,
Underinsured Motorist Coverage: Legislative Solutions to Settlement Difficulties, 64 N.C.
L. REv. 1408, 1416-17 (1986) (discussing the 1985 amendment).
80. See Act of July 10, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 851, 862 (stating that
the intent of the statutory UIM provision was "to provide to the owner, in instances
where more than one policy may apply, the benefit of all limits of liability of underinsured
motorist coverage under all such policies") (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-279.21(b)(4)); see also Buckley, supra note 79, at 1416 (noting the express statutory
permission of interpolicy stacking and the statutory ambiguity concerning the question of
intrapolicy stacking).
81. 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in Stamper,
122 N.C. App. at 257, 468 S.E.2d at 585-86.
82. See id. at 266-67, 382 S.E.2d at 764. The court noted that the compensation
afforded by interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking was consistent with the compensatory
purpose of the Act. See id. See generally Joseph H. Nanney, Jr., Note, Sutton v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.: The North Carolina Supreme Court Approves Stacking of
Underinsured Motorist Coverage-Will Uninsured Coverage Follow?, 68 N.C. L. REV.
1281 (1990) (discussing Sutton and UIM coverage).
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coverage.83 The court allowed the insured to stack all four UIM
coverages, despite the limitation of liability clauses in the insurance
policies.' Thus, in accordance with Sutton, the courts'
interpretations of the Act following the 1985 amendment, but prior
to the 1991 amendment, permitted both interpolicy and intrapolicy
stacking in order to determine whether a tortfeasor's automobile was
an "underinsured highway vehicle. '85  However, because the 1991
amendment added a provision expressly precluding any intrapolicy
stacking of UIM coverage,86 the courts have interpreted the Act to
prohibit all intrapolicy stacking but to permit interpolicy stacking.Y7
83. See Sutton, 325 N.C. at 261,382 S.E.2d at 761.
84. See id. at 261-63, 382 S.E.2d at 760-61.
85. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 335 N.C. 433, 435, 439 S.E.2d 110,
111 (1994) (noting that the statute then applicable "required that a person living in the
household with relatives be allowed to aggregate or stack, both interpolicy and
intrapolicy, the underinsured motorist coverages of the relatives"); Harris v. Nationwide
Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 194, 420 S.E.2d 124, 130 (1992) (holding that the intrapolicy
stacking of UIM coverage was permissible when the injured party was a first-class
insured), superseded by statute as stated in Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458;
Onley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 687, 689, 456 S.E.2d 882, 882-84
(1995) (permitting both interpolicy and intrapolicy stacking of UIM coverage in a case
involving an automobile accident that occurred in 1988).
Before the 1991 amendment, the statute expressly stated that the intent was to
"provide to the owner, in instances where more than one policy may apply, the benefit of
all limits of liability of underinsured motorist coverage under all such policies." N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1989) (emphasis added); see also Bost, 126 N.C.
App. at 49, 483 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting relevant portions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21
(Supp. 1989)). The statute also declared the limit of UIM coverage that was applicable to
any claim was determined by "the difference between the amount paid to the claimant
pursuant to the exhausted liability policy and the total limits of the owner's underinsured
motorist coverages provided in the owner's policies of insurance." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1989)); see also Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49, 483 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting
the statute).
86. See Act of July 12, 1991, ch. 646, § 2, 1991 N.C. Sess. Laws 1550, 1556 ("The
underinsured motorist limits applicable to any one motor vehicle under a policy shall not
be combined with or added to the limits applicable to any other motor vehicle under that
policy.") (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)).
87. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 50,483 S.E.2d at 458 (citing cases); Maryland Cas. Co.
v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 593, 597, 452 S.E.2d 318, 320 (1995) (deciding that the 1991
amendment permitted stacking of UIM coverage between policies but not within
policies); SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:13, at 132 (stating that "although the current version
of the statute preserves the right to stack interpolicy, it prohibits intrapolicy stacking
across the board"); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) ("The underinsured
motorist limits applicable to any one motor vehicle under a policy shall not be combined
with or added to the limits applicable to any other motor vehicle under that policy.");
Bass v. North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 109, 113 n.2, 418 S.E.2d 221,
223 n.2 (1992) (noting that the 1991 amendment appears to bar intrapolicy stacking);
Honeycutt v. Walker, 119 N.C. App. 220, 224, 458 S.E.2d 23, 26 (1995) (stating that the
primary purpose of the 1991 amendment was to prevent intrapolicy stacking of' UIM
coverage).
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Against the background of frequent changes made by the
General Assembly to the statutory provisions concerning UIM
coverage, insurance companies have sought to prevent stacking and
thus minimize their exposure by including certain provisions in their
policies.88 For example, an insurance company may attempt to create
exclusionary provisions by using an "other insurance" clause. 9 Such
a change tries to make the insurance company's policy coverage
excess to every other policy availablef0 An insurer may also use an
"other insurance" clause as an attempt to restrict or to prevent
interpolicy stacking (1) by stating that other applicable insurance
policies must first be exhausted first before its insurance will apply,
or (2) by limiting the insurer's entire liability to the limits of a single
policy.91 North Carolina courts traditionally have not honored "other
insurance" provisions, however, when the provisions are in conflict
with the statutory minimum coverage.92 For example, in Sutton v.
88. See, e.g., 8C JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN & JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5106, at 522-23 (1981) (noting that an "anti-stacking result has been reached
where the policy, or policies, in question used an 'other insurance' provision, or an excess
or excess-escape clause" (footnotes omitted)); Nanney, supra note 82, at 1284 (noting that
"insurers have devised a variety of policy provisions to preclude aggregated coverages");
Cf SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-1, at 256 (asserting that insurance policies try to prevent
the aggregation of UM coverage by using "other insurance" provisions); see also supra
note 62 (explaining "other insurance").
89. In Bost, for example, Farm Bureau and Allstate's insurance policies contained
identical "other insurance" clauses, which read:
"If this policy and any other auto insurance policy issued to you apply to the
same accident, the maximum limit of liability for your injuries under all the
policies shall not exceed the highest applicable limit of liability under any one
policy.
In addition, if there is other applicable similar insurance we will pay only our
share of the loss. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to
the total of all applicable limits. However, any insurance we provide with respect
to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance."
Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458 (quoting Farm Bureau and Allstate's
insurance policies); see also supra note 62 (explaining "other insurance").
90. See 12A RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:628, at 70; 3 VIDISS, supra note 5, § 40.1, at
239.
91. See SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-3, at 266; see also Nanney, supra note 82, at 1285
(describing "other insurance" clauses).
92. See, e.g., Moore v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. Group, 270 N.C. 532, 543, 155 S.E.2d
128, 136 (1967) (holding that the Act does not allow "other insurance" clauses in an
insurance policy if such clauses are adverse to the minimum amount of coverage required
by statute); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Herndon, 79 N.C. App. 365, 368, 339
S.E.2d 472, 473-74 (1986) (holding that while limiting clauses cannot prevent recovery up
to the minimum amount allowed under the statute, they may apply to coverage that
exceeds the statutory minimum in UM cases); Nanney, supra note 82, at 1285-88
(discussing the North Carolina courts' interpretation of "other insurance" clauses); cf.
12A RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:628, at 70 (noting that "[m]any jurisdictions have held
that excess or other insurance clauses are invalid in the UM context"). See generally 12A
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Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,9' the North Carolina Supreme Court
held that UIM coverage can never be excess or additional coverage
according to the Act.94 In Sutton, the injured plaintiff paid separate
premiums for four vehicles insured under two separate insurance
policies. 95  The defendant argued that the Act should not be
determinative "to the extent the policy coverages at issue exceed[ed]
the mandatory minimum coverage required by the Financial
Responsibility Act."96 The court disagreed, however, because the
statute compels UIM coverage in an amount equal to the insured's
bodily injury liability coverage. 7 Therefore, the court concluded that
because UIM coverage cannot be excess, insurance companies cannot
prevent stacking through exclusionary clauses. 9
While the supreme court has established generally that "other
insurance" clauses cannot preclude stacking, the court of appeals has
addressed the more specific issue of the effect of identical "other
insurance" clauses in one or more policies to be stacked.99 In North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hilliard,"'0 Hilliard
had an automobile insurance policy that included UIM coverage up
to $50,000 per person.10 1 Furthermore, because she lived with her
sister, she also claimed UIM coverage under her sister's automobile
RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:628 (discussing "other insurance" clauses and stacking).
93. 325 N.C. 259, 382 S.E.2d 759 (1989), superseded by statute as stated in North
Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 122 N.C. App. 254, 257, 468 S.E.2d 584,
585-86, disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 17 (1996).
94. See id. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765.
95. See id. at 261,382 S.E.2d at 761.
96. Id. at 267,382 S.E.2d at 764.
97. See id. at 268, 382 S.E.2d at 765.
98. See id.; see also Harris v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 332 N.C. 184, 194-95, 420
S.E.2d 124, 130 (1992) (following Sutton and noting that the stacking of multiple vehicles
within one policy is not "excess" coverage within the meaning of the Financial
Responsibility Act, and thus not controlled by the compulsory provisions of the Act),
superseded by statute as stated in Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458.
99. See Onley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 690, 456 S.E.2d 882,
884 (1995); North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. 507, 511,
369 S.E.2d 386, 388 (1988); see also SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:15, at 143-44 (discussing
interpolicy stacking in Onley). In Onley, the two insurance policies providing UIM
coverage contained identical "other insurance" provisions, which stated that "'any
insurance we provide with respect to a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any
other collectible insurance.'" Onley, 118 N.C. App. at 690,456 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting tIe
insurance policies). Deeming the clauses to be mutually repugnant, the court refused to
give them effect and therefore read the insurance policies as though the "excess"
provisions were not there. See id.; see also SNYDER, supra note 54, § 33-5.1, at 62 (Supp.
1997) (noting that courts will refuse to give identical "other insurance" provisions effect,
instead reading the policies as though the provisions are not included).
100. 90 N.C. App. 507,369 S.E.2d 386 (1988).
101. See id. at 508,369 S.E.2d at 387.
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insurance policy.'02 The "other insurance" provisions in Hilliard's
policy limited the insurance company's coverage by making it
"excess" when another policy applied to the same accident10 3 The
court concluded, however, that because the provisions in the
insurance policies were identical, the court would ignore the clauses,
thus allowing Hilliard to stack the policies and to recover from both
insurance companies on a pro-rata basis."° The identical clauses
were mutually repugnant and consequently unenforceable.105
In addition to deciding whether stacking is permissible in UIM
claims, the courts have had to address the effect of a settlement
agreement and release between an injured person and a tortfeasor or
a tortfeasor's insurance company.0 6 Under North Carolina law, an
insured's right to UIM coverage derives from the insured's claim
against an underinsured tortfeasor.' 7 In order to receive UIM
coverage, the injured claimant must exhaust all insurance policies
that provide liability coverage for the tortfeasor 08 In cases in which
102. See id.
103. See id. at 511, 369 S.E.2d at 388.
104. See id. at 512, 369 S.E.2d at 389; cf. 12A RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:628, at 70-
71 (noting that "other insurance" clauses may provide for a pro-rata payment of an
uninsured motorist claim up to the higher limit of liability according to the policies at
issue).
105. See Hilliard, 90 N.C. App. at 511,369 S.E.2d at 388.
106. See, e.g., Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 296, 378 S.E.2d 21, 26
(1989) (holding that the plaintiff's entering into a consent judgment with the tortfeasor
and the tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier did not bar UIM recovery); Spivey v.
Lowery, 116 N.C. App. 124, 126, 446 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1994) (holding that the plaintiff's
entering into a general release with the tortfeasor precludes the subsequent assertion of
any further claims arising out of the accident, including a claim against a UIM carrier);
Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163, 168, 423 S.E.2d 317, 320
(1992) (holding that the plaintiffs could proceed with their claim for UIM recovery even
though the plaintiffs dismissed with prejudice the underlying claim against the primary
tortfeasor); see also Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. 428, 430, 350 S.E.2d 175, 177
(1986) (holding that the plaintiff could not recover UM benefits after signing a general
release).
107. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 294, 350 S.E.2d at 25 (acknowledging the derivative
nature of a UIM claim); Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167, 423 S.E.2d at 319 (citing the
assertion in Silvers that a UIM claim derives from a claim against the tortfeasor); cf.
Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. at 429, 350 S.E.2d at 176 (noting the derivative nature of an
uninsured motorist claim); Kristen P. Sosnosky, Note, Reconciling North Carolina's
Interpretation of "Legally Entitled to Recover" with the Spirit of the Uninsured Motorist
Statute: The Lessons of Grimsley v. Nelson, 73 N.C. L. REv. 2474, 2481 (1995)
(recognizing the derivative nature of uninsured motorist claims).
108. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997) (stating that UIM coverage
applies following the exhaustion of, "by reason of payment of judgment or settlement, all
liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the
ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle"). Furthermore, the
Act states that "[e]xhaustion of that liability coverage for the purpose of any single
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a tortfeasor's liability is undisputed and a plaintiff's injuries exceed
the limits of the tortfeasor's liability coverage, the liability carrier will
want to settle the case quickly by paying its limits and thus avoiding
expensive or unsuccessful litigation.1 9 While a plaintiff may agree to
accept a settlement from the tortfeasor's liability carrier, a plaintiff
must be careful not to compromise the UIM claim. 10  The
amendment to the Act in 1985 that allowed an insured to settle a
claim without insurance company approval raised the question of
whether a plaintiff could complete a settlement by giving a standard
release to a tortfeasor, or to a tortfeasor's liability carrier, without
liability claim presented for underinsured motorist coverage is deemed to occur when ...
by reason of multiple claims, the aggregate per occurrence limit of liability has been
paid." Id.; see also 8C STEPHEN L. LIEBO, APPLEMAN'S INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE § 5108, at 47 (Supp. 1997) (reviewing the use of exhaustion clauses); SIMPSON,
supra note 5, § 3:2, at 74-75 (discussing the requirement that a claimant pursuing UIM
recovery must exhaust the tortfeasor's liability coverage). The UIM insurance agreement
states, in language similar to that of the statute, that the insurer will pay UIM coverage
"'only after the limits of liability under any applicable liability bonds or policies have
been exhausted by payments of judgments or settlement,'" unless the insurer has
received advance written notice of settlement between an insured and the tortfeasor and
the insurer consents to the advance payment to the insured in an amount that is equal to
the settlement. SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 3:2, at 74 (quoting the UIM provisions of a
standard automobile insurance policy). However, the UIM carrier may choose to pay the
claimant even if the claimant has not exhausted the tortfeasor's liability insurance. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
109. See SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 168; SNYDER, supra note 54, § 12-1, at 117.
For an example of a consent judgment stating the liability insurance carrier's desire to
avert unnecessary litigation costs, see Silvers, 324 N.C. at 291-92, 378 S.E.2d at 23.
110. See SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 168. Before the 1985 amendment to the UIM
provisions in the Act, two difficulties arose for a plaintiff who wanted to settle with a
liability insurer and to preserve a UIM claim. See id. First, UIM policies issued before
the 1985 amendment often required an insured to have the insurance company's consent
before settling with a tortfeasor or a tortfeasor's liability carrier in order to obtain UIM
coverage. See id. The second problem involved the plaintiff's right to settle with a
tortfeasor, especially when the plaintiff provided the tortfeasor with a standard release.
See id. at 169. While the statute prior to the 1985 amendment required a plaintiff to
exhaust a tortfeasor's liability coverage, it also required that a plaintiff be "legally
entitled to recover" from a tortfeasor. See id. Perhaps in an attempt to address the
apparent contradiction between these two requirements, the 1985 amendment limited
insurance companies' control by adding that an insurer does not have the right "to
approve settlement with the original owner, operator, or maintainer of the underinsured
highway vehicle under a policy providing coverage against an underinsured motorist" if
the insurer has received advance written notice of a settlement between an underinsured
motorist and its insured and "the insurer fails to advance a payment to the insured in an
amount equal to the tentative settlement within 30 days following receipt of such notice."
Act of July 10, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 851, 862-63 (codified as amended
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4)); see SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 169. In
accordance with the statutory amendments, insurance companies similarly altered the
provisions in personal automobile policies. See SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 170.
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endangering a UIM claim."' Although some attorneys viewed the
amended version of the statute as enabling a plaintiff to preserve a
UIM claim in lieu of executing a standard release, other attorneys
were more wary.112 Therefore, more cautious attorneys prepared a
"covenant not to enforce judgment," which is a "less comprehensive
agreement in which the plaintiff does not 'release' the tortfeasor in
the conventional sense but covenants that if he obtains a judgment
against the tortfeasor for an amount greater than the liability
insurance proceeds, he will not attempt to enforce the judgment
against the tortfeasor's personal assets.""1
3
While liability insurance carriers generally have been indifferent
to the form of settlement agreements and have accepted covenants
not to enforce judgments instead of standard releases,"4 the courts
have reached different results, depending on the type of agreement
involved."5 For example, in Buchanan v. Buchanan,u6 the court of
appeals held that the plaintiff's signing of a general release precluded
111. See SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 170. Under the Act, an insurer loses the right
to subrogation and the right to approve settlement between the owner of an underinsured
highway vehicle and an injured person claiming UIM benefits if the insurer has received
written notice prior to a settlement between the UIM claimant (the insurance company's
insured) and the owner of the underinsured highway vehicle and has failed to advance
payment to the insured in an amount equal to the proposed settlement within 30 days
after receiving the notice. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4); see also Williams v.
Bowden, 128 N.C. App. 318,320,494 S.E.2d 798,799-800 (1998) (holding that oral notice
does not satisfy the statutory requirement of written notice); SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3,
at 170 ("[T]he 1985 amendment makes it clear that if the UIM insurer fails to make the
required advance, the plaintiff is free to settle with the tortfeasor and the liability
insurer."). The "right of subrogation" means the right of the insurance company to stand
in the place of its insured, giving the insurance company, as substituted party, the same
legal rights that the insured had. See BLACK'S LAWv DICrIONARY 1325-26 (6th ed. 1990).
112. See SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 170-71.
113. Id. at 170.
114. See id. at 171.
115. See, e.g., Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 296, 378 S.E.2d 21, 26
(1989) (holding that a plaintiff who had entered into a consent judgment releasing the
tortfeasors and their insurance company could pursue UIM benefits); Spivey v. Lowery,
116 N.C. App. 124, 126, 446 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1994) (holding that an injured party who
executed a general release could not subsequently assert a claim for UIM coverage);
Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163, 168, 423 S.E.2d 317, 320
(1992) (holding that a plaintiff can proceed with a UIM claim after dismissing the
underlying claim against the tortfeasor); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. 428, 430,
350 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986) (holding that a general release precluded a claim for UM
benefits); see also infra notes 114-53 (discussing cases involving the effects of the 1985
amendment on the issue of settlement).
116. 83 N.C. App. 428,350 S.E.2d 175 (1986). While Buchanan involved a UM claim,
a discussion of the case is pertinent because the Act recognizes that an "uninsured motor




her claim for damages under her husband's UM coverage."7 When
the plaintiff and her husband accepted payment from the tortfeasor's
liability carrier, they also signed a general release discharging "all
'persons, firms or corporations liable or who might be claimed to be
liable.' "118 More than a year later, however, the plaintiff filed suit to
recover under the UM provision in her husband's policy, claiming
that she had not intended to release anyone but the tortfeasors.119
Because the defendant insurance company's UM coverage was
derivative of Buchanan's underlying claim against the tortfeasors, the
court rejected Buchanan's argument and concluded that the
plaintiff's release of the tortfeasors also released the UM carrier as a
matter of law.120
The supreme court addressed a similar situation in Silvers v.
Horace Mann Insurance Co.' Silvers, who sued for the wrongful
death of her son, had entered into a consent judgment with the
tortfeasor and the tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier." 2 Unlike a
general release, l"' the consent judgment expressly recognized and
specifically preserved the plaintiff's UIM benefits by stating that
Silvers did " 'not release nor relinquish any rights that the Plaintiff's
intestate has or might have' " against her UIM carrier.124 The
insurance company argued that the derivative nature of UIM
coverage precluded Silvers from recovering UIM benefits,"z claiming
that because the judgment released the tortfeasors, it prevented
Silvers from being "legally entitled to recover"'26 from the tortfeasors
117. See Buchanan, 83 N.C. App. at 430,350 S.E.2d at 177.
118. Id. at 428, 350 S.E.2d at 176 (quoting the release signed by the plaintiff and her
husband).
119. See id. at 428-29, 350 S.E.2d at 176. The plaintiff argued that her intent not to
release anyone but the tortfeasors created a mutual mistake of fact. See id. at 429, 350
S.E.2d at 176.
120. See id. at 429-30, 350 S.E.2d at 176-77. In its analysis of the plaintiff's claim as
being derivative, the court relied on the wording of the insurance policy, which stated that
the insurance company was liable to the plaintiff only if she was "legally entitled to
recover" from the owner or the operator of the uninsured motor vehicle. See id. See
generally Sosnosky, supra note 107, at 2481-90 (discussing in detail the meaning of
"legally entitled to recover").
121. 324 N.C. 289, 378 S.E.2d 21 (1989).
122 See id. at 290-91, 378 S.E.2d at 23.
123. See supra note 44 (defining a general release).
124. Silvers, 324 N.C. at 292,378 S.E.2d at 23 (quoting the consent judgment).
125. See id. at 292-93, 378 S.E.2d at 24.
126. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(3) (Supp. 1997) ("No policy of bodily injury
liability insurance ... shall be delivered or issued ... unless coverage is provided therein
... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover
damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles .... "); see also Sosnosky,
supra note 107, at 2481-90 (discussing the meaning of "legally entitled to recover").
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or from her insurance company.127 While the court agreed that the
claim was derivative, it noted that the statutory requirement that the
plaintiff must be legally entitled to recover conflicted with the
statutory requirement that the claimant must exhaust liability
coverage before pursuing UIM benefits.1" Because the language in
the insurance contract incorporated the ambiguous statutory
language, 29 the court attributed the fault to the insurance company
and interpreted the language in favor of the insured. 3 The court
further supported its reasoning by recalling the remedial purpose of
the UIM statute13' and concluded that the consent judgment did not
127. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 292-93, 378 S.E.2d at 24.
128. See id. at 294-95, 378 S.E.2d at 25; see also Act of July 18, 1983, ch. 777, § 1, 1983
N.C. Sess. Laws 958, 958-59 (setting forth the requirement that liability limits be
exhausted before the insurer seeks UIM insurance coverage) (codified as amended at
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)); SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 169
(asserting that the UIM statute "sent mixed signals concerning the plaintiff's right to
settle with the tortfeasor and, in particular, concerning his right to give the tortfeasor a
standard release from further liability").
Exhaustion clauses in insurance contracts typically provide that an insurer will not
pay UIM benefits until the claimant has exhausted through judgment or settlement the
limits of all available liability policies. See 8C LIEBO, supra note 108, § 5108, at 47. Thus,
insurance companies use exhaustion clauses in an attempt to make sure that UIM
coverage does not apply unless the insured is still undercompensated following receipt of
the limits of the tortfeasor's liability policy. See id. Courts may refuse to enforce
exhaustion clauses, however, if the clauses prevent an insured from settling with a
tortfeasor for less than the full amount of the tortfeasor's liability limits. See id. Courts
justify this result on the grounds that forcing the insured "to litigate every claim to obtain
policy limits would defeat the policy favoring settlement of lawsuits and further would
defeat the compensation purposes of underinsured motorists coverage by delaying the
payment of claims and by increasing the costs and burdens borne by the insured in
obtaining compensation." Id.
129. The court noted that "[a] reasonable reading of the policy ... appears to require
the insured both to preserve the cause of action against the tort-feasor and to settle the
cause before seeking UIM benefits. This conflict must be resolved in favor of the
insured." Silvers, 324 N.C. at 295, 378 S.E.2d at 25; see also SNYDER, supra note 54, § 30-
5, at 236 (noting that a conflict in the statute and the insurance policy could lead a
claimant to believe that he must approach the UIM carrier "with judgment or settlement
in hand when seeking to recover").
130. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 295, 378 S.E.2d at 25. In order to resolve ambiguous
insurance policy provisions, courts can resort to the general rule that an ambiguous
contract is to be construed against the drafter. See Chavis v. Southern Life Ins. Co., 318
N.C. 259, 262, 347 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1986); Mazza v. Medical Mut. Ins. Co., 311 N.C. 621,
631, 319 S.E.2d 217, 223 (1984); see also Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456
(citing the Silvers court in its resolution in favor of the insured when an internal conflict
exists between the provisions in the Act and the insurance policy); SNYDER, supra note
54, § 30-5, at 236 (noting resolution in favor of the insured when the Act and the policy
seem to mandate that the claimant exhaust all liability coverage through judgment or
settlement before seeking UIM benefits).
131. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 26; see also supra note 77 and
accompanying text (citing cases and discussing the remedial nature of the statute).
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bar the plaintiff's claim for UIM benefits as a matter of law.132
Despite the fact that the plaintiff had entered into a consent
judgment without giving notice to or obtaining the consent of the
UIM carrier, the court nevertheless held that the insured was not
barred from UIM coverage.133
The court of appeals again addressed the consequences of
settlement in Gurganious v. Integon General Insurance Corp.
34
Before the plaintiffs settled their suit against the tortfeasor by
accepting the liability insurance company's check for the limits of the
tortfeasor's policy, their attorney sent written notice to the UIM
carrier of the initiation of a civil lawsuit against the tortfeasor, the
settlement of the suit, and the plaintiffs' intent to pursue UIM
benefits.135 Despite such notice, the insurance carrier did not defend
the action, and the plaintiffs filed and received a dismissal with
prejudice in the action against the tortfeasor136 However, when the
plaintiffs filed suit against the insurance company in order to receive
UIM benefits, the insurance company claimed res judicata. 37 After
recognizing the effect of the 1985 amendment to the UIM statute,38
the court determined that the insurance company's failure to take
advantage of the statutory procedures placed it in a situation similar
to the one the supreme court faced in Silvers. 39  Relying on the
132 See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 296, 378 S.E.2d at 26; see also SNYDER, supra note 54,
§ 30-6, at 236 & n.1 (noting the holding in Silvers).
133. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 290,296, 378 S.E.2d at 22-23, 26. The court permitted the
plaintiff to pursue recovery even though the consent judgment violated the terms of the
UIM policy. See id. at 297, 378 S.E.2d at 26. The plaintiff's UIM policy required that the
plaintiff have the insurance company's written consent before settling a claim for bodily
injury or property damage. See id. Because the plaintiff failed to obtain the insurer's
consent before settling, the court remanded this part of the case to determine if the
plaintiff's conduct materially prejudiced the defendant insurance company. See id. at 299,
378 S.E.2d at 27.
134. 108 N.C. App. 163,423 S.E.2d 317 (1992).
135. See id. at 164-65, 423 S.E.2d at 318.
136. See id. at 165,423 S.E.2d at 318.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 166, 423 S.E.2d at 318. The court noted that the 1985 amendment to
§ 20-279.21(b)(4) added extensive procedures that permitted a UIM carrier to protect
itself. See id.; see also Act of July 10, 1985, ch. 666, § 74, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 851, 862-64
(setting forth protective measures) (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-
279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)); supra note 110 (quoting the 1985 amendment). The Act as
amended requires a plaintiff to notify the UIM carrier when a plaintiff files a claim
against the primary tortfeasor and also when the plaintiff receives a settlement offer. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4);.Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 166,423 S.E.2d at 318.
139. See Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167, 423 S.E.2d at 319. The court referred to
the Silvers court's reasoning that "while a release of the tort-feasor acts to release the
UIM insurance carrier of its derivative liability, the statute regarding UIM coverage
appears 'to require the insured to exhaust all liability policies by judgment or settlement
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decision in Silvers, the court of appeals noted a similar ambiguity in
the 1985 version of the statute,'140 and decided to follow the Silvers
court by construing the statute liberally to accomplish its remedial
purpose of compensating the victims of underinsured motorists. 141
Therefore, the court concluded that in spite of the derivative nature
of a UIM claim, 42 the plaintiffs' settlement with the insurance
company and dismissal of the underlying suit against the primary
tortfeasor did not bar their claim for UIM recovery. 143
In Spivey v. Lowery," the court of appeals held that the
plaintiff, who had signed a general release, could not subsequently
pursue a claim against her UIM carrier.345 After receiving permission
from her UIM carrier to settle with the tortfeasor's liability carrier,
Spivey accepted settlement and signed a general release. 46 In the
document that she signed, Spivey released, acquitted, and forever
discharged the tortfeasor, his insurance company, and " 'all other
persons, firms, corporations, associations or partnerships of and from
any and all claims of action, demands, rights, [and] damages ...
whatsoever' "that she then had or that she may have in the future as
a result of the accident at issue347 Therefore, when she filed a suit for
UIM benefits against her insurance company and Lowery, the
before the insurer is obligated to pay under the UIM coverage.'" Id. (quoting Silvers v.
Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 295, 378 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989)); see also supra notes
121-33 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the court's holding in Silvers);
supra note 128 (explaining exhaustion clauses).
140. See Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167,423 S.E.2d at 319. The apparent ambiguity
resulted from the requirement that the plaintiff exhaust liability coverage before pursuing
UIM benefits; yet if the plaintiff complied with that requirement and exhausted liability
coverage first, then a question might arise whether the plaintiff was legally entitled to
recover UIM benefits thereafter. See id.; see also supra note 107 (noting the meaning of
"legally entitled to recover" in relation to the derivative nature of UIM claims).
141. See Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167-68, 423 S.E.2d at 319-20; see also supra
notes 77-78 and accompanying text (describing the remedial purpose of the Act and the
courts' liberal construction of the Act); supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text
(discussing Silvers).
142 See Gurganious, 108 N.C. App. at 167,423 S.E.2d at 319.
143. See id. at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 320. While the court interpreted the case in light of
the 1985 version of the statute, see id. at 165, 423 S.E.2d at 318, it determined that
inconsistencies similar to those in the pre-1985 version remained, despite the legislative
amendments, see id. at 168, 423 S.E.2d at 319. The court also noted that the amendments
did not affect the applicability of its decision in Silvers to the present case. See id. at 165,
423 S.E.2d at 318; see also supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (discussing Silvers).
144. 116 N.C. App. 124,446 S.E.2d 835 (1994).
145. See id. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837; see also SNYDER, supra note 54, § 31-7, at 53
(Supp. 1997) (citing Spivey and discussing the effect of a tortfeasor's release by the
insured).
146. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 125,446 S.E.2d at 836.
147. Id. (quoting the general release signed by the plaintiff) (alterations in original).
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defendant insurance company argued that the general release barred
Spivey's claim.1 8
The court noted that a general release effectively discharges all
claims between the parties to the release 149 and pointed out the
general rule that a UIM carrier's liability derives from the
tortfeasor's liability."' The court distinguished the present facts from
both Silvers and Gurganious on the grounds that neither case
involved a general release.' Citing Buchanan, the court further
stated that Spivey's intent regarding the release of her UIM carrier
was irrelevant because as long as she intended to release the
tortfeasor, she released the UIM carrier as well. 52 The court
concluded that the UIM carrier's consent to the plaintiff's settlement
did not change the legal effect of the general release, nor did the
carrier's consent circumvent the fact that UIM coverage derives from
an underlying claim against a tortfeasor153  Thus, having signed a
general release, the plaintiff was barred from pursuing her UIM
benefits.
The court's holding in Bost is in accord with and helps to clarify
precedent. The Bost court considered three issues: (1) whether
Bost's entering into a settlement agreement and release and
accepting a check for $100,000 released Farm Bureau from having to
provide UIM coverage to her; (2) whether the automobile owned by
Ezzelle, the tortfeasor, was an "underinsured motor vehicle" in
accordance with § 20-279.21(b)(4) of the North Carolina General
Statutes; and (3) if the vehicle was an "underinsured motor vehicle,"
148. See id. The plaintiff did not question the validity of the release. See id. at 126,
446 S.E.2d at 837.
149. See id. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837; see also McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen v.
Syntek Fin. Corp., 92 N.C. App. 708, 710-11, 375 S.E.2d 689, 691 (1989) (noting that a
general release usually has the effect of discharging all claims between the parties to the
release).
150. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126,446 S.E.2d at 837; supra note 107 (discussing the
derivative nature of UIM coverage).
151. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 127,446 S.E.2d at 837. The court further noted that
Spivey based her claim solely on the fact that her UIM carrier consented to the
settlement, in contrast to the claimants in Silvers and Gurganious, who relied on
ambiguities within the Act and insurance policies. See id.; see also Silvers v. Horace Mann
Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 294-95, 378 S.E.2d 21, 25 (1989) (noting the conflict within the
statute and the insurance policy); Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App.
163, 167, 423 S.E.2d 317, 319 (1992) (pointing out the conflict within the statute and the
insurance policy); supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and the
holding in Silvers); supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (discussing the facts and
the holding in Gurganious).
152. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 127,446 S.E.2d at 837-38.
153. See id. at 128, 446 S.E.2d at 838.
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whether Farm Bureau's UIM coverage was "primary" as to the
liability coverage of the Ezzelle's vehicle.'5 4 While Farm Bureau
relied on Spivey for its contentions that an injured party who signs a
general release cannot subsequently assert any claim arising out of
the accident and that a UIM carrier's consent does not change the
legal impact of the general release, 155 the court easily distinguished
Spivey by pointing out that it involved a general release, not a limited
release like the one at issue in Bost.156 The court also noted that the
Spivey court had relied on the general rule expressed by the court in
Buchanan that a UIM carrier's liability derives from a tortfeasor's
liability. 157 While a general release of a tortfeasor may preclude any
claim for UIM coverage because UIM coverage derives directly from
a claim against a tortfeasor,58 the court correctly emphasized the
specific limitations of the release signed by Bost.'59 Furthermore, the
court appropriately concluded that the document was distinguishable
from the release in Spivey as a covenant not to enforce judgment.60
Thus, the court's conclusion that the covenant did not preclude Bost's
claim as a matter of law for UIM benefits extends the compensatory
purpose of the Act by allowing the claim to proceed. 6'
In a manner similar to other insurance companies in cases
preceding Bost, Farm Bureau relied on the derivative nature of UIM
coverage to argue that the signed settlement agreement barred Bost
from pursuing UIM recovery. 62 However, unlike previous cases in
154. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 45,483 S.E.2d at 455.
155. See id. at 46, 483 S.E.2d at 455 (relying on Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126-28, 446
S.E.2d at 837).
156. See id. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455-56; see also supra notes 144-53 (discussing the
facts and the holding in Spivey).
157. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 46, 483 S.E.2d at 455; see also supra notes 116-20 and
accompanying text (discussing the facts and the holding of Buchanan); supra notes 144-53
and accompanying text (detailing the facts and the holding in Spivey). Although
Buchanan involved a UM claim, the rule applies as well to UIM claims, because the Act
recognizes that an "uninsured motor vehicle" includes an "underinsured highway
vehicle." See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997).
158. See Spivey, 116 N.C. App. at 126, 446 S.E.2d at 837; Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83
N.C. App. 428,430,350 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986).
159. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455-56.
160. See id. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also SIMPSON, supra note 5, § 4:3, at 171
(defining a "covenant not to enforce judgment"); supra note 44 and accompanying text
(explaining the difference between a general release and a covenant not to enforce
judgment).
161. See supra note 77 and accompanying text (citing cases and discussing the remedial
goal of the Act).
162. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455-56; see also supra note 107
(explaining the derivative nature of UIM claims).
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which insurance companies had argued against UIM recovery, 163
Farm Bureau also claimed that Bost's acceptance and endorsement
of the settlement check from the tortfeasor's liability carrier
established an accord and satisfaction in full and final settlement of
all claims.164  While the court noted that tendering a check as
payment in full of a contested claim generally established an accord
and satisfaction,16 it determined that the accord and satisfaction
created between Bost and the tortfeasor's liability carrier did not
extinguish Bost's claim for UIM coverage, in spite of the fact that
UIM claims are derivative.66
Despite Farm Bureau's novel argument, the court looked to
similar precedent for guidance in its interpretation of the facts and
for support in its reasoning.67 Relying directly on the supreme
court's reasoning in Silvers v. Horace Mann Insurance Co., 68 the
court of appeals noted that when an internal conflict exists within the
UIM statute and a policy providing UIM coverage, the resolution of
the conflict should favor the insured.169 Although the Silvers court
interpreted the language of the 1983 version of the statute,'170 the Bost
court believed that the prior reasoning in Silvers also applied to the
current version of the Act.171  Because of the similarities in the
language noted by each court 72 and the similar provisions in the
163. See, e.g., Silvers v. Horace Mann Ins. Co., 324 N.C. 289, 378 S.E.2d 21 (1989);
Spivey, 116 N.C. App. 124, 446 S.E.2d 835; Gurganious v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp., 108
N.C. App. 163,423 S.E.2d 317 (1992).
164. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also supra note 46 (quoting
the definition of an accord and satisfaction).
165. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also Canady v. Mann, 107
N.C. App. 252, 257, 419 S.E.2d 597, 601 (1992) (noting that a check tendered as payment
in full of a disputed claim constitutes an accord and satisfaction).
166. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47,483 S.E.2d at 456.
167. See id
168. 324 N.C. 289,378 S.E.2d 21 (1989).
169. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also Silvers, 324 N.C. at 295,
378 S.E.2d at 25 (resolving conflicting provisions in the UIM statute and the insurance
policy in favor of the insured); supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (reviewing the
facts and the holding in Silvers); cf. 12 RHODES, supra note 29, § 45:9, at 238 (advocating
a liberal construction of automobile liability policies and noting that "[a]n automobile
liability policy is governed by the general principle of strict construction of ambiguities in
favor of the insured").
170. See Silvers, 324 N.C. at 293 n.3, 378 S.E.2d at 24 n.3 (noting that, in its analysis,
the court was relying on the 1983 version of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21); see also supra
note 128 (referring to the 1983 version of the Act relied on by the court in Silvers).
171. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 47-48, 483 S.E.2d at 456; see also supra note 108
(quoting the current statutory requirement that an insured seeking UIM benefits must
first exhaust the tortfeasor's liability coverage).
172. Compare Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 456.(" 'Underinsured motorist
coverage is deemed to apply when, by reason of payment of judgment or settlement, all
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insurance policies in both cases, 73 the court's reliance on Silvers
seems reasonable. The court further noted that Bost had properly
notified both UIM carriers of her intent to enter into the settlement
agreement and to pursue UIM benefits according to § 20-
279.21(b)(4) of the North Carolina General Statutes, 174 and
determined that she had correctly exhausted the tortfeasor's liability
coverage as required both under the terms of the statute and under
the UIM provisions of the insurance policy with Farm Bureau.17 5
Therefore, the court's determination that the insurance company
could not complain even though Bost had accepted a settlement
check appears more than fair, especially because the limited release
specifically preserved Bost's right to pursue UIM benefits.'76
In Bost, the court also clarified the issue of interpolicy stacking
in UIM claims. 77 The court rejected Farm Bureau's contention that,
while the 1991 amendment allowed interpolicy stacking in some
situations,7 8 it precluded interpolicy stacking of the UIM coverage
available to Bost to determine if Ezzelle's car was an underinsured
highway vehicle. 7 9 The court carefully analyzed the language of the
Act both before and after the 1991 amendment, noting specifically
liability bonds or insurance policies providing coverage for bodily injury caused by the
ownership, maintenance, or use of the underinsured highway vehicle have been
exhausted ....... (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (1993))), with Silvers, 324
N.C. at 294, 378 S.E.2d at 25 (" 'The insurer shall not be obligated to make any payment
... to which underinsured motorist insurance coverage applies ... until after the limits of
liability under all bodily injury liability bonds or insurance policies applicable at the time
of the accident have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements .......
(quoting Act of July 18, 1983, ch. 777, § 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 958, 958 (codified as
amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)))).
173. Compare Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 456 (quoting the insurance
policy issued by Farm Bureau, which stated that it would pay UIM coverage "'only after
the limits of liability under any applicable liability bonds or policies have ben [sic]
exhausted by payments of judgments or settlements'" (alteration in original)), with
Silvers, 324 N.C. at 294, 378 S.E.2d at 25 (quoting from an insurance policy providing
UIM coverage that contained the very same language, without the misprint).
174. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 283 S.E.2d at 456; see also supra note 30
(describing the notice requirements under the Act).
175. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 457; see also supra note 110
(describing the procedural requirements).
176. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 48, 483 S.E.2d at 457; see also Gurganious v. Integon
Gen. Ins. Corp., 108 N.C. App. 163, 168, 423 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1992) (asserting that the
insurance company could not complain when the insured took the necessary steps to
recover UIM benefits); supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text (discussing the facts
and the holding in Gurganious).
177. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 49-51, 483 S.E.2d at 457-58.
178. See, e.g., supra note 64 (discussing persons who may engage in interpolicy
stacking).
179. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 50,483 S.E.2d at 458.
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that the 1991 amendment clearly states that a claimant can combine
the UIM coverage available in different policies. 80 The court
recognized that while the statutory language "'vehicle involved in
the accident'" could be interpreted to limit Bost's UIM claim to her
son's policy with Farm Bureau because her son's car was the one
"involved in the accident," the "limits" available to Bost included all
UIM coverage benefits applicable to her.' By broadly construing
the term "limits," the court furthered the general compensatory
policy behind the Act, '2 and its determination accords with the
liberal construction of the Act traditionally afforded by the North
Carolina courts in order to effectuate the remedial purpose of the
Act.
8 3
Perhaps in an attempt to resolve any uncertainty in the area of
settlements in UIM cases, the General Assembly recently amended
the Act.&4 The Act now provides that a person who receives injuries
as a result of an accident with an underinsured motor vehicle may,
"[a]s consideration for payment of policy limits by a liability insurer
on behalf of the owner, operator, or maintainer of an underinsured
motor vehicle, ... execute a contractual covenant not to enforce
against the owner, operator, or maintainer of the vehicle any
judgment that exceeds the policy limits."'"5 The Act further states
that "[a] covenant not to enforce judgment shall not preclude the
injured party from pursuing available underinsured motorist benefits,
180. See id. at 51, 483 S.E.2d at 458. Under the Act, the limit of UIM coverage
applicable to a claimant who has coverage under more than one policy is "the difference
between the amount paid to the claimant under the exhausted liability policy ... and the
total limits of the claimant's underinsured motorist coverages as determined by combining
the highest limit available under each policy." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp.
1997) (emphasis added).
181. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 50, 483 S.E.2d at 457 (quoting the Act following the
1991 amendment). The court thus determined that Onley v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Co., 118 N.C. App. 686, 456 S.E.2d 882 (1995), was on point. See id. at 689, S.E.2d at 884
(permitting interpolicy stacking to determine if a vehicle qualifies under the Act as an
"underinsured highway vehicle"); supra note 99 (discussing Onley).
182. See Sutton v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 325 N.C. 259,265,382 S.E.2d 759,763 (1989)
(noting that the "avowed purpose" of the Financial Responsibility Act is to protect
innocent persons who are injured by financially irresponsible motorists), superseded by
statute as stated in North Carolina Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Stamper, 122 N.C. App.
254, 257, 468 S.E.2d 584, 585-86, disc. rev. denied, 343 N.C. 513, 472 S.E.2d 17 (1996);
supra notes 81-84, 93-98 (discussing the facts and the holding in Sutton).
183. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (recognizing the courts' liberal
construction of the Act in order to effectuate the remunerative goal of the Act and citing
cases supporting a liberal construction of the Act).
184. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, § 2, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 52-55
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4) (Supp. 1997)).
185. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4).
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unless the terms of the covenant expressly provide otherwise. 18 6
The General Assembly also added a new section pertaining to
the effect of a covenant not to enforce judgment in UM claims.'87 In
language similar to the amended UIM provision, the new section
permits a person injured as a result of an uninsured motor vehicle to
"execute a contractual covenant not to enforce against the owner,
operator, or maintainer of the uninsured vehicle any judgment that
exceeds the liability policy limits, as consideration for payment of any
applicable policy limits by the insurer where judgment exceeds the
policy limits." 188  Furthermore, according to the new provision, a
covenant not to enforce judgment does not prevent an injured person
from seeking UM benefits, unless the covenant specifically states
otherwise.189 Even though the court's ruling in Bost pertained only to
a UIM claim, 19 providing new rules concerning a covenant not to
enforce judgment in both UIM and UM claims appears to be a logical
response by the General Assembly.
The court's determination that the agreement constituted a
covenant not to enforce judgment seems to have paved the way for
the latest addition to the Act.191 Interestingly, the General Assembly
seems to have acted on the court's holding in Bost in amending the
Act to include express provisions detailing the effects of a covenant
not to enforce judgment.'9 While the insurance company argued that
Bost should be prevented from pursuing her claim because she signed
a settlement agreement, 9 3 the court accurately emphasized the
narrowness of the agreement. 9 4 The limited release applied only to
186. Id. The Act also certifies that a covenant not to enforce judgment does not
prevent an insurer who provides UIM coverage from seeking subrogation. See id.
187. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, § 3, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 55 (codified
at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21() (Supp. 1997)).
188. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(o.
189. See id.
190. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 43-44, 483 S.E.2d at 454.
191. See Act of Aug. 14, 1997, ch. 396, §§ 2, 3, 1997 N.C. Adv. Legis. Serv. 52, 52-55
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4), () (Supp. 1997)).
192. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-279.21(b)(4), (0.
193. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 45,483 S.E.2d at 455.
194. See id. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455-56; see also supra notes 30-31 and
accompanying text (describing the precise wording of the agreement in Bost). But see
Spivey v. Lowery, 116 N.C. App. 124, 127, 446 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1994) (holding that the
plaintiff's intent to release the tortfeasor as evidenced through her signing a general
release of the tortfeasor also released the UIM carrier); Buchanan v. Buchanan, 83 N.C.
App. 428, 430, 350 S.E.2d 175, 177 (1986) (holding that a general release of the
tortfeasors also released the insurance company as a matter of law and thus precluded
any claim for uninsured motorist benefits); supra notes 144-53 and accompanying text
(discussing Spivey); supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text (discussing Buchanan).
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the tortfeasor, and the agreement specifically preserved Bost's right
to pursue UIM benefits.'95 Moreover, the Act's long-standing
purpose of compensating victims of inadequately insured tortfeasors
offers an overriding principal to guide the courts in cases involving
new circumstances or problems not yet apparent. 6 Thus, the result
in Bost seems logical. Perhaps because the court of appeals
formulated the rule, cases presenting similar issues will not cause
courts as much trouble when interpreting the new amendments.
With both case law and statutory provisions on point, the issue of
settlement agreements would be seemingly less problematic or
litigious. However, until attorneys and lower courts are aware of the
exact effects of a covenant not to enforce judgment, it remains
questionable whether a covenant not to enforce judgment will settle
the issue of when an injured insured can pursue UIM benefits.
KATHRYN CAMERON WALTON
195. See Bost, 126 N.C. App. at 46-47, 483 S.E.2d at 455-56. Bost offers precise
instruction about the correct wording of a covenant not to enforce judgment against the
tortfeasor. See id. at 45-46, 483 S.E.2d at 455. The document, entitled "Settlement
Agreement and Limited Release," should state expressly that the undersigned fully
releases and discharges the tortfeasor from any personal liability arising out of the
accident and also specifically reserve the undersigned's right to recover all available UIM
benefits. See id.
196. See supra note 77 (citing cases that describe the remedial purpose of the Act).
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